Detect One-Way Communication in Google Chronicle
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to a compromised system without receiving return output over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media (GitHub, Twitter/X, Telegram, GitLab, TechNet) to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems may send output back over a different C2 channel or return no output at all. Using common services makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise, and SSL/TLS encryption from Web service providers adds an additional layer of protection.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Command and Control
- Technique
- T1102 Web Service
- Sub-technique
- T1102.003 One-Way Communication
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/003/
YARA-L Detection Query
rule t1102_003_one_way_c2_web_service {
meta:
author = "Argus Detection Engineering"
description = "Detects one-way C2 communication via legitimate web services initiated by suspicious LOLBin or scripting processes (MITRE ATT&CK T1102.003)"
mitre_attack_tactic = "Command and Control"
mitre_attack_technique = "T1102.003"
severity = "HIGH"
priority = "HIGH"
false_positives = "Developer tooling, IT automation scripts, CI/CD pipelines accessing public APIs"
version = "1.0"
events:
$net.metadata.event_type = "NETWORK_CONNECTION"
$net.principal.process.file.full_path = /(?i)(powershell\.exe|pwsh\.exe|cmd\.exe|wscript\.exe|cscript\.exe|mshta\.exe|rundll32\.exe|regsvr32\.exe|certutil\.exe|curl\.exe|wget\.exe|bitsadmin\.exe|msiexec\.exe|python\.exe|python3\.exe|ruby\.exe|node\.exe|wmic\.exe|msbuild\.exe)$/
$net.target.hostname = /(?i)(twitter\.com|x\.com|github\.com|githubusercontent\.com|gitlab\.com|telegram\.org|t\.me|pastebin\.com|paste\.ee|hastebin\.com|discord\.com|discordapp\.com|googleapis\.com|sharepoint\.com|onedrive\.live\.com|reddit\.com|redd\.it|notion\.so|trello\.com|digitalpoint\.com)/
$net.principal.hostname = $hostname
match:
$hostname over 5m
outcome:
$process_name = array_distinct($net.principal.process.file.full_path)
$dest_domain = array_distinct($net.target.hostname)
$command_line = array_distinct($net.principal.process.command_line)
$parent_process = array_distinct($net.principal.process.parent_process.file.full_path)
$is_encoded_cmd = max(if($net.principal.process.command_line = /(?i)(-EncodedCommand|-enc\s|FromBase64String|base64)/, 1, 0))
$is_office_parent = max(if($net.principal.process.parent_process.file.full_path = /(?i)(winword\.exe|excel\.exe|powerpnt\.exe|outlook\.exe|onenote\.exe|msaccess\.exe|acrord32\.exe|acrobat\.exe)/, 1, 0))
$is_service_spawn = max(if($net.principal.process.parent_process.file.full_path = /(?i)(svchost\.exe|taskeng\.exe|taskhostw\.exe|services\.exe|wmiprvse\.exe)/, 1, 0))
$risk_score = max(if($net.principal.process.command_line = /(?i)(-EncodedCommand|-enc\s|FromBase64String|base64)/, 30, 0)) +
max(if($net.principal.process.parent_process.file.full_path = /(?i)(winword\.exe|excel\.exe|powerpnt\.exe|outlook\.exe|onenote\.exe|msaccess\.exe|acrord32\.exe|acrobat\.exe)/, 40, 0)) +
max(if($net.principal.process.parent_process.file.full_path = /(?i)(svchost\.exe|taskeng\.exe|taskhostw\.exe|services\.exe|wmiprvse\.exe)/, 20, 0))
condition:
$net
} Chronicle YARA-L 2.0 rule detecting NETWORK_CONNECTION UDM events from suspicious process executables to hostnames associated with legitimate web platforms commonly abused for T1102.003 one-way C2. Outcomes include process name, destination domain, command line, parent process, and a composite risk score weighted by encoded command use (+30), office application parent (+40), and service-spawned context (+20) to support alert prioritization.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- DevOps tooling such as Terraform provisioners, Ansible playbooks, or Jenkins agents using PowerShell or Python runtimes to interact with GitHub or Google Cloud APIs during automated infrastructure pipelines
- Scripted monitoring solutions that spawn node.exe or curl.exe to probe Discord webhooks or Telegram bot API endpoints for alerting pipeline health checks
- Scheduled compliance or inventory scripts that use certutil.exe or msbuild.exe to fetch current policy baselines from SharePoint repositories
Other platforms for T1102.003
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1PowerShell C2 Polling via Pastebin Raw URL
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=powershell.exe, CommandLine containing 'Invoke-WebRequest', 'pastebin.com/raw', 'Invoke-Expression', '-WindowStyle Hidden'. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network Connection to pastebin.com on port 443. Sysmon Event ID 22: DNS query for pastebin.com. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 with the full script content.
- Test 2Python Script Polling GitHub Raw Content for Commands
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=python.exe, CommandLine containing 'raw.githubusercontent.com' and urllib. Sysmon Event ID 3: Three successive network connections to raw.githubusercontent.com on port 443, approximately 30 seconds apart. Sysmon Event ID 22: DNS queries for raw.githubusercontent.com.
- Test 3Curl Silent Polling of Telegram Bot API
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=curl.exe, CommandLine containing '-s', '-o', 'api.telegram.org', 'getUpdates'. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network Connection to api.telegram.org on port 443. Sysmon Event ID 11: File creation at %TEMP%\tg_response.txt. Sysmon Event ID 22: DNS query for api.telegram.org.
- Test 4Scheduled Task Simulating Periodic Web Service C2 Poll
Expected signal: Security Event ID 4698 (Scheduled Task Created) with task name 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTaskMachineUA_ARGUSTEST' and command containing 'raw.githubusercontent.com'. Sysmon Event ID 1: schtasks.exe process creation. Registry event for new task in HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache. On execution: Sysmon Event ID 1 for powershell.exe spawned by taskeng.exe/taskhostw.exe, Sysmon Event ID 3 for network connection to raw.githubusercontent.com.
References (10)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/003/
- https://www.prevailion.com/darkwatchman-a-new-javascript-rat/
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/gamaredon-group-russia-linked-threat-actor/
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/lotus-blossom-sagerunex/
- https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes_whitepaper.pdf
- https://www.volexity.com/blog/2024/04/12/zero-day-exploitation-of-unauthenticated-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-in-globalprotect/
- https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1102.003/T1102.003.md
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-using-wellmess-malware-to-target-covid19-vaccine-development
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