Detect Device Registration in IBM QRadar
Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account to establish persistence or escalate privileges. Devices may be registered in an MFA system (Duo, Okta) to bypass multi-factor authentication requirements, or registered in a device management system (Entra ID, Intune) to access sensitive data while bypassing conditional access policies. APT29 has enrolled attacker-controlled devices into compromised Azure AD tenants. Tools like AADInternals can automate device registration to Entra ID. Adversaries may also exploit self-enrollment workflows that require only a username and password for dormant or first-device scenarios.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Persistence Privilege Escalation
- Technique
- T1098 Account Manipulation
- Sub-technique
- T1098.005 Device Registration
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/005/
QRadar Detection Query
SELECT
DATEFORMAT(MIN(starttime), 'YYYY-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS first_registration,
DATEFORMAT(MAX(starttime), 'YYYY-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS last_registration,
username AS initiated_by_upn,
sourceip AS source_ip,
COUNT(*) AS registration_count,
LOGSOURCENAME(logsourceid) AS log_source_name,
QIDNAME(qid) AS event_name
FROM events
WHERE LOGSOURCETYPENAME(devicetype) LIKE '%Azure Active Directory%'
AND (
QIDNAME(qid) LIKE '%Add device%'
OR QIDNAME(qid) LIKE '%Register device%'
OR QIDNAME(qid) LIKE '%Add registered owner to device%'
OR QIDNAME(qid) LIKE '%Add registered users to device%'
OR QIDNAME(qid) LIKE '%Update device%'
OR QIDNAME(qid) LIKE '%Enroll device%'
)
AND "result" = 'success'
LAST 24 HOURS
GROUP BY
username,
sourceip
HAVING
COUNT(*) >= 1
ORDER BY
registration_count DESCDetects T1098.005 device registration abuse in Azure AD audit events ingested into IBM QRadar via the Microsoft Azure Active Directory DSM. Aggregates successful device registration operations by initiating user and source IP over the last 24 hours. The HAVING clause is intentionally permissive (>= 1) so analysts see all registrations ranked by count; triage by focusing on accounts with registration_count >= 3 or source IPs associated with known anonymisers. The QIDNAME-based filter relies on QRadar's DSM-parsed event name fields rather than raw payload parsing.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- IT helpdesk staff enrolling multiple devices during a hardware refresh or new-employee onboarding wave from a shared provisioning workstation
- Service accounts used by automated MDM workflows (Intune Autopilot, Windows Autopilot) that sequentially register a batch of pre-staged devices
- Conditional Access re-enrollment storms when a new device compliance policy forces all users to re-register within a short window
- Azure AD hybrid join synchronisation during initial Azure AD Connect deployment that registers all on-premises machines at once
Other platforms for T1098.005
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Register Device to Entra ID using AADInternals PowerShell Module
Expected signal: Azure AD AuditLogs: OperationName='Add device' with actor UPN, source IP, and DeviceName='TestDevice-AtomicTest'. Result='success'. The initiating app will appear as an unexpected application ID (not standard Intune). SigninLogs will show token acquisition event from the same session.
- Test 2MFA Device Enrollment on Dormant Account Using Only Password
Expected signal: Azure AD AuditLogs: OperationName='User registered security info' or 'User started security info registration' and 'Update user' with modified properties showing phoneAuthenticationMethod added. SigninLogs: ROPC flow authentication (non-interactive) from the test IP. Identity Protection may flag the ROPC sign-in as risky.
- Test 3Bulk Device Registration to Entra ID via Graph API
Expected signal: Azure AD AuditLogs: 5 separate 'Add device' events within ~10 seconds from the same actor UPN and IP address. Each event will have Result='success' and DeviceName='AtomicTestDevice-Bulk-{1-5}'. The rapid succession of registrations will be visible in the timestamp sequence.
- Test 4Register Device to Entra ID Using Existing PRT (Primary Refresh Token) via dsregcmd
Expected signal: Azure AD AuditLogs: OperationName='Add device' or 'Register device' with DeviceName matching the machine's hostname. Initiated by the currently logged-on user. Windows Event Log (System): Event ID 4648 or Events from Microsoft-Windows-User Device Registration source. Certificate created in CERT:\LocalMachine\My for the device.
References (14)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/005/
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-continues-targeting-microsoft
- https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-074a
- https://o365blog.com/post/devices/
- https://o365blog.com/post/mdm
- https://o365blog.com/post/bprt/
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/26/evolved-phishing-device-registration-trick-adds-to-phishers-toolbox-for-victims-without-mfa
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/devices/overview
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
- https://expel.com/blog/observing-atlas-lion-part-one/
- https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/fireeye-s-mandia-severity-zero-alert-led-to-discovery-of-solarwinds-attack
- https://github.com/dirkjanm/ROADtools
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/device-post-devices
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