T1092 Google Chronicle · YARA-L

Detect Communication Through Removable Media in Google Chronicle

Adversaries can perform command and control between compromised hosts on potentially disconnected networks using removable media to transfer commands from system to system. Both systems would need to be compromised, with the likelihood that an Internet-connected system was compromised first and the second through lateral movement via Replication Through Removable Media. Commands and files are relayed from the disconnected system to the Internet-connected system to which the adversary has direct access. This technique has been observed in APT28/Fancy Bear operations using CHOPSTICK and USBStealer malware to bridge air-gapped networks, writing encoded command files to USB drives on internet-connected hosts and reading results from the same media when re-inserted.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Command and Control
Technique
T1092 Communication Through Removable Media
Canonical reference
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1092/

YARA-L Detection Query

Google Chronicle (YARA-L)
yaral
rule T1092_CommunicationThroughRemovableMedia {
  meta:
    author = "Argus Detection Engineering"
    description = "Detects T1092 Communication Through Removable Media - identifies executable or encoded data files written to removable drives, processes executing from removable drives, and rapid file access patterns after USB mount events."
    mitre_attack_tactic = "Command and Control"
    mitre_attack_technique = "T1092"
    severity = "HIGH"
    confidence = "MEDIUM"
    created = "2026-04-13"
    version = "1.0"

  events:
    (
      // Branch 1: Executable or script dropped to USB drive
      $e1.metadata.event_type = "FILE_CREATION"
      and (
        $e1.target.file.full_path = /^[D-Id-i]:\\/i
      )
      and (
        $e1.target.file.full_path = /\.(exe|dll|bat|cmd|ps1|vbs|js|hta|dat|bin|enc|tmp|cfg|db)$/i
      )
      and not $e1.principal.process.file.full_path = /explorer\.exe$/i
      and not $e1.principal.process.file.full_path = /robocopy\.exe$/i
    )
    or
    (
      // Branch 2: Process executed from removable media path
      $e1.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
      and (
        $e1.target.process.file.full_path = /^[D-Id-i]:\\/i
        or re.regex($e1.target.process.command_line, `[D-Id-i]:\\`)
      )
      and not $e1.target.process.file.full_path = /setup\.exe$/i
      and not $e1.target.process.file.full_path = /install\.exe$/i
      and not $e1.target.process.file.full_path = /autorun\.exe$/i
    )
    or
    (
      // Branch 3: Encoded/data file written to USB (C2 staging)
      $e1.metadata.event_type = "FILE_CREATION"
      and (
        $e1.target.file.full_path = /^[D-Id-i]:\\/i
      )
      and (
        $e1.target.file.full_path = /\.(enc|tmp|cfg|dat|bin|db)$/i
      )
      and not $e1.principal.process.file.full_path = /explorer\.exe$/i
      and not $e1.principal.process.file.full_path = /backup\.exe$/i
    )

  condition:
    $e1
}
high severity medium confidence

Chronicle YARA-L 2.0 rule detecting T1092 Communication Through Removable Media using UDM events. Three detection branches: (1) executable/script files written to removable drive letters D-I, (2) process launch events where the process binary or command line path originates from removable media, (3) encoded or data staging files written to USB paths by non-legitimate backup processes. Maps directly to the KQL/SPL behavioral logic.

Data Sources

Google Chronicle SIEMWindows Event Logs via Chronicle forwarderCrowdStrike Falcon via Chronicle ingestionCarbon Black via Chronicle ingestion

Required Tables

UDM Events - FILE_CREATIONUDM Events - PROCESS_LAUNCH

False Positives & Tuning

  • Corporate imaging workflows where Windows PE environment writes OS installer files to USB drives via DISM or WinPE tools
  • Legitimate use of portable security scanners (ClamAV portable, Malwarebytes portable) executed from USB by IT helpdesk during malware remediation
  • Software development workflows where developers run build artifacts directly from USB for quick testing on isolated lab machines without network access
Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1092


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Stage Encoded Command File on USB Drive

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11 (FileCreate): TargetFilename=E:\system.dat, Image=powershell.exe. Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Create): CommandLine containing 'Out-File' and 'E:\'. DeviceFileEvents in MDE: ActionType=FileCreated, FolderPath=E:\, FileName=system.dat, InitiatingProcessFileName=powershell.exe.

  2. Test 2Execute Payload from USB Drive

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Create): Image=cmd.exe, CommandLine=cmd.exe /c E:\update.bat. Parent process is cmd.exe or the test shell. Sysmon Event ID 11: TargetFilename=E:\update.bat and E:\output.dat. Security Event ID 4688 (if command line auditing enabled): NewProcessName contains E:\update.bat. DeviceProcessEvents: FileName=cmd.exe, ProcessCommandLine contains 'E:\update.bat'.

  3. Test 3Automated USB File Pickup Simulation

    Expected signal: Multiple Sysmon Event ID 11 entries for file creation on E:\ by powershell.exe (cmd_*.dat and rsp_*.dat). Sysmon Event ID 1: PowerShell process with Get-Content and Out-File accessing removable drive. DeviceFileEvents: multiple FileCreated and FileRead actions on E:\ within a short time window — triggers the rapid-access-after-mount correlation branch.

  4. Test 4USB Device Serial Number Enumeration

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: powershell.exe with CommandLine containing 'USBSTOR' and 'Win32_DiskDrive'. Security Event ID 4663 (if object access auditing enabled on registry): access to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\USBSTOR. DeviceProcessEvents: PowerShell process accessing registry via Get-ItemProperty with USBSTOR path.

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