T1090.003 Google Chronicle · YARA-L

Detect Multi-hop Proxy in Google Chronicle

Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise the source of malicious traffic. Techniques include Tor onion routing, ProxyChains, SOCKS proxy chaining, operational relay box (ORB) networks, and peer-to-peer routing to make attribution difficult. Defenders can typically only see the last hop before their network boundary.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Command and Control
Technique
T1090 Proxy
Sub-technique
T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy
Canonical reference
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003/

YARA-L Detection Query

Google Chronicle (YARA-L)
yaral
rule t1090_003_multi_hop_proxy_process_launch {
  meta:
    author = "Argus Detection Engineering"
    description = "Detects T1090.003 - Multi-hop proxy via known proxy tool execution and SSH dynamic forwarding"
    mitre_attack_tactic = "Command and Control"
    mitre_attack_technique = "T1090.003"
    severity = "HIGH"
    confidence = "HIGH"

  events:
    $e.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
    (
      re.regex($e.target.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(tor\.exe|proxychains|proxifier\.exe|3proxy\.exe|srelay\.exe|microsocks|redsocks|plink\.exe)`)
      or re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)(proxychains|socks5|socks4a?|tor2web|proxyjump|proxycommand|dynamicforward)`)
      or (
        re.regex($e.target.process.file.full_path, `(?i)[\\/]ssh(\.exe)?$|plink\.exe$`)
        and re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)(\s-[DJw]\s|proxyjump|proxycommand)`)
      )
    )

  condition:
    $e
}

rule t1090_003_tor_port_network_connection {
  meta:
    author = "Argus Detection Engineering"
    description = "Detects T1090.003 - Outbound network connection to Tor relay ports on public IP addresses"
    mitre_attack_tactic = "Command and Control"
    mitre_attack_technique = "T1090.003"
    severity = "HIGH"
    confidence = "HIGH"

  events:
    $e.metadata.event_type = "NETWORK_CONNECTION"
    $e.network.direction = "OUTBOUND"
    $e.target.port in (9001, 9030, 9040, 9050, 9051, 9150, 9151)
    not net.ip_in_range_cidr($e.target.ip, "10.0.0.0/8")
    not net.ip_in_range_cidr($e.target.ip, "172.16.0.0/12")
    not net.ip_in_range_cidr($e.target.ip, "192.168.0.0/16")
    not net.ip_in_range_cidr($e.target.ip, "127.0.0.0/8")

  condition:
    $e
}
high severity high confidence

Two complementary Chronicle YARA-L 2.0 rules detecting T1090.003. Rule 1 (t1090_003_multi_hop_proxy_process_launch) fires on PROCESS_LAUNCH UDM events where the target process full path matches known proxy tool filenames or the command line contains SOCKS proxy keywords, Tor-related arguments, SSH dynamic forwarding flags, ProxyJump, or ProxyCommand patterns. Rule 2 (t1090_003_tor_port_network_connection) fires on NETWORK_CONNECTION UDM events that are outbound, target Tor relay ports, and destinate to non-RFC1918 public addresses using Chronicle's built-in net.ip_in_range_cidr function for accurate CIDR exclusion.

Data Sources

Chronicle UDM PROCESS_LAUNCH events from endpoint telemetryChronicle UDM NETWORK_CONNECTION events from network sensors or EDRGoogle Cloud Chronicle Forwarder ingesting Sysmon or CrowdStrike data

Required Tables

UDM events with metadata.event_type = PROCESS_LAUNCHUDM events with metadata.event_type = NETWORK_CONNECTION

False Positives & Tuning

  • Authorized red team or penetration testing personnel running Tor, plink, or ProxyChains on Chronicle-enrolled endpoints during documented, scoped engagements
  • DevOps or SRE teams establishing SSH dynamic port forwarding (-D) or multi-hop ProxyJump chains to reach services in isolated network segments as part of standard access procedures
  • OSINT analysts or threat intelligence researchers using Tor Browser on corporate devices to access dark web resources under an approved, policy-documented research exception
Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1090.003


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Launch Tor Process as SOCKS Proxy

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image path in %TEMP%\tortest\tor\tor.exe and CommandLine containing --SocksPort 9050. Sysmon Event ID 3: Multiple outbound TCP connections to public IPs on ports 9001 and 9030 (Tor directory and guard connections). Sysmon Event ID 11: File creation events for tor.exe and torrc in non-standard temp path.

  2. Test 2ProxyChains Multi-hop Configuration and Execution

    Expected signal: Linux auditd/syslog: Process creation for proxychains4 with command line referencing the config file. Sysmon for Linux (if deployed) Event ID 1: Process Create for proxychains4 with full command line. Network connection attempts through the configured SOCKS chain. File creation event for /tmp/test_proxychains.conf.

  3. Test 3SSH Dynamic Port Forwarding (Multi-hop SOCKS Proxy)

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1 (Linux) or Security Event ID 4688 (Windows with OpenSSH): Process Create for ssh with CommandLine containing '-D 1080' or '-J jumphost.example.com'. Sysmon Event ID 3: Outbound TCP connection to 192.0.2.1:22 and jumphost.example.com:22. The -D flag creates a listening socket on local port 1080 visible in netstat/socket monitoring.

  4. Test 4SOCKS Proxy via Netcat/Ncat Relay Chain Simulation

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Multiple ncat.exe or nc.exe process creation events with -l (listen) and -c (command/forward) flags. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network listen and connection events on ports 18080 and 18081. Security Event ID 4688 (if command line auditing enabled): ncat.exe process creation with forwarding arguments.

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