T1090.001 IBM QRadar · QRadar

Detect Internal Proxy in IBM QRadar

Adversaries may use an internal proxy to direct command and control traffic between two or more systems in a compromised environment. Tools such as HTRAN, ZXProxy, ZXPortMap, and Cobalt Strike's peer-to-peer beacon mode enable traffic redirection through proxies or port forwarding. Adversaries use internal proxies to manage C2 communications inside a compromised environment, reduce the number of simultaneous outbound connections, provide resiliency, or ride over existing trusted communications paths between infected systems. Internal proxy connections may use common protocols such as SMB to blend in with normal traffic.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Command and Control
Technique
T1090 Proxy
Sub-technique
T1090.001 Internal Proxy
Canonical reference
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/001/

QRadar Detection Query

IBM QRadar (QRadar)
sql
SELECT
  DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS event_time,
  sourceip,
  username,
  LOGSOURCENAME(logsourceid) AS log_source,
  CATEGORYNAME(category) AS category_name,
  "Process Name",
  "Command",
  CASE
    WHEN LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES '(htran|zxproxy|lcx\.exe|socat|chisel|ligolo|frpc|frps|earthworm|ew\.exe|gost|iox|revsocks|venom)'
      OR LOWER("Command") MATCHES '(htran|zxproxy|lcx|earthworm|chisel|ligolo|frpc|frps|gost|iox|revsocks|pivotnacci|rpivot)'
    THEN 'KnownProxyTool'
    WHEN LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES 'netsh\.exe'
      AND LOWER("Command") MATCHES 'portproxy'
      AND LOWER("Command") MATCHES 'add'
    THEN 'NetshPortProxy'
    WHEN LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES '(ssh\.exe|plink\.exe|ssh)'
      AND LOWER("Command") MATCHES '(\s-[lrd]\s|localforward|remoteforward|gatewayports|allowtcpforwarding|-w \d)'
    THEN 'SSHTunneling'
    WHEN LOWER("Command") MATCHES '(v4tov4|listenport=|connectport=|connectaddress=|listenaddress=)'
    THEN 'PortForwardCommand'
    ELSE 'Unknown'
  END AS detection_type
FROM events
WHERE
  LOGSOURCETYPEID IN (12, 13, 14, 314, 352)
  AND starttime > (NOW() - 86400000)
  AND (
    LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES '(htran|zxproxy|lcx\.exe|socat|chisel|ligolo|frpc|frps|earthworm|ew\.exe|gost|iox|revsocks|venom)'
    OR LOWER("Command") MATCHES '(htran|zxproxy|lcx|earthworm|chisel|ligolo|frpc|frps|gost|iox|revsocks|pivotnacci|rpivot|v4tov4|listenport=|connectport=|connectaddress=|listenaddress=)'
    OR (
      LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES 'netsh\.exe'
      AND LOWER("Command") MATCHES 'portproxy'
      AND LOWER("Command") MATCHES 'add'
    )
    OR (
      LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES '(ssh\.exe|plink\.exe)'
      AND LOWER("Command") MATCHES '(\s-[lrld]\s|localforward|remoteforward|gatewayports|-w \d)'
    )
  )
ORDER BY starttime DESC
LIMIT 500
high severity medium confidence

AQL detection for internal proxy tool execution and port forwarding. Queries Windows Security (4688) and Sysmon (Event ID 1) log sources for known proxy binaries, netsh portproxy configuration, SSH tunneling flags, and port forwarding command-line parameters.

Data Sources

Windows Security Event LogSysmonMicrosoft Sysmon for Linux

Required Tables

events

False Positives & Tuning

  • Legitimate IT automation scripts that use netsh portproxy to redirect ports for application compatibility shims
  • Security tools or SIEM agents that use SSH with port forwarding flags for log collection or remote administration
  • Network monitoring software (e.g., SolarWinds, PRTG agents) that uses socat or netcat-like utilities for probe connectivity
Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1090.001


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 5 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Netsh PortProxy Rule Creation for Internal Traffic Forwarding

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=netsh.exe, CommandLine containing 'portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=8080'. Security Event ID 4688 (with command line auditing). Sysmon Event ID 13: Registry value set in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\PortProxy\v4tov4\tcp. Windows Firewall may log new listening port.

  2. Test 2SSH Local Port Forwarding for Internal Proxy Pivot

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=ssh.exe, CommandLine containing '-L 9090:192.168.1.50:445'. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network Connection attempt from ssh.exe to 10.0.0.1:22. Security Event ID 4688 if command line auditing is enabled.

  3. Test 3Chisel Reverse Proxy Tool Execution

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=chisel.exe (or renamed binary), CommandLine containing 'client' and 'R:socks' or 'socks'. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network Connection attempt from chisel.exe to 10.0.0.99:8443. File hash of chisel.exe will match known threat intelligence indicators.

  4. Test 4HTRAN-Style Port Forwarding with Netcat

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for cmd.exe spawning nc.exe with '-l -p 4444 -e cmd.exe'. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network Connection showing nc.exe listening on 0.0.0.0:4444. Windows Firewall event for new inbound rule exception (if UAC prompt accepted).

  5. Test 5Linux SOCKS Proxy via SSH Dynamic Forwarding

    Expected signal: Auditd syscall logs showing execve for ssh with -D 1080 arguments. Syslog entry for ssh process. Network connection attempt to 192.168.1.10:22. Process listing shows ssh with -D flag in /proc/<pid>/cmdline.

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Get the full detection package for T1090.001 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.

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