T1087.004 Google Chronicle · YARA-L

Detect Cloud Account in Google Chronicle

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of cloud accounts. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. With authenticated access, tools such as Get-MsolRoleMember, az ad user list, aws iam list-users, aws iam list-roles, and gcloud iam service-accounts list can enumerate cloud accounts across Azure AD, AWS IAM, and GCP. Tools like ROADTools, AADInternals, AzureHound, and Pacu have been used by threat actors including APT29 and Storm-0501 to conduct this activity.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Discovery
Technique
T1087 Account Discovery
Sub-technique
T1087.004 Cloud Account
Canonical reference
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/004/

YARA-L Detection Query

Google Chronicle (YARA-L)
yaral
rule t1087_004_cloud_account_enumeration {
  meta:
    author = "Argus Detection Engineering"
    description = "Detects cloud account enumeration via scripting interpreters targeting Azure AD, AWS IAM, GCP IAM, and offensive frameworks (AzureHound, ROADtools, Pacu, AADInternals)"
    mitre_attack_tactic = "Discovery"
    mitre_attack_technique = "T1087.004"
    severity = "HIGH"
    confidence = "HIGH"

  events:
    $e.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
    $e.target.process.file.full_path = /powershell\.exe$|pwsh\.exe$|cmd\.exe$|python3?\.exe$/ nocase
    $e.target.process.command_line = /Get-MsolRoleMember|Get-MsolUser|Get-AzureADUser|Get-AzADUser|Get-MsolGroupMember|Get-MsolServicePrincipal|az\s+ad\s+user\s+list|az\s+ad\s+sp\s+list|az\s+role\s+assignment\s+list|az\s+account\s+list|aws\s+iam\s+list-users|aws\s+iam\s+list-roles|aws\s+iam\s+list-groups|aws\s+iam\s+get-account-authorization-details|gcloud\s+iam\s+service-accounts\s+list|gcloud\s+projects\s+get-iam-policy|gcloud\s+organizations\s+get-iam-policy|Invoke-AzureHound|roadrecon|roadtools|AADInternals|Get-AADInt|Invoke-Pacu/ nocase

  condition:
    $e
}
high severity high confidence

Chronicle YARA-L 2.0 rule using UDM PROCESS_LAUNCH events to detect cloud account enumeration. Matches process launches from common scripting interpreters whose command lines contain known Azure AD, AWS IAM, GCP gcloud, or offensive framework enumeration patterns. Uses RE2 regex with nocase modifier across all endpoint telemetry ingested into Chronicle UDM.

Data Sources

Chronicle Forwarder (Windows Event Logs via Sysmon/Security)Google Workspace Chronicle integrationCrowdStrike Falcon telemetry via Chronicle UDM ingestionCarbon Black EDR via Chronicle UDM

Required Tables

UDM events with metadata.event_type = PROCESS_LAUNCH

False Positives & Tuning

  • Cloud infrastructure automation tools such as Terraform, Pulumi, or Ansible executing IAM enumeration during state reconciliation, drift detection, or infrastructure provisioning on monitored hosts
  • Security operations center analysts running cloud account audits with administrative PowerShell on dedicated privileged access workstations (PAWs) during quarterly access review cycles
  • Automated employee onboarding or offboarding workflows in HR platforms (ServiceNow, Workday integrations) invoking az/aws/gcloud CLIs to manage user lifecycle events from orchestration servers
Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1087.004


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 5 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Azure AD User Enumeration via AZ CLI

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=cmd.exe or powershell.exe, CommandLine containing 'az ad user list'. The Azure AD Audit Log will record 'List users' operations attributed to the authenticated service principal or user.

  2. Test 2AWS IAM User and Role Enumeration

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for each aws CLI invocation with CommandLine containing 'aws iam list-users', 'aws iam list-roles', and 'aws iam get-account-authorization-details'. Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create for iam_dump.json in TEMP directory. AWS CloudTrail will record ListUsers, ListRoles, GetAccountAuthorizationDetails API calls.

  3. Test 3Azure AD Enumeration via PowerShell MSOnline Module

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=powershell.exe, CommandLine containing 'Get-MsolUser', 'Get-MsolRoleMember'. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 with full module import and cmdlet invocation. Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create for msol_users.csv. Azure AD Audit Logs will record 'List users' and 'Get member' operations.

  4. Test 4GCP IAM Service Account Enumeration

    Expected signal: Linux auditd or syslog: process execution of gcloud with arguments 'iam service-accounts list' and 'projects get-iam-policy'. GCP Cloud Audit Logs will record iam.serviceAccounts.list and cloudresourcemanager.projects.getIamPolicy Admin Activity operations attributed to the authenticated user or service account.

  5. Test 5Azure AD Enumeration via ROADTools (roadrecon)

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for pip install (python.exe) and roadrecon.exe invocations with 'auth' and 'gather' subcommands. Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create for roadrecon_output.db in TEMP directory. Network connections from python.exe to login.microsoftonline.com and graph.microsoft.com. Azure AD Audit Logs will show bulk 'List users', 'List groups', 'List applications' operations.

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