Which SIEM platforms have a T1078.003 detection rule?

df00tech provides T1078.003 (Local Accounts) detection queries for 7 SIEM platforms: Microsoft Sentinel / Defender, Splunk, Elastic Security (EQL), IBM QRadar (AQL), Sumo Logic CSE, Google Chronicle / SecOps, CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL).

What data sources are required to detect Local Accounts (T1078.003)?

Detecting Local Accounts requires the following data sources: Logon: Logon, User Account: User Account Creation, User Account: User Account Modification, Windows Security Event Log.

What severity and confidence is the T1078.003 detection?

The T1078.003 detection is rated high severity with medium confidence.

What are common false positives for T1078.003?

Common false positives for T1078.003 include: IT helpdesk creating local accounts for break-glass or emergency access scenarios (expected during documented maintenance windows); Software installation procedures that create local service accounts (e.g., SQL Server, antivirus agents, monitoring tools installing their own local accounts); Remote management tools (e.g., LAPS, PDQ Deploy, SCCM) authenticating to endpoints using the local administrator account for legitimate patching or management tasks.

T1078.003 IBM QRadar · QRadar

Detect Local Accounts in IBM QRadar

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. Adversaries may target dormant local accounts, brute-force local admin credentials, create new local accounts, or reuse harvested credentials across multiple systems. This technique is commonly observed in ransomware operations, APT lateral movement, and post-exploitation frameworks such as Cobalt Strike.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic: Defense Evasion Persistence Privilege Escalation Initial Access
Technique: T1078 Valid Accounts
Sub-technique: T1078.003 Local Accounts
Canonical reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003/

QRadar Detection Query

IBM QRadar (QRadar)

sql

SELECT
  DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS event_time,
  devicehostname AS computer,
  username AS target_username,
  "Account Domain" AS target_domain,
  QIDNAME(qid) AS event_name,
  eventid AS event_code,
  sourceip,
  CASE
    WHEN eventid = 4720 THEN 'LocalAccountCreated'
    WHEN eventid = 4722 THEN 'LocalAccountEnabled'
    WHEN eventid = 4732 THEN 'AddedToAdministrators'
    WHEN eventid = 4624 THEN 'NetworkLogonLocalAccount'
    WHEN eventid = 4625 THEN 'FailedLogonLocalAccount'
    WHEN eventid = 4648 THEN 'ExplicitCredentialUseLocalAccount'
    ELSE 'Other'
  END AS event_type,
  CASE
    WHEN eventid = 4720 THEN 3
    WHEN eventid = 4722 THEN 2
    WHEN eventid = 4732 THEN 4
    WHEN eventid = 4624 THEN 2
    WHEN eventid = 4625 THEN 1
    WHEN eventid = 4648 THEN 3
    ELSE 1
  END AS risk_score
FROM events
WHERE
  LOGSOURCETYPENAME(devicetype) ILIKE '%Windows%'
  AND eventid IN (4720, 4722, 4732, 4624, 4625, 4648)
  AND (
    "Account Domain" = '.'
    OR "Account Domain" = ''
    OR LOWER("Account Domain") = LOWER(devicehostname)
  )
  AND username NOT IN (
    'ANONYMOUS LOGON', 'LOCAL SERVICE', 'NETWORK SERVICE',
    'SYSTEM', 'DWM-1', 'DWM-2', 'DWM-3', 'UMFD-0', 'UMFD-1'
  )
  AND username IS NOT NULL
  AND username != ''
  AND (
    eventid != 4624
    OR (
      "Logon Type" IN ('3', '10')
      AND sourceip NOT IN ('127.0.0.1', '::1', '-')
    )
  )
  AND starttime > NOW() - 1 DAYS
ORDER BY starttime DESC, risk_score DESC

high severity medium confidence

AQL query for IBM QRadar detecting local account abuse on Windows systems. Identifies new local account creation, reactivation of dormant accounts, elevation to local Administrators group, network/remote interactive logons using local accounts, explicit credential use, and failed logon attempts. Filters on TargetDomainName matching the machine name, dot notation, or empty string to distinguish local from domain accounts.

Data Sources

Windows Security Event Log forwarded to QRadar via WinCollect or syslog

Required Tables

events

False Positives & Tuning

Domain-joined workstations where the computer name partially matches a domain name, causing legitimate domain logons to be misclassified as local account logons
Scheduled tasks or services configured to run under local accounts on servers, generating frequent Type 3 logon events during normal operation
Password reset or account provisioning workflows that create and enable local accounts in bulk as part of automated onboarding processes

Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1078.003

Microsoft Sentinel (KQL) Splunk (SPL) Elastic Security (Elastic) Sumo Logic CSE (Sumo) Google Chronicle (YARA-L) CrowdStrike LogScale (LogScale) All platforms (combined) →

Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 5 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

Test 1Create Backdoor Local Admin Account
Expected signal: Security EventID 4720: New local account 'argus_test_backdoor' created (TargetDomainName will match ComputerName). Security EventID 4732: Account added to Administrators group (TargetUserName=Administrators). Security EventID 4722: Account enabled. Process creation events for net.exe and net1.exe (Sysmon EventID 1 or Security EventID 4688).
Test 2Brute Force Local Administrator Account
Expected signal: 15x Security EventID 4625 (logon failure) with TargetUserName=Administrator, LogonType=3, IpAddress=127.0.0.1. Failure reason 0xC000006D (wrong password) or 0xC000006A. SubStatus 0xC0000064 or 0xC000006A. Events will appear in rapid succession within a 1-minute window.
Test 3Pass-the-Hash Style Lateral Movement Using Local Account Credentials
Expected signal: Security EventID 4648 (explicit credentials used) on the initiating host with TargetUserName=Administrator, TargetDomainName=<COMPUTERNAME>. Security EventID 4624 (LogonType=3) on the target with TargetUserName=Administrator, TargetDomainName=<COMPUTERNAME>, IpAddress of initiating host. Sysmon EventID 3: network connection to destination port 445.
Test 4Enable and Use Disabled Built-in Administrator Account via Registry
Expected signal: Security EventID 4722 (local account enabled) with TargetUserName=Administrator. Security EventID 4723 or 4724 (password change/reset) for the Administrator account. Process creation events for net.exe (Sysmon EventID 1). If the account is then used for logon, EventID 4624 with TargetUserName=Administrator and LogonType matching the access method.
Test 5Linux Local Account Abuse — Create Privileged User and Switch Context
Expected signal: Syslog/auth.log: useradd command execution, new user creation entry. /var/log/auth.log or /var/log/secure: PAM authentication events for su session. auditd (if configured): syscall audit records for useradd (execve), usermod (execve), write to /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow. Sysmon for Linux (if deployed): process creation events for useradd, usermod, chpasswd, su.

Last updated: 2026-04-18 Research depth: deep

References (13)

Response Playbook

1. Examine the full command line and decode any Base64 content...
2. Identify the parent process chain and user context...
3. Check for concurrent network connections from the process...

Investigation Guide

Related techniques: T1027, T1105, T1562.001...
Forensic artifacts: PSReadLine history, Prefetch, ScriptBlock logs...

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1: Encoded command execution...
Test 2: Download cradle via Net.WebClient...

Unlock Pro Content

Get the full detection package for T1078.003 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.

Response PlaybookInvestigation GuideHunting QueriesAtomic Red Team TestsTuning Guidance

Detect Local Accounts in IBM QRadar

MITRE ATT&CK

QRadar Detection Query

Data Sources

Required Tables

False Positives & Tuning

Other platforms for T1078.003

Testing Methodology

Response Playbook

Investigation Guide

Atomic Red Team Tests

Unlock Pro Content

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Same Tactic: Defense Evasion

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MITRE ATT&CK

QRadar Detection Query

Data Sources

Required Tables

False Positives & Tuning

Other platforms for T1078.003

Testing Methodology

Unlock Pro Content

Related Detections

Parent Technique

Related Sub-techniques

Related Techniques

Same Tactic: Defense Evasion

Popular Detections

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