Detect Domain Accounts in Splunk
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services. Adversaries may compromise domain accounts, some with a high level of privileges, through various means such as OS Credential Dumping or password reuse, allowing access to privileged resources of the domain.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Technique
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- Sub-technique
- T1078.002 Domain Accounts
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002/
SPL Detection Query
| tstats summariesonly=false count as TotalEvents,
count(eval(EventCode=4624)) as SuccessCount,
count(eval(EventCode=4625)) as FailureCount
from datamodel=Authentication
where nodename=Authentication.Failed_Authentication OR nodename=Authentication.Successful_Authentication
by Authentication.user, Authentication.src, Authentication.dest, _time span=1h
| fields - _timediff
```
Use the raw search below for full fidelity:
```
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" (EventCode=4624 OR EventCode=4625 OR EventCode=4648 OR EventCode=4672 OR EventCode=4697 OR EventCode=4698)
| eval LogonType=if(EventCode=4624 OR EventCode=4625, LogonType, "N/A")
| eval AccountDomain=coalesce(TargetDomainName, SubjectDomainName)
| eval AccountName=coalesce(TargetUserName, SubjectUserName)
| where AccountDomain!="" AND AccountDomain!="NT AUTHORITY" AND AccountDomain!="Window Manager" AND AccountDomain!="Font Driver Host"
| where NOT match(AccountName, "\$$") `comment("Exclude machine accounts")`
| eval EventType=case(
EventCode=4624, "SuccessfulLogon",
EventCode=4625, "FailedLogon",
EventCode=4648, "ExplicitCredentialUse",
EventCode=4672, "SpecialPrivilegeLogon",
EventCode=4697, "ServiceInstalled",
EventCode=4698, "ScheduledTaskCreated",
true(), "Other"
)
| eval IsNetworkLogon=if(EventCode=4624 AND LogonType=3, 1, 0)
| eval IsRemoteInteractive=if(EventCode=4624 AND LogonType=10, 1, 0)
| eval IsOffHours=if(tonumber(strftime(_time, "%H")) < 7 OR tonumber(strftime(_time, "%H")) > 19, 1, 0)
| eval IsExplicitCred=if(EventCode=4648, 1, 0)
| eval IsPersistence=if(EventCode=4697 OR EventCode=4698, 1, 0)
| eval SignalScore=IsNetworkLogon + IsRemoteInteractive + IsOffHours + IsExplicitCred + IsPersistence
| stats
count as TotalEvents,
sum(eval(EventCode=4624)) as SuccessLogons,
sum(eval(EventCode=4625)) as FailedLogons,
sum(IsNetworkLogon) as NetworkLogons,
sum(IsRemoteInteractive) as RemoteInteractiveLogons,
sum(IsOffHours) as OffHoursEvents,
sum(IsExplicitCred) as ExplicitCredentialUse,
sum(IsPersistence) as PersistenceEvents,
dc(ComputerName) as UniqueDestinations,
values(ComputerName) as Destinations,
values(IpAddress) as SourceIPs,
values(EventType) as ObservedEventTypes,
max(SignalScore) as MaxSignalScore
by AccountName, AccountDomain
| eval RiskScore=SuccessLogons + (FailedLogons * 0.5) + (NetworkLogons * 2) + (RemoteInteractiveLogons * 2) + (OffHoursEvents * 3) + (ExplicitCredentialUse * 4) + (PersistenceEvents * 5) + (if(UniqueDestinations >= 3, UniqueDestinations * 2, 0)) + (if(FailedLogons >= 5 AND SuccessLogons >= 1, 20, 0))
| eval Severity=case(
RiskScore >= 50, "Critical",
RiskScore >= 25, "High",
RiskScore >= 10, "Medium",
true(), "Low"
)
| where RiskScore >= 10
| eval BruteForceIndicator=if(FailedLogons >= 5 AND SuccessLogons >= 1, "YES", "NO")
| eval LateralMovementIndicator=if(UniqueDestinations >= 3 AND NetworkLogons >= 3, "YES", "NO")
| eval PersistenceIndicator=if(PersistenceEvents >= 1, "YES", "NO")
| table _time, AccountName, AccountDomain, RiskScore, Severity, BruteForceIndicator, LateralMovementIndicator, PersistenceIndicator, TotalEvents, SuccessLogons, FailedLogons, NetworkLogons, UniqueDestinations, Destinations, SourceIPs, ExplicitCredentialUse, OffHoursEvents
| sort - RiskScoreDetects domain account abuse using Windows Security Event logs in Splunk. Ingests EventIDs 4624 (successful logon), 4625 (failed logon), 4648 (explicit credential use), 4672 (special privilege logon), 4697 (service installed), and 4698 (scheduled task created). Computes a composite risk score per account weighted by logon type, time of day, persistence indicators, lateral movement breadth, and brute-force patterns. Flags three key abuse scenarios: brute-force/credential spray success (5+ failures followed by success), lateral movement (3+ unique destinations via network logon), and domain account persistence (service or task installation). Results are severity-bucketed for analyst triage.
Data Sources
Required Sourcetypes
False Positives & Tuning
- Legitimate IT administrators performing authorized after-hours maintenance, patching, or incident response across multiple systems
- Service accounts that traverse many workstations as part of normal operations (e.g., backup agents, antivirus, patch management)
- Automated software deployment systems (SCCM, Intune, Ansible) that authenticate to many systems in rapid succession
- Password policy enforcement causing legitimate users to fail multiple times before successfully entering a new password
- Helpdesk staff using domain admin credentials to perform authorized remote support across multiple machines
Other platforms for T1078.002
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Domain Account Network Logon Simulation (PsExec-style)
Expected signal: EventID 4648 on source: Explicit credential logon with TargetServerName=TARGET_HOSTNAME and TargetUserName=username. EventID 4624 Type 3 on TARGET_HOSTNAME: TargetUserName=username, IpAddress=source IP. EventID 4672 on TARGET_HOSTNAME if account is in local admins. EventID 5140 on TARGET_HOSTNAME: Network share C$ accessed. Sysmon EventID 3 if net.exe network connections are monitored.
- Test 2Domain Account Explicit Credential Use via RunAs
Expected signal: EventID 4648 on local system: SubjectUserName=current user, TargetUserName=alternate_user, TargetDomainName=DOMAIN, ProcessName=runas.exe. EventID 4624 Type 9 (NewCredentials) on local system for the spawned cmd.exe process. Sysmon EventID 1: Process Create for runas.exe with AccountName=alternate_user context.
- Test 3Simulated Domain Account Brute Force Followed by Success
Expected signal: 6x EventID 4625 on DC_HOSTNAME: Logon failures for DOMAIN\testuser with LogonType=3, FailureReason=0xC000006A (wrong password). 1x EventID 4624 Type 3 on DC_HOSTNAME: Successful logon. EventID 4776 on DC: NTLM validation attempts. The pattern of failures followed by success is the primary detection signal.
- Test 4Domain Account Creates Scheduled Task for Persistence
Expected signal: EventID 4698 (Scheduled Task Created): SubjectUserName=current user, TaskName=WindowsDefenderUpdate, TaskContent includes the command and RunAs=DOMAIN\svc_account. Sysmon EventID 1: schtasks.exe process creation with full command line. If Sysmon registry monitoring is enabled, EventID 12/13 for Task Scheduler registry keys under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tasks.
References (12)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002/
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/active-directory-accounts
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/audit-policy-recommendations
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/06/02/exposing-polonium-activity-and-infrastructure-targeting-israeli-organizations/
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/kegtap-and-singlemalt-with-a-ransomware-chaser.html
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1078.002/T1078.002.md
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/lateral-movement-alerts
- https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4624
- https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4648
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