Detect Exploitation for Privilege Escalation in Sumo Logic CSE
Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions. When initially gaining access to a system, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileged process which will prevent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system components and software commonly running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the system. A key sub-technique is Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD), where adversaries drop a legitimately signed but vulnerable kernel driver onto a compromised machine and then exploit it to execute code in kernel mode, bypassing Driver Signature Enforcement. Real-world examples include Embargo ransomware using MS4Killer, ZeroCleare using VBoxDrv.sys, APT29 exploiting CVE-2021-36934, and Turla exploiting VBoxDrv.sys vulnerabilities.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Privilege Escalation
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
Sumo Detection Query
(_sourceCategory="windows/sysmon" OR _sourceCategory="windows/security")
| parse "EventID=*" as EventID nodrop
| parse "ImageLoaded=*" as ImageLoaded nodrop
| parse "ServiceFileName=*" as ServiceFileName nodrop
| parse "ServiceType=*" as ServiceType nodrop
| parse "SubjectUserName=*" as SubjectUserName nodrop
| parse "User=*" as SysmonUser nodrop
| where EventID in ("6", "4697")
| if(EventID == "6", ImageLoaded, ServiceFileName) as DriverPath
| toLowerCase(DriverPath) as LowerDriverPath
| if(EventID == "6", SysmonUser, SubjectUserName) as UserAccount
| if(
matches(LowerDriverPath, "(?i).*(rtcore64\.sys|rtcore32\.sys|gdrv2?\.sys|asrdrv10[012]?\.sys|aswarpot\.sys|vboxdrv\.sys|dbutil_2_3\.sys|dbutildrv2\.sys|mhyprot[23]?\.sys|iqvw(?:64|32)e\.sys|winring0(?:x64)?\.sys|capcom\.sys|msio(?:64|32)\.sys|ms4killer\.sys|glckio2\.sys|physmem\.sys|nvflash\.sys|nicm\.sys|nscm\.sys|spwizeng\.sys|bs_rcio64\.sys).*"),
1, 0) as IsKnownVulnDriver
| if(
matches(LowerDriverPath, "(?i).*\\\\(temp|tmp|downloads|appdata|users\\\\public|programdata|\\$recycle\.bin|windows\\\\tasks|perflogs)\\\\.*"),
1, 0) as IsSuspiciousPath
| where IsKnownVulnDriver = 1 OR IsSuspiciousPath = 1
| if(IsKnownVulnDriver = 1, "KnownVulnerableDriverLoaded",
if(IsSuspiciousPath = 1, "DriverFromSuspiciousPath",
"KernelDriverServiceInstalled")) as DetectionSignal
| fields _messageTime, _sourceHost, UserAccount, EventID, DetectionSignal, DriverPath, IsKnownVulnDriver, IsSuspiciousPath
| sort by _messageTime descSumo Logic detection for BYOVD kernel driver abuse and exploitation for privilege escalation (T1068). Parses Sysmon Event 6 (Driver Load) and Windows Security Event 4697 (Kernel Driver Service Installation) from standard source categories, evaluating each event against 28 known-vulnerable driver names (regex-matched) and 9 suspicious user-writable staging paths. The matches() function applies Java-style regex against the lowercased driver path. Discrete scoring fields (IsKnownVulnDriver, IsSuspiciousPath) are preserved in output for analyst triage context.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- GPU overclocking utilities (MSI Afterburner, EVGA Precision X1, ASUS GPU Tweak II) loading RTCore64.sys or RTCore32.sys for hardware register access — these are among the most common false positives and should be suppressed via allowlist lookup table keyed on SHA256 hash, not driver name
- VirtualBox desktop virtualization loading VBoxDrv.sys from %TEMP% staging directories during fresh installs or version upgrades on developer workstations
- Gigabyte App Center, ASRock Polychrome Sync, and ASUS Armoury Crate shipping AsrDrv10x.sys or GDrv.sys variants for LED, fan control, and voltage monitoring — common on gaming endpoints in BYOD environments
Other platforms for T1068
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 5 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1BYOVD — Drop and Register Known Vulnerable Driver (RTCore64.sys Simulation)
Expected signal: Windows Security Event ID 4697 (New Service Installed): ServiceName=RTCore64, ServiceFileName=C:\Windows\Temp\RTCore64.sys, ServiceType=0x1 (Kernel Driver). Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Create): Image=sc.exe, CommandLine containing 'create RTCore64 type= kernel'. DeviceRegistryEvents: RegistryKey containing \Services\RTCore64, RegistryValueName=ImagePath, RegistryValueData=C:\Windows\Temp\RTCore64.sys.
- Test 2Suspicious Driver Load Path — Copy System Driver to Temp and Reload
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11 (File Create): TargetFilename=C:\Users\Public\null_test.sys. Security Event ID 4697: ServiceFileName=C:\Users\Public\null_test.sys, ServiceType=0x1. DeviceRegistryEvents: RegistryKey containing \Services\TestPathDriver, ImagePath=C:\Users\Public\null_test.sys.
- Test 3SeLoadDriverPrivilege Assignment via sc.exe (Privilege Telemetry)
Expected signal: Security Event ID 4697: ServiceName=FakePrivTest, ServiceType=0x1. Security Event ID 4672: PrivilegeList containing SeLoadDriverPrivilege assigned to the calling session's SubjectLogonId. System Event ID 7045 (New Service Installed) in System event log. sc.exe Process Create in Sysmon Event ID 1.
- Test 4Linux Kernel Module Load from Non-Standard Path (Container/Linux)
Expected signal: Auditd SYSCALL record with syscall=finit_module or init_module, uid/euid of calling process. Syslog/kern.log message: 'df00tech_test: disagrees about version of symbol module_layout' or 'insmod: ERROR: could not insert module'. Auditd WATCH record for file access to /tmp/df00tech_test.ko. /var/log/audit/audit.log entries with key=t1068_test.
- Test 5BYOVD — Enumerate Loaded Drivers for Vulnerable Candidates
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Create): driverquery.exe, sc.exe, powershell.exe executions with respective command lines. Security Event ID 4688 (if command-line auditing enabled) for same processes. WMI Activity log entries for Win32_SystemDriver query in Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational.
References (12)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
- https://www.loldrivers.io/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/acidbox-rare-malware/
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/embargo-ransomware-rockyou2024-data-leak-ms4killer/
- https://github.com/wavestone-cdt/EDRSandblast
- https://github.com/Idov31/Nidhogg
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-deviceimageloadevents-table
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1068/T1068.md
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/driver_load
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