Detect Container CLI/API in Sumo Logic CSE
Adversaries may abuse built-in CLI tools or API calls to execute malicious commands in containerized environments. The Docker CLI manages containers via the dockerd daemon API. Kubernetes kubectl and the Kubernetes API server enable cluster management. Adversaries may leverage Docker CLI/API/SDK to pull images, run containers, execute commands inside containers, and scan for cloud credentials. TeamTNT has extensively targeted misconfigured Docker and Kubernetes environments, using container CLIs to deploy cryptominers, exfiltrate cloud credentials, and spread laterally across clusters.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Execution
- Technique
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- Sub-technique
- T1059.013 Container CLI/API
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/013/
Sumo Detection Query
_sourceCategory=linux/auditd OR _sourceCategory=linux/syslog OR _sourceCategory=endpoint/process
| where (%"process.name" in ("docker", "kubectl", "crictl", "ctr", "podman", "nerdctl") or
%"process.executable" matches /\/(docker|kubectl|crictl|ctr|podman|nerdctl)$/)
| where %"process.args" matches /(?i)(docker exec|docker run|docker pull|docker build|docker cp|kubectl exec|kubectl run|kubectl apply|kubectl create|kubectl get secrets|kubectl get configmaps|kubectl port-forward|kubectl proxy|crictl exec|ctr run|--privileged|--cap-add=SYS_ADMIN|--net=host|--pid=host|-v \/:\/host|-v \/etc:\/|-v \/var\/run\/docker\.sock)/
| if(%"process.args" matches /(?i)(--privileged|--cap-add=SYS_ADMIN|--net=host|--pid=host)/, 3, 0) as priv_score
| if(%"process.args" matches /(?i)(-v \/:\/host|-v \/etc:\/|-v \/var\/run\/docker\.sock)/, 3, 0) as mount_score
| if(%"process.args" matches /(?i)(docker exec|kubectl exec|crictl exec)/, 1, 0) as exec_score
| if(%"process.args" matches /(?i)(get secrets|get configmaps)/, 2, 0) as secrets_score
| if(%"process.args" matches /(?i)(nsenter|chroot \/host)/, 3, 0) as escape_score
| toInt(priv_score) + toInt(mount_score) + toInt(exec_score) + toInt(secrets_score) + toInt(escape_score) as suspicion_score
| where suspicion_score > 0
| if(suspicion_score >= 6, "CRITICAL", if(suspicion_score >= 3, "HIGH", "MEDIUM")) as severity
| fields _messageTime, %"host.name", %"user.name", %"process.name", %"process.args", priv_score, mount_score, exec_score, secrets_score, escape_score, suspicion_score, severity
| sort by suspicion_score desc, _messageTime descSumo Logic CSE query detecting T1059.013 Container CLI/API abuse by monitoring Linux audit and syslog sources for suspicious invocations of container management tools. Applies a multi-factor weighted suspicion score to prioritize events by risk — privileged flags, host mounts, exec sessions, secrets access, and escape techniques each contribute to the final severity classification.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Docker Swarm managers and Kubernetes node admission controllers may issue frequent kubectl apply and docker run commands as part of legitimate workload scheduling and autoscaling operations.
- Security-conscious organizations running container escape benchmarks (docker-bench-security, kube-bench) will produce high suspicion scores from intentional privileged container tests against their own environments.
- Multi-tenant Kubernetes environments where developers self-service via kubectl may generate significant volumes of kubectl get secrets events as applications retrieve their own configuration data from namespaced secrets.
Other platforms for T1059.013
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Docker Container Execution
Expected signal: Auditd: EXECVE record for docker with 'run' command. Docker daemon logs: container creation event. Container process creation for whoami inside the container.
- Test 2Docker Privileged Container Creation
Expected signal: Auditd: EXECVE record for docker with '--privileged' and '--net=host' flags. Docker daemon logs: privileged container creation.
- Test 3Kubectl Secrets Enumeration
Expected signal: Kubernetes audit log: get secrets API call with user identity and source IP. Auditd: EXECVE record for kubectl with 'get secrets' arguments.
References (6)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/013/
- https://docs.docker.com/desktop/features/desktop-cli/
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/teamtnt-targeting-aws-alibaba-2/
- https://www.aquasec.com/blog/teamtnt-reemerged-with-new-aggressive-cloud-campaign/
- https://intezer.com/blog/watch-your-containers-doki-infecting-docker-servers-in-the-cloud/
- https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/kubectl/
Unlock Pro Content
Get the full detection package for T1059.013 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.