Detect Thread Execution Hijacking in Sumo Logic CSE
Adversaries may inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Thread Execution Hijacking is commonly performed by suspending an existing process then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can then be replaced with malicious code or the path to a DLL. A handle to an existing victim process is first created with native Windows API calls such as OpenThread. At this point the process can be suspended then written to, realigned to the injected code, and resumed via SuspendThread, VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, SetThreadContext, then ResumeThread respectively. This is very similar to Process Hollowing but targets an existing process rather than creating a process in a suspended state.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Technique
- T1055 Process Injection
- Sub-technique
- T1055.003 Thread Execution Hijacking
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/003/
Sumo Detection Query
_sourceCategory="windows/sysmon" EventID=10
| parse "<SourceImage>*</SourceImage>" as source_image
| parse "<TargetImage>*</TargetImage>" as target_image
| parse "<GrantedAccess>*</GrantedAccess>" as granted_access
| parse "<SourceProcessId>*</SourceProcessId>" as source_pid
| parse "<TargetProcessId>*</TargetProcessId>" as target_pid
| parse "<User>*</User>" as user
| where granted_access in ("0x1FFFFF", "0x001F0FFF", "0x1F3FFF", "0x1F1FFF", "0x143A", "0x1478", "0x40", "0x20")
| where !(source_image matches "*MsMpEng.exe" or source_image matches "*csrss.exe" or source_image matches "*services.exe" or source_image matches "*WerFault.exe" or source_image matches "*taskmgr.exe" or source_image matches "*WmiPrvSE.exe")
| where target_image matches "*svchost.exe" or target_image matches "*explorer.exe" or target_image matches "*ctfmon.exe" or target_image matches "*RuntimeBroker.exe" or target_image matches "*lsass.exe" or target_image matches "*winlogon.exe" or target_image matches "*sihost.exe"
| if(granted_access in ("0x1FFFFF", "0x001F0FFF", "0x1F3FFF"), "High - PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS or THREAD_ALL_ACCESS", "Medium - Suspicious access mask") as hijack_severity
| fields _messageTime, _sourceHost, user, source_image, target_image, granted_access, source_pid, target_pid, hijack_severity
| sort by _messageTime descDetects Thread Execution Hijacking using Sumo Logic by parsing Sysmon Event ID 10 (Process Access) for high-privilege access masks associated with thread hijacking techniques. Correlates source and target process names to identify non-whitelisted processes accessing high-value Windows system processes with THREAD_ALL_ACCESS or PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS permissions.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Legitimate process injection performed by endpoint security solutions for behavioral monitoring — many EDR agents use process access APIs that resemble injection patterns
- Just-in-time (JIT) compilers in .NET and Java runtimes may write executable code into memory regions and manipulate thread contexts as part of normal JIT compilation
- Remote administration tools (RATs used legitimately, such as TeamViewer or AnyDesk) may perform thread-level operations on target processes during screen sharing or remote control sessions
Other platforms for T1055.003
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Thread Hijacking API Chain Simulation
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: notepad.exe spawned by PowerShell. If full API chain executed: Sysmon Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) with THREAD_ALL_ACCESS rights. MDE DeviceEvents with SetThreadContextApiCall action type.
- Test 2SuspendThread via NtSuspendThread Syscall
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1 for notepad.exe creation. If NtSuspendThread called: ETW event from Microsoft-Windows-Threat-Intelligence provider. Process status would show suspended state in Process Explorer.
- Test 3Thread Context Modification Detection Test
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1 for calc.exe/Calculator.exe creation. Process Access events (Event ID 10) from PowerShell to the calculator process. Thread enumeration visible in ETW traces.
References (4)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/003/
- https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1055.003/T1055.003.md
- https://www.elastic.co/blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
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