Detect System Owner/User Discovery in IBM QRadar
Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this by retrieving account usernames via built-in OS utilities such as whoami, query user, qwinsta, w, who, and id, or by querying environment variables, WMI, and Active Directory. The information is used during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors — determining whether to fully deploy a payload, escalate privileges, or target a specific high-value user account.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Discovery
- Technique
- T1033 System Owner/User Discovery
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/
QRadar Detection Query
SELECT
DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'YYYY-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS event_time,
LOGSOURCENAME(logsourceid) AS log_source,
username,
"Account Domain" AS account_domain,
"Process Name" AS process_name,
"Process Command Line" AS command_line,
"Parent Process Name" AS parent_process,
CASE
WHEN LOWER("Parent Process Name") MATCHES '(cmd\.exe|powershell\.exe|pwsh\.exe|wscript\.exe|cscript\.exe|mshta\.exe|rundll32\.exe|regsvr32\.exe|schtasks\.exe|msbuild\.exe|installutil\.exe)$' THEN 1
ELSE 0
END AS suspicious_parent,
CASE
WHEN LOWER("Process Command Line") IMATCHES '.*((/all|/groups|/priv|/fo)|useraccount|get-localuser|get-aduser|windowsidentity|user /domain|localgroup administrators).*' THEN 1
ELSE 0
END AS enriched_flags,
CASE
WHEN LOWER(username) IMATCHES '.*(system|administrator|admin).*' THEN 1
ELSE 0
END AS high_priv
FROM events
WHERE
LOGSOURCETYPEID IN (12, 14, 169, 260)
AND QIDNAME(qid) IN ('Process Create', 'Sysmon - Process Create')
AND (
(LOWER("Process Name") IMATCHES '.*\\whoami\.exe$' AND LOWER("Process Command Line") IMATCHES '.*/all.*|.*/groups.*|.*/priv.*|.*/fo.*')
OR LOWER("Process Name") IMATCHES '.*(\\query\.exe|\\qwinsta\.exe|\\quser\.exe)$'
OR (LOWER("Process Name") IMATCHES '.*\\wmic\.exe$' AND LOWER("Process Command Line") IMATCHES '.*(useraccount|useraccount).*')
OR (LOWER("Process Name") IMATCHES '.*\\net\.exe$' AND LOWER("Process Command Line") IMATCHES '.*(user /domain|localgroup administrators|group /domain).*')
OR (LOWER("Process Name") IMATCHES '.*\\net1\.exe$' AND LOWER("Process Command Line") IMATCHES '.*(user /domain|localgroup administrators).*')
OR (LOWER("Process Name") IMATCHES '.*(\\powershell\.exe|\\pwsh\.exe)$' AND LOWER("Process Command Line") IMATCHES '.*(get-localuser|get-aduser|win32_useraccount|windowsidentity|whoami).*')
)
AND LAST 24 HOURS
ORDER BY
(suspicious_parent + enriched_flags + high_priv) DESC, starttime DESCDetects T1033 System Owner/User Discovery in QRadar using AQL against Windows Security event log and Sysmon process creation events. Queries for execution of whoami with enumeration flags, query/qwinsta/quser, wmic useraccount, net user /domain, and PowerShell user discovery cmdlets. Applies risk scoring based on suspicious parent process, enriched command-line flags, and high-privilege user context.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Helpdesk or IT support staff using net user /domain or query user interactively from cmd.exe to troubleshoot user account or RDS session issues
- System inventory or SCCM/Intune management agents that use wmic useraccount or PowerShell Get-LocalUser for compliance reporting and asset management
- Automated deployment scripts and CI/CD pipelines that verify user context with whoami or environment variable checks before executing privileged operations
Other platforms for T1033
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 5 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Whoami Full Enumeration
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=C:\Windows\System32\whoami.exe, CommandLine='whoami /all', ParentImage=cmd.exe or calling shell. Security Event ID 4688 if command line auditing is enabled. No network events expected.
- Test 2Query Active User Sessions
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=C:\Windows\System32\query.exe, CommandLine='query user'. Alternatively may appear as quser.exe. Security Event ID 4688 with command line auditing enabled.
- Test 3WMI User Account Enumeration
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=C:\Windows\System32\wbem\wmic.exe, CommandLine containing 'useraccount get'. No network events if targeting local system. Security Event ID 4688 with full command line if auditing is enabled.
- Test 4Linux Multi-Command User Discovery
Expected signal: Linux auditd: SYSCALL records for execve of /usr/bin/whoami, /usr/bin/id, /usr/bin/w, /usr/bin/who, /usr/bin/last, /bin/cat with respective arguments. Syslog entries if auditd is configured to log to syslog. On systems with Sysmon for Linux: EventType=ProcessCreate for each command.
- Test 5PowerShell Active Directory User Enumeration
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=powershell.exe, CommandLine containing 'Get-WmiObject' and 'Win32_UserAccount'. PowerShell ScriptBlock Logging Event ID 4104 in Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational log with full script content. No AD network queries for local account enumeration.
References (10)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/
- https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-deviceprocessevents-table
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1033/T1033.md
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_whoami_execution.yml
- https://www.secureworks.com/research/karagany-backdoor
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/04/poetrat-covid-19-lures.html
- https://www.cybereason.com/blog/research/dropping-anchor-from-a-trickbot-infection-to-the-discovery-of-the-anchor-malware
- https://securelist.com/shadowpad-in-corporate-networks/81432/
- https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-239a
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