Detect Internet Connection Discovery in Microsoft Sentinel
Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems as part of automated discovery. This can be performed using ping, tracert, HTTP GET requests to known websites (e.g., bing.com, google.com, ifconfig.me), or bandwidth/speed tests. Adversaries use the results to confirm C2 reachability, identify proxy servers or redirectors, and determine network routing before establishing full C2 communications.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Discovery
- Sub-technique
- T1016.001 Internet Connection Discovery
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016/001/
KQL Detection Query
let KnownConnectivityTargets = dynamic([
"8.8.8.8", "8.8.4.4", "1.1.1.1", "1.0.0.1",
"bing.com", "google.com", "microsoft.com", "ifconfig.me",
"ipinfo.io", "icanhazip.com", "checkip.amazonaws.com",
"whatismyip.com", "ipecho.net", "myexternalip.com",
"wtfismyip.com", "api.ipify.org", "ip-api.com",
"ifconfig.co", "ipv4.icanhazip.com"
]);
let PingTracertCommands = dynamic([
"ping", "tracert", "traceroute", "pathping", "nslookup",
"Test-NetConnection", "Test-Connection", "Invoke-WebRequest",
"curl", "wget", "bitsadmin"
]);
// Detection 1: Process-based — ping/tracert/curl to connectivity check targets
let ProcessBased = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("ping.exe", "tracert.exe", "traceroute", "pathping.exe", "nslookup.exe", "curl.exe", "wget.exe", "bitsadmin.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "cmd.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any (KnownConnectivityTargets)
or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("ifconfig.me", "ipinfo.io", "icanhazip", "wtfismyip", "api.ipify", "ip-api.com", "ifconfig.co", "checkip.amazonaws")
| extend DetectionType = "ProcessCommandLine"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
InitiatingProcessId, ProcessId, DetectionType;
// Detection 2: Network-based — direct HTTP/DNS connections to connectivity-check services
let NetworkBased = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (KnownConnectivityTargets)
or RemoteUrl has_any ("ifconfig.me", "ipinfo.io", "icanhazip", "wtfismyip", "api.ipify", "ip-api.com", "ifconfig.co", "checkip.amazonaws")
or RemoteIP in ("8.8.8.8", "8.8.4.4", "1.1.1.1", "1.0.0.1")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe", "firefox.exe", "msedge.exe", "iexplore.exe", "opera.exe", "brave.exe")
| extend DetectionType = "NetworkConnection"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName,
FileName = InitiatingProcessFileName,
ProcessCommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, RemotePort, DetectionType,
InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
InitiatingProcessId;
union ProcessBased, NetworkBased
| sort by Timestamp descDetects Internet connection discovery activity on Windows endpoints using Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. Combines two detection approaches: (1) process command line inspection for ping, tracert, curl, nslookup, PowerShell, and bitsadmin commands targeting well-known connectivity check services or DNS resolvers; (2) network connection events to IP-geolocation/connectivity-check services initiated by non-browser processes. Covers known adversary patterns including Gamaredon ping to 8.8.8.8, Neoichor HTTP GET to bing.com, NKAbuse queries to ifconfig.me, and HEXANE bitsadmin connectivity tests.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- IT administrators or network engineers running ping/tracert diagnostics for legitimate troubleshooting
- Monitoring and observability agents (Datadog, New Relic, SolarWinds) that periodically check internet reachability
- Automated health check scripts in CI/CD pipelines or deployment automation that verify outbound connectivity before deploying updates
- Operating system components and update services (Windows Update, Microsoft Defender signature updates) that contact Microsoft infrastructure
- Network diagnostic tools used by help desk staff confirming connectivity for remote users
Other platforms for T1016.001
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 5 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Ping Public DNS Resolver (Gamaredon/QuietSieve Style)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=ping.exe, CommandLine='ping -n 1 8.8.8.8', ParentImage=cmd.exe. Security Event ID 4688 (with command line auditing enabled): NewProcessName=ping.exe, ProcessCommandLine='ping -n 1 8.8.8.8'. ICMP traffic to 8.8.8.8 visible in network logs.
- Test 2HTTP GET to IP Geolocation Service (NKAbuse/Malware Style)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=curl.exe, CommandLine containing 'api.ipify.org'. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network Connection from curl.exe to api.ipify.org:443 (HTTPS). Sysmon Event ID 22: DNS Query for 'api.ipify.org'. Security Event ID 4688 if command line auditing enabled.
- Test 3BITSAdmin Internet Connectivity Test (HEXANE Style)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=bitsadmin.exe, CommandLine containing '/transfer connecttest' and 'bing.com'. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network Connection from svchost.exe (BITS service) to www.bing.com:443. Security Event ID 4688 with bitsadmin command line. File creation event (Sysmon Event ID 11) for %TEMP%\connecttest.txt if transfer succeeds.
- Test 4PowerShell Test-NetConnection to Public DNS
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=powershell.exe, CommandLine containing 'Test-NetConnection' and '8.8.8.8'. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network Connection from powershell.exe to 8.8.8.8:80 (TCP, Test-NetConnection default). PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 containing 'Test-NetConnection -ComputerName 8.8.8.8'.
- Test 5Tracert to External Host for Route Discovery (Proxy Enumeration)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=tracert.exe, CommandLine='tracert -d -h 10 8.8.8.8'. Sysmon Event ID 3: Multiple ICMP/UDP network connections to intermediate hop IPs. Security Event ID 4688 with tracert command line if process creation auditing enabled.
References (12)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016/001/
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/
- https://securityintelligence.com/posts/more_eggs-malware-moonlighting-as-linkedin-recruiter/
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/12/06/nickel-targeting-government-organizations-across-latin-america-and-europe/
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/02/04/actinium-targets-ukrainian-organizations/
- https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/threat-intelligence/shuckworm-ukraine/
- https://securelist.com/lyceum-group-reborn/104586/
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/operation-layover-how-we-tracked-a-possible-carrier/
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/unc3890-targets-israel
- https://securelist.com/qakbot-technical-analysis/103931/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1016.001/T1016.001.md
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-devicenetworkevents-table
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