Detect Exfiltration Over Bluetooth in Sumo Logic CSE
Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over Bluetooth rather than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, an adversary may opt to exfiltrate data using a Bluetooth communication channel. Adversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access and proximity. Bluetooth connections might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network. Real-world examples include the Flame malware's BeetleJuice module, which transmitted encoded data over Bluetooth and acted as a Bluetooth beacon to identify nearby Bluetooth-enabled devices.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Exfiltration
- Sub-technique
- T1011.001 Exfiltration Over Bluetooth
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1011/001/
Sumo Detection Query
(_sourceCategory="windows/sysmon" OR _sourceCategory="windows/security" OR _sourceCategory="linux/syslog" OR _sourceCategory="endpoint*")
| parse regex field=_raw "<EventID>(?P<EventID>\d+)</EventID>" nodrop
| parse regex field=_raw "<Image>(?P<Image>[^<]+)</Image>" nodrop
| parse regex field=_raw "<CommandLine>(?P<CommandLine>[^<]+)</CommandLine>" nodrop
| parse regex field=_raw "<TargetObject>(?P<TargetObject>[^<]+)</TargetObject>" nodrop
| parse regex field=_raw "<TargetFilename>(?P<TargetFilename>[^<]+)</TargetFilename>" nodrop
| parse regex field=_raw "<Computer>(?P<Computer>[^<]+)</Computer>" nodrop
| parse regex field=_raw "<User>(?P<User>[^<]+)</User>" nodrop
| where (
(EventID in ("1", "4688") and (
Image matches /(?i)(btattach|btmgmt|hciconfig|hcitool|hcidump|bluetoothctl|sdptool|rfcomm|obexftp|obexd|fsquirt)/ or
CommandLine matches /(?i)(bluetooth|rfcomm|obex|hcitool|hciconfig|btmgmt|bluetoothctl|bt-adapter|bluetoothd)/
)) or
(EventID in ("12", "13") and (
TargetObject matches /(?i)(bluetooth|bthport|bthenum|bthle|rfcomm|obex)/
)) or
(EventID = "11" and (
TargetFilename matches /(?i)(bluetooth|rfcomm|obex|btooth)/
))
)
| if(EventID in ("1", "4688"), "Bluetooth Tool Execution",
if(EventID in ("12", "13"), "Bluetooth Registry Modification",
if(EventID = "11", "Bluetooth File Activity", "Unknown"))) as DetectionType
| fields _messageTime, Computer, User, Image, CommandLine, TargetObject, TargetFilename, DetectionType
| sort by _messageTime descSumo Logic log search query detecting T1011.001 Bluetooth exfiltration activity by regex-parsing Sysmon XML event fields from Windows endpoint log sources. Extracts EventID, process Image, CommandLine, TargetObject, and TargetFilename from raw event data. Applies three detection branches: Bluetooth tool execution (Event IDs 1 and 4688), Bluetooth stack registry modification (Sysmon 12 and 13), and Bluetooth-related file creation (Sysmon 11). Classifies each matching event with a DetectionType label for analyst triage.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Legitimate IT administration tasks using bluetoothctl, hciconfig, or btmgmt to pair or troubleshoot Bluetooth peripherals on employee endpoints, particularly common in hot-desk or shared hardware environments.
- Automated MDM or system provisioning agents writing to BTHPORT or BTHENUM registry keys as part of Bluetooth adapter configuration steps during endpoint imaging or enrollment.
- Bluetooth protocol testing tools such as obexftp, sdptool, or rfcomm executed on developer or QA workstations during authorized IoT or mobile application development and integration testing.
- macOS and Linux system daemons (bluetoothd, btmgmt) initializing Bluetooth hardware adapters at boot or user session login, forwarded via syslog collectors to Sumo Logic.
Other platforms for T1011.001
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 5 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Enumerate Bluetooth Devices on Windows
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=powershell.exe and CommandLine containing 'Get-PnpDevice' and 'Bluetooth'. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 with the full enumeration command. No registry modification events, but PnpDevice queries may appear in Windows Plug and Play logs.
- Test 2Linux Bluetooth Device Scan with hcitool
Expected signal: Linux auditd: execve syscall for hcitool with arguments 'scan' and 'lescan'. Syslog/daemon.log: bluetoothd activity logs showing scan initiation. If auditd is configured with execve monitoring: type=EXECVE msg= records with a0='hcitool' a1='scan'. Sysmon for Linux Event ID 1 if deployed.
- Test 3Transfer File via OBEX over Bluetooth on Linux
Expected signal: Linux auditd/Sysmon: execve event for obexftp with arguments including '--bluetooth', a MAC address, and '--put' with the file path. File creation event for /tmp/bt_test_exfil.txt. The process will exit with an error but telemetry is generated. Syslog may show bluetoothd connection attempt to the specified MAC address.
- Test 4Python Bluetooth Exfiltration Script Execution (Windows/Linux)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for python3.exe or python.exe with CommandLine referencing Bluetooth. Child process creation: powershell.exe spawned by python with 'Get-PnpDevice -Class Bluetooth'. Sysmon Event ID 1 for the child powershell.exe. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 for the enumeration command.
- Test 5Bluetooth Registry Key Inspection for Paired Devices
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for reg.exe with query arguments targeting BTHPORT. If PowerShell fallback executes: Sysmon Event ID 1 for powershell.exe with BTHPORT in CommandLine. Sysmon Event ID 12 (Registry key access) for HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\BTHPORT\Parameters\Devices. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104.
References (10)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1011/001/
- https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0143/
- https://securelist.com/the-flame-questions-and-answers/34344/
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/bluetooth/bluetooth-host-radio-support
- https://www.bluetooth.com/learn-about-bluetooth/tech-overview/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1011.001/T1011.001.md
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-do-not-require-ctrl-alt-del
- https://www.stigviewer.com/stig/windows_10/2021-08-18/finding/V-220843
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-deviceregistryevents-table
- https://www.sans.org/white-papers/bluetooth-security-overview/
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