Detect Direct Volume Access in Sumo Logic CSE
Adversaries may directly access a volume to bypass file access controls and file system monitoring. Windows allows programs to have direct access to logical volumes, enabling reads and writes directly from the drive by analyzing file system data structures. This technique bypasses Windows file access controls and file system monitoring tools. Utilities such as NinjaCopy (PowerShell), vssadmin, wbadmin, and esentutl can be used to create shadow copies or access locked files (such as ntds.dit, SYSTEM hive, and SAM) directly from disk. Real-world actors including Scattered Spider and Volt Typhoon have leveraged Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) to extract credential stores without triggering standard file access controls.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Defense Evasion
- Technique
- T1006 Direct Volume Access
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1006/
Sumo Detection Query
(_sourceCategory=*windows* OR _sourceCategory=*sysmon*)
| where _raw matches "*EventID=1*" OR _raw matches "*EventCode=1*" OR _raw matches "*EventID=4688*" OR _raw matches "*EventCode=4688*"
| parse "Image=*\n" as ProcessImage nodrop
| parse "CommandLine=*\n" as CommandLine nodrop
| parse "ParentImage=*\n" as ParentImage nodrop
| parse "ParentCommandLine=*\n" as ParentCommandLine nodrop
| parse "User=*\n" as User nodrop
| parse "Computer=*\n" as Computer nodrop
| where (
(ProcessImage matches "*vssadmin.exe*" AND (
CommandLine matches "*create shadow*" OR CommandLine matches "*list shadow*" OR CommandLine matches "*delete shadow*"
)) OR
(ProcessImage matches "*esentutl.exe*" AND (
CommandLine matches "*HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy*" OR CommandLine matches "*GLOBALROOT*"
OR CommandLine matches "*/y *" OR CommandLine matches "*/vss*"
)) OR
ProcessImage matches "*diskshadow.exe*" OR
(ProcessImage matches "*ntdsutil.exe*" AND (
CommandLine matches "*ifm*" OR CommandLine matches "*activate instance*" OR CommandLine matches "*ntds*"
)) OR
(ProcessImage matches "*wbadmin.exe*" AND (
CommandLine matches "*start backup*" OR CommandLine matches "*start recovery*"
)) OR
((ProcessImage matches "*powershell.exe*" OR ProcessImage matches "*pwsh.exe*") AND (
CommandLine matches "*NinjaCopy*" OR CommandLine matches "*Invoke-NinjaCopy*"
OR CommandLine matches "*PhysicalDrive*" OR CommandLine matches "*HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy*"
OR CommandLine matches "*GLOBALROOT*" OR CommandLine matches "*GetDriveGeometry*"
)) OR
CommandLine matches "*PhysicalDrive*" OR
CommandLine matches "*GLOBALROOT*HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy*"
)
| eval ToolCategory = if(ProcessImage matches "*vssadmin.exe*", "ShadowCopyManagement",
if(ProcessImage matches "*esentutl.exe*", "EsentutlVSS",
if(ProcessImage matches "*diskshadow.exe*", "DiskShadow",
if(ProcessImage matches "*ntdsutil.exe*", "NtdsutilIFM",
if(ProcessImage matches "*wbadmin.exe*", "WindowsBackup",
if(ProcessImage matches "*powershell.exe*" OR ProcessImage matches "*pwsh.exe*",
"PowerShellVolumeAccess", "DirectVolumeAccess"))))))
| eval TargetsCredentials = if(
toLowerCase(CommandLine) matches "*(ntds.dit|ntds.jfm|ntuser.dat|security.bak)*",
"true", "false")
| eval RiskScore = if(TargetsCredentials = "true", "Critical",
if(ToolCategory = "PowerShellVolumeAccess", "High",
if(ToolCategory = "NtdsutilIFM", "High",
if(ToolCategory = "EsentutlVSS", "High", "Medium"))))
| fields _messagetime, Computer, User, ProcessImage, CommandLine, ParentImage, ParentCommandLine, ToolCategory, TargetsCredentials, RiskScore
| sort by _messagetime descSumo Logic query detecting T1006 Direct Volume Access by parsing Sysmon Event ID 1 and Windows Security Event ID 4688 process creation events. Uses field extraction to parse Image, CommandLine, and parent process fields from raw event data, then applies multi-branch detection logic covering VSS tool abuse, direct volume paths, and PowerShell raw disk access. Enriches each event with tool category, credential targeting flag, and risk score.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Scheduled backup agents (Veeam, Backup Exec, Windows Server Backup service) that invoke vssadmin.exe and wbadmin.exe on backup servers during maintenance windows — add backup server hostnames to a suppression list to reduce noise
- Legitimate domain controller IFM media creation during AD deployment procedures using ntdsutil.exe — the 'activate instance ntds' and 'ifm' argument pattern is identical to attacker technique; cross-reference with change management tickets
- PowerShell-based disk health monitoring scripts and storage management automation that reference HarddiskVolume or PhysicalDrive paths for SMART data collection or disk capacity reporting
Other platforms for T1006
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1VSS Shadow Copy Creation and NTDS Extraction via esentutl
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for vssadmin.exe with CommandLine containing 'create shadow /for=C:'. Second Sysmon Event ID 1: esentutl.exe with CommandLine containing the \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy path and '/vss'. Security Event ID 4688 for both processes if command line auditing is enabled. Microsoft-Windows-StorageService/Operational events for VSS snapshot creation. Sysmon Event ID 11 (File Create) for SYSTEM.bak in %TEMP%.
- Test 2Diskshadow Script-Based Shadow Copy and File Exposure
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: diskshadow.exe with CommandLine containing '/s' and the .dsh script path. Sysmon Event ID 11: creation of dsh_test.dsh in %TEMP% by powershell.exe. Security Event ID 4688 for diskshadow.exe. Microsoft-Windows-StorageService/Operational events for VSS snapshot creation via diskshadow. If drive Z: is exposed, subsequent file access on Z: generates normal file system events attributed to the accessing process.
- Test 3ntdsutil IFM Media Creation for NTDS Extraction
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: ntdsutil.exe with CommandLine containing 'ifm', 'create full', and the output path. Security Event ID 4688 for ntdsutil.exe. On a domain controller: Security Event ID 4656/4663 for NTDS directory handle access, and Sysmon Event ID 11 for file creation of ntds.dit and SYSTEM in the IFM output directory. On a non-DC: ntdsutil exits with an error (0x80070003 - path not found for NTDS) but process creation event still fires.
- Test 4PowerShell Direct Physical Drive Read Simulation
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: powershell.exe with CommandLine containing '\\.\PhysicalDrive0' and 'FileOpen'. Security Event ID 4688 if command line auditing is enabled. If Object Access auditing covers raw disk handles: Security Event ID 4656 for handle request to PhysicalDrive0. This command will fail with 'Access Denied' for non-elevated users, but the process creation event still fires and matches the detection pattern.
References (10)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1006/
- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Esentutl/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/vssadmin
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/diskshadow
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc753455(v=ws.11)
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/10/25/octo-tempest-crosses-boundaries-to-facilitate-extortion-encryption-and-destruction/
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-038a
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1006/T1006.md
- http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/32169/FDump-Dumping-File-Sectors-Directly-from-Disk-usin
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