Detect Proc Filesystem in IBM QRadar
Adversaries on Linux systems read process memory directly via the /proc filesystem to extract credentials from running processes. By accessing /proc/<PID>/maps to identify memory regions and /proc/<PID>/mem to read those regions, attackers dump credentials from processes like sshd, su, sudo, gnome-keyring, and KWallet without injecting code or using ptrace. Tools include MimiPenguin (specifically targeting sshd and gnome-keyring), LaZagne (Linux edition), and PACEMAKER. This technique requires root privileges or the same UID as the target process. Used by threat actors targeting Linux servers where traditional Windows credential tools don't apply.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Credential Access
- Technique
- T1003 OS Credential Dumping
- Sub-technique
- T1003.007 Proc Filesystem
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/007/
QRadar Detection Query
SELECT
DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'YYYY-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS event_time,
sourceip,
username,
"HOST"(sourceip) AS hostname,
QIDNAME(qid) AS event_name,
CATEGORYNAME(category) AS category,
"processname" AS process_name,
"filepath" AS file_path,
CASE
WHEN LOWER("processname") IN ('mimipenguin', 'lazagne', 'pacemaker') THEN 'KnownCredDumpTool'
WHEN LOWER("processname") IN ('python3', 'python', 'perl', 'ruby', 'bash')
AND "filepath" LIKE '/proc/%/mem' THEN 'HighRisk'
WHEN "filepath" LIKE '/proc/%/maps'
OR "filepath" LIKE '/proc/%/environ' THEN 'Review'
ELSE 'Unknown'
END AS risk_level,
REGEXP_REPLACE("filepath", '/proc/(\\d+)/.*', '\\1') AS target_pid
FROM events
WHERE
LOGSOURCETYPEID IN (11 /* Linux Syslog */, 191 /* Audit */)
AND starttime > NOW() - 86400 SECONDS
AND (
("filepath" LIKE '/proc/%/mem'
OR "filepath" LIKE '/proc/%/maps'
OR "filepath" LIKE '/proc/%/environ')
AND LOWER("processname") NOT IN ('gdb', 'strace', 'ltrace', 'cat')
)
OR (
LOWER("processname") IN ('mimipenguin', 'lazagne', 'pacemaker')
)
OR (
LOWER("processname") IN ('python3', 'python')
AND ("Message" ILIKE '%lazagne%' AND ("Message" ILIKE '%memory%' OR "Message" ILIKE '%all%'))
)
ORDER BY starttime DESC
LAST 24 HOURSQRadar AQL query detecting /proc filesystem credential dumping on Linux by correlating auditd and syslog events for suspicious /proc/<PID>/mem, /proc/<PID>/maps, and /proc/<PID>/environ file access by non-debugger processes, and by matching known credential harvesting tool names (MimiPenguin, LaZagne, PACEMAKER). Risk levels are assigned based on process type and target path.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Performance monitoring agents (Zabbix, Nagios, Prometheus node exporter) that read /proc entries for system metrics — these typically run as root and access maps/status files
- Container runtime daemons (containerd, dockerd) that inspect /proc for namespace and cgroup information during container lifecycle operations
- Python-based automation scripts run by system administrators for legitimate process introspection or memory profiling
Other platforms for T1003.007
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1MimiPenguin Linux Credential Dump
Expected signal: Auditd SYSCALL events for openat on /proc/<PID>/mem with exe=/usr/bin/python3. DeviceFileEvents (if MDE Linux agent present) for /proc/*/mem access by python3. Syslog entries if gnome-keyring or sshd crash due to memory access attempt.
- Test 2Manual /proc/mem Credential Extraction
Expected signal: Auditd SYSCALL openat events for /proc/<PID>/maps with exe=/bin/cat or /bin/bash. Process creation event for pgrep sshd. DeviceProcessEvents for pgrep and cat with /proc path arguments.
- Test 3LaZagne Linux Memory Module
Expected signal: DeviceProcessEvents for lazagne binary execution with 'memory' argument. Auditd execve event for /tmp/lazagne. Auditd openat events for /proc/*/mem if memory module runs. Network connection to GitHub for download (DeviceNetworkEvents).
References (6)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/007/
- https://github.com/huntergregal/mimipenguin
- https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne
- https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/91040/what-is-proc-pid-mem
- https://www.slideshare.net/roottoor1/linux-credential-access-techniques
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.007/T1003.007.md
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