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CVE-2026-9198

IBM Langflow Code Injection Exploitation (CVE-2026-9198)

Initial Access Execution Persistence Last updated:

Detects exploitation attempts against IBM Langflow instances vulnerable to CVE-2026-9198, a code injection vulnerability (CWE-94) that allows unauthenticated or authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code via crafted requests to Langflow's component/flow execution API. This vulnerability is listed in CISA KEV and is being actively exploited in the wild. Detection focuses on anomalous process execution spawned by the Langflow application, suspicious payloads to Langflow API endpoints, and post-exploitation indicators such as reverse shells, credential harvesting, or outbound C2 connections originating from Langflow hosts.

Vulnerability Intelligence

KEV — Known Exploited

What is CVE-2026-9198 IBM Langflow Code Injection Exploitation (CVE-2026-9198)?

IBM Langflow Code Injection Exploitation (CVE-2026-9198) (CVE-2026-9198) maps to the Initial Access and Execution and Persistence tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.

This page provides production-ready detection logic for IBM Langflow Code Injection Exploitation (CVE-2026-9198), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, Windows Security Event Logs, Sysmon. The queries below are rated critical severity at high confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Execution Persistence
Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
kusto
let LangflowHosts = dynamic(["langflow", "7860"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("langflow", "python -m langflow", "uvicorn") or InitiatingProcessFolderPath has "langflow"
| where FileName in~ ("bash", "sh", "powershell.exe", "cmd.exe", "python.exe", "python3", "curl", "wget", "nc", "ncat", "perl", "ruby")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("/bin/sh -c", "eval(", "exec(", "os.system", "subprocess", "base64 -d", "IEX", "Invoke-Expression", "curl http", "wget http", "0>&1")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName
| order by TimeGenerated desc

Detects suspicious child processes (shells, interpreters, network utilities) spawned by the Langflow application process, indicative of code injection exploitation via CVE-2026-9198.

critical severity high confidence

Data Sources

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Windows Security Event Logs Sysmon

Required Tables

DeviceProcessEvents

False Positives

  • Legitimate Langflow developers testing custom Python component code that shells out intentionally
  • CI/CD pipelines invoking Langflow via automation scripts that use interpreters
  • Administrative maintenance scripts that restart or manage the Langflow service using shell commands

Sigma rule & cross-platform mapping

The detection logic for IBM Langflow Code Injection Exploitation (CVE-2026-9198) (CVE-2026-9198) above is provided in a vendor-neutral form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the following logsource:

logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows

Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Simulate Langflow Component Code Injection via Python eval

    Expected signal: Process creation event showing python3 as parent spawning bash child process with command line containing 'echo LANGFLOW_ATOMIC_TEST_INJECTION'

  2. Test 2Simulate Reverse Shell Spawn from Langflow Process

    Expected signal: Process and network events showing bash establishing an outbound TCP connection with redirected file descriptors (0>&1 pattern) in command line.

  3. Test 3Simulate PowerShell Encoded Command Execution via Langflow on Windows

    Expected signal: Windows Security Event ID 4688 / Sysmon Event ID 1 showing powershell.exe launched with -EncodedCommand flag, ideally with a Langflow-related parent process (python.exe or uvicorn).

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