Skip to content
CVE-2026-91500 Sumo Logic CSE · Sumo

Detect Oracle Access Manager Authentication Engine Pre-Auth Compromise (CVE-2026-91500) in Sumo Logic CSE

Detects exploitation attempts against a critical (CVSS 10.0) vulnerability in the Authentication Engine component of Oracle Access Manager (Oracle Fusion Middleware, affected versions 12.2.1.4.0 and 14.1.2.1.0). An unauthenticated attacker with network access over HTTP can compromise Oracle Access Manager. The vulnerability has a scope change, so attacks may significantly impact other products. No public PoC exists yet (exploit status: theoretical), so this detection focuses on behavioral and anomalous-access indicators against OAM endpoints: unauthenticated requests to authentication and SSO endpoints yielding authenticated sessions, anomalous OAM server-side errors, suspicious OAM process activity, and post-exploitation session or credential anomalies.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Privilege Escalation Credential Access

Sumo Detection Query

Sumo Logic CSE (Sumo)
sql
// df00tech DF00-e5435c57a5 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-91500 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
_sourceCategory=*oam* OR _sourceCategory=*ohs* OR _sourceCategory=*iis*
| parse regex "(?<method>\S+)\s(?<uri>/\S*)\sHTTP" nodrop
| where uri matches "/oam*" or uri matches "/oamfed*" or uri matches "/ms_oauth*"
| parse regex "\s(?<status>\d{3})\s" nodrop
| if (status in ("200","302","500","503"), 1, 0) as relevant
| where relevant = 1
| timeslice 10m
| count by _timeslice, src_ip, uri, status
| where _count > 20
critical severity medium confidence

Identifies concentrated anomalous request activity against Oracle Access Manager endpoints with success or server-error responses.

Data Sources

IIS access logsOracle HTTP Server access logs

Required Tables

_sourceCategory:oam_sourceCategory:ohs

False Positives & Tuning

  • Legitimate SSO login surges
  • Synthetic monitoring traffic
  • Authorized scanning

Other platforms for CVE-2026-91500


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Unauthenticated burst against OAM authentication endpoints

    Expected signal: 60 unauthenticated GET requests to /oam/server/authentication from a single source IP within a short window appear in OHS/IIS access logs.

  2. Test 2 Mixed server-error then unauthenticated success sequence

    Expected signal: A 500/503 response followed by a 200/302 response to OAM endpoints from the same source IP in OHS/IIS logs.

  3. Test 3 Anonymous access to OAM federation endpoint

    Expected signal: 30 unauthenticated requests to /oamfed/idp/initiatesso logged from a single host/source.

Last updated: Research depth: standard
References (2)

Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Confirm the OAM version of the targeted host is an affected release (Oracle Access Manager 12.2.1.4.0 or 14.1.2.1.0) and whether the November 2026 Oracle Critical Patch Update addressing CVE-2026-91500 has been applied.
  2. Review the source IP's full request history to the /oam, /oamfed and /ms_oauth endpoints and determine whether any unauthenticated request resulted in an authenticated session or OAM token issuance.
  3. Pull OAM server diagnostic/audit logs (oam-server-diagnostic.log, Audit records) for the alert window and look for authentication successes with no corresponding credential validation.
  4. Correlate the source IP against threat intelligence and establish whether it is a known scanner, internal monitoring host, or previously unseen external address.

Containment

  1. Block the offending source IP(s) at the WAF/load balancer and restrict external access to OAM administrative and authentication endpoints.
  2. Rotate OAM encryption keys and invalidate active SSO sessions (OAM_ID / OAMAuthnCookie) if authentication bypass is confirmed, forcing re-authentication.
  3. Apply the relevant Oracle Critical Patch Update for the OAM Authentication Engine, or take the exposed OAM instance offline until patched.

Evidence Collection

  1. Preserve OHS/IIS access logs, OAM server and audit logs, and WebGate logs covering the suspicious activity window.
  2. Capture the full HTTP request/response pairs (including headers and bodies) for the flagged transactions.
  3. Snapshot the OAM managed-server JVM state and heap if live compromise is suspected, and export relevant OAM data-store session records.

Escalation Criteria

  • !Escalate to incident response immediately if an unauthenticated request is confirmed to have produced a valid OAM session or impersonated a privileged identity.
  • !Escalate if evidence shows lateral movement from OAM into downstream protected applications or directory services following the suspicious activity.
  • !Escalate to Oracle support and management if the affected OAM instance is internet-exposed and unpatched against CVE-2026-91500.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • >OAM server diagnostic and audit logs (oam-server-diagnostic.log, OAM Audit framework records)
  • >OHS/IIS access logs showing anonymous requests to /oam endpoints with 200/302 responses
  • >OAM session store records and issued OAM_ID / OAMAuthnCookie session cookies
  • >WebGate/WebLogic managed-server logs for the OAM domain

Tuning Guidance

Baseline the normal volume and source IPs of anonymous SSO redirect traffic (the legitimate pre-authentication 302 flow produces many unauthenticated 200/302 responses). Whitelist load balancers, uptime monitors and approved scanners, then tighten the request-count and error-correlation thresholds so only anomalous bursts or mixed success/error sequences from unexpected sources alert. Prioritize alerts from external source IPs against internet-facing OAM instances.


Hunting Queries

Hunts for unauthenticated (no username) requests to OAM endpoints that returned successful or redirect responses across the environment.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-e5435c57a5 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-91500 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | where csUriStem startswith "/oam" | where scStatus in (200,302) | where isempty(csUsername) or csUsername == "-" | summarize count() by cIP, csUriStem, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h) | order by count_ desc
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-e5435c57a5 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-91500 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web (uri_path="/oam/*" OR uri_path="/oamfed/*") status IN (200,302) (user="-" OR NOT user=*) | stats count by src_ip, uri_path, date_hour | sort - count

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Unauthenticated burst against OAM authentication endpoints
linux

Simulates an unauthenticated attacker repeatedly probing OAM authentication/SSO endpoints to trigger the burst/anomaly detection.

Command

bash
for i in $(seq 1 60); do curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" "https://oam-test.lab.local/oam/server/authentication?id=$i"; done

Cleanup

bash
rm -f /tmp/oam_probe.log 2>/dev/null; true

Expected Telemetry

60 unauthenticated GET requests to /oam/server/authentication from a single source IP within a short window appear in OHS/IIS access logs.

Expected Detection

The KQL/SPL rules fire on the request-count threshold (>200 or >20 aggregated) for the source IP against OAM endpoints.

Test 2 Mixed server-error then unauthenticated success sequence
linux

Simulates the error-then-success pattern characteristic of authentication-bypass exploitation by hitting a malformed then normal OAM request.

Command

bash
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" "https://oam-test.lab.local/oam/server/authentication?%00malformed"; curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" "https://oam-test.lab.local/oam/server/authentication"

Cleanup

bash
true

Expected Telemetry

A 500/503 response followed by a 200/302 response to OAM endpoints from the same source IP in OHS/IIS logs.

Expected Detection

The Elastic EQL sequence rule and the KQL/SPL error+unauth-success correlation fire for the source IP.

Test 3 Anonymous access to OAM federation endpoint
windows

Simulates probing of the OAM federation/OAuth endpoints without authentication cookies.

Command

powershell
powershell -Command "1..30 | ForEach-Object { try { Invoke-WebRequest -Uri 'https://oam-test.lab.local/oamfed/idp/initiatesso' -UseBasicParsing -TimeoutSec 5 } catch {} }"

Cleanup

powershell
powershell -Command "Remove-Item Env:\OAM_TEST -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue"

Expected Telemetry

30 unauthenticated requests to /oamfed/idp/initiatesso logged from a single host/source.

Expected Detection

Chronicle YARA-L and QRadar AQL rules aggregate the anonymous requests to the OAM federation endpoint and alert.

Related Detections