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CVE-2026-90436 IBM QRadar · QRadar

Detect Apache Axis Unsafe Reflection (CWE-470) Exploitation, CVE-2026-90436 in IBM QRadar

Detects exploitation attempts against CVE-2026-90436, an unsafe reflection (CWE-470) vulnerability in Apache Axis 1.x. Apache Axis is a Java SOAP/web-services engine. Deserialization of an inbound SOAP fault lets an unauthenticated remote attacker cause a named class to load and be instantiated through its String constructor before it is checked, which can lead to remote code execution with a suitable class on the classpath. This CVE is listed in the CISA KEV catalog (known exploited). Detection focuses on anomalous Axis service requests, Java process spawning of child processes (a common post-exploitation signal when reflection leads to code execution), and web-server telemetry indicating interaction with Axis service endpoints followed by suspicious process or network activity.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Execution

QRadar Detection Query

IBM QRadar (QRadar)
sql
-- df00tech DF00-6f985f592e · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-90436 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
SELECT QIDNAME(qid) AS event, sourceip, destinationip, "Process Name" AS process, "Parent Process Name" AS parent, "Command Line" AS cmd FROM events WHERE ("Parent Process Name" ILIKE '%java%' OR "Parent Process Name" ILIKE '%catalina%') AND ("Process Name" ILIKE '%cmd.exe%' OR "Process Name" ILIKE '%powershell%' OR "Process Name" ILIKE '%/sh' OR "Process Name" ILIKE '%/bash' OR "Process Name" ILIKE '%curl%' OR "Process Name" ILIKE '%wget%') LAST 24 HOURS
high severity low confidence

Surfaces suspicious child processes spawned by Java/Tomcat parents in QRadar, correlating with potential Axis unsafe-reflection exploitation.

Data Sources

Endpoint process event logs

Required Tables

events

False Positives & Tuning

  • Java maintenance jobs that shell out to OS utilities.
  • Container deployment scripts executed by Tomcat.
  • APM/monitoring agents spawning helper processes.

Other platforms for CVE-2026-90436


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Simulate Axis endpoint probing

    Expected signal: Multiple web-server access-log entries for /axis/services/ from the test source IP.

  2. Test 2 Java parent spawns shell

    Expected signal: Process-creation event showing a java parent spawning /bin/sh and whoami.

  3. Test 3 Java parent downloads payload

    Expected signal: Process-creation event showing a java-associated parent launching curl/powershell, plus an outbound connection.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Confirm whether the affected host runs Apache Axis and identify the deployed Axis version and exposed service endpoints.
  2. Review the correlated web-server access logs for the source IP(s) that hit Axis service URLs immediately before the suspicious process activity.
  3. Inspect the full command line and process tree of any child process spawned by the Java/Tomcat parent to determine whether code execution occurred.
  4. Check whether the host is internet-facing, since CVE-2026-90436 is in the CISA KEV catalog and actively exploited.

Containment

  1. Isolate the affected host from the network to prevent lateral movement or data exfiltration.
  2. Block the identified attacker source IP(s) at the perimeter and WAF, and disable or restrict access to the exposed Axis service endpoints.

Evidence Collection

  1. Capture the Java/Tomcat process memory, access logs, and Axis request payloads for forensic analysis.
  2. Preserve the servlet container logs, EDR process telemetry, and any dropped files or newly created artifacts on disk.

Escalation Criteria

  • !Escalate to incident response if a child process executed by the Axis/Java parent performed recon, downloaded a payload, or established an outbound connection.
  • !Escalate immediately if persistence, credential access, or lateral movement is observed following the initial exploitation.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • >Servlet container (Tomcat) access and catalina logs showing requests to Axis service endpoints.
  • >Process-creation records linking a Java/Tomcat parent to interpreter or download-tool children.
  • >Newly written files in the web application or temp directories following the request.

Tuning Guidance

Baseline the set of legitimate child processes normally spawned by your Java/Tomcat applications and exclude known maintenance or deployment jobs. Restrict the web-log queries to hosts actually running Apache Axis to reduce noise from scanners, and tighten the suspicious-child-process list to interpreters and download utilities that are abnormal in your environment.


Hunting Queries

Hunt for outbound connections or download activity originating from Axis/Java processes that would indicate successful exploitation and payload retrieval.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-6f985f592e · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-90436 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
DeviceNetworkEvents | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("java.exe","java") | where RemotePort in (443,80,4444,1337) | where RemoteUrl !endswith "example.com" | project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-6f985f592e · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-90436 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=edr parent_process="java*" (process_name="curl" OR process_name="wget" OR process_name="powershell.exe") | stats count by host, process_name, cmdline

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Simulate Axis endpoint probing
linux

Send HTTP requests to a lab Axis service endpoint to generate web-log telemetry matching the detection.

Command

bash
for i in $(seq 1 10); do curl -s -o /dev/null "http://localhost:8080/axis/services/Version"; done

Cleanup

bash
echo 'No cleanup required; stateless HTTP requests only.'

Expected Telemetry

Multiple web-server access-log entries for /axis/services/ from the test source IP.

Expected Detection

The Sumo Logic and SPL web-log queries flag elevated requests to Axis service endpoints.

Test 2 Java parent spawns shell
linux

Simulate reflection-based code execution by having a Java process launch a shell command.

Command

bash
java -e 2>/dev/null; cat > /tmp/Spawn.java <<'EOF'
public class Spawn { public static void main(String[] a) throws Exception { Runtime.getRuntime().exec(new String[]{"/bin/sh","-c","whoami"}); } }
EOF
javac /tmp/Spawn.java -d /tmp && java -cp /tmp Spawn

Cleanup

bash
rm -f /tmp/Spawn.java /tmp/Spawn.class

Expected Telemetry

Process-creation event showing a java parent spawning /bin/sh and whoami.

Expected Detection

The Elastic EQL, Chronicle YARA-L, and CrowdStrike CQL process rules match the java-parent-to-shell child sequence.

Test 3 Java parent downloads payload
windows

Simulate post-exploitation payload retrieval from an Axis/Java process.

Command

powershell
java -cp . Spawn || powershell.exe -Command "Start-Process java -ArgumentList '-version'; curl.exe http://127.0.0.1/payload -o $env:TEMP\p.bin"

Cleanup

powershell
del %TEMP%\p.bin 2>nul

Expected Telemetry

Process-creation event showing a java-associated parent launching curl/powershell, plus an outbound connection.

Expected Detection

The KQL and hunting queries detect the download/outbound activity originating from a Java process.

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