CVE-2026-87886

Acronis Backup Incorrect Default Permissions Exploitation (CVE-2026-87886)

Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-87886, a KEV-listed incorrect default permissions vulnerability (CWE-276) in Acronis Backup, notably affecting the Acronis cPanel Backup plugin. Overly permissive default file/directory permissions on Acronis Backup installation directories, backup archives, agent binaries, and configuration files allow low-privilege local users to read sensitive backup data or modify agent components to achieve privilege escalation or code execution. This detection surfaces suspicious permission states, world-writable/world-readable Acronis paths, unauthorized access to backup archives by non-privileged accounts, and tampering with Acronis agent binaries and config.

Vulnerability Intelligence

KEV — Known Exploited

What is CVE-2026-87886 Acronis Backup Incorrect Default Permissions Exploitation (CVE-2026-87886)?

Acronis Backup Incorrect Default Permissions Exploitation (CVE-2026-87886) (CVE-2026-87886) maps to the Privilege Escalation and Defense Evasion and Collection tactics — the adversary is trying to gain higher-level permissions in MITRE ATT&CK.

This page provides production-ready detection logic for Acronis Backup Incorrect Default Permissions Exploitation (CVE-2026-87886), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, DeviceFileEvents. The queries below are rated high severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Privilege Escalation Defense Evasion Collection
Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
kusto
// Acronis Backup incorrect default permissions abuse - CVE-2026-87886
let acronisPaths = dynamic(["acronis", "BackupAndRecovery", "cpanel\\backup", "Acronis Agent", "mms"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FolderPath has_any (acronisPaths)
| where ActionType in ("FileModified", "FileCreated", "FileRenamed")
| where FileName endswith ".exe" or FileName endswith ".dll" or FileName endswith ".sh" or FileName endswith ".conf" or FileName endswith ".config" or FileName endswith ".tib" or FileName endswith ".tibx"
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !in~ ("system", "acronis agent user", "acronismms")
| where InitiatingProcessTokenElevation != "TokenElevationTypeFull" or FileName has_any (".tib", ".tibx")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessTokenElevation
| order by Timestamp desc

Flags non-service, non-elevated accounts modifying Acronis Backup agent binaries/config or accessing backup archives (.tib/.tibx) in Acronis directories, indicating exploitation of world-writable/readable default permissions.

high severity medium confidence

Data Sources

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint DeviceFileEvents

Required Tables

DeviceFileEvents

False Positives

  • Legitimate Acronis agent auto-updates running under the Acronis service account
  • Administrators manually restoring or migrating backup archives
  • Backup validation jobs that read .tib/.tibx archives as part of scheduled integrity checks

Sigma rule & cross-platform mapping

The detection logic for Acronis Backup Incorrect Default Permissions Exploitation (CVE-2026-87886) (CVE-2026-87886) above is provided in a vendor-neutral form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the following logsource:

logsource:
  product: windows

Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Set world-writable permissions on Acronis binary directory (Windows)

    Expected signal: DeviceFileEvents FileCreated for schedul2.dll under Acronis path by a non-service account; Windows 4663 access event.

  2. Test 2Read backup archive as non-privileged user (Linux)

    Expected signal: auditd file access record showing user 'nobody' opening a .tibx file under an Acronis path.

  3. Test 3Tamper with Acronis config file as unprivileged user (Linux)

    Expected signal: auditd write event for user 'nobody' modifying /etc/Acronis/agent.conf.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Confirm the affected host runs Acronis Backup (including the cPanel Backup plugin) and identify the installed version against Acronis advisory SEC-10986.
  2. Inspect the flagged Acronis directory/file permissions (icacls on Windows, ls -l / getfacl on Linux) to confirm world-writable/world-readable or otherwise overly permissive defaults.
  3. Identify the account that accessed or modified the file and determine whether it is a legitimate Acronis service identity or a low-privilege/unexpected user.
  4. Correlate the timestamp with any scheduled backup, validation, or update job to rule out benign automation.

Containment

  1. Restrict permissions on Acronis Backup install directories, agent binaries, config, and archive stores to the service account and administrators only (remove Everyone/Users/other write and read grants).
  2. Apply the vendor patch per Acronis advisory SEC-10986 and CISA BOD 26-04 timelines; if patching is delayed, isolate the host or disable the exposed plugin.

Evidence Collection

  1. Capture the current ACL/permission state of all Acronis paths and preserve before-remediation output (icacls / getfacl dumps).
  2. Collect file system audit logs, EDR file events, and copies of any modified agent binaries/config for forensic comparison against known-good hashes.

Escalation Criteria

  • ! Escalate to incident response if a non-service account modified an Acronis agent binary or config, indicating potential privilege escalation or persistence.
  • ! Escalate if backup archives (.tib/.tibx) were read or exfiltrated by an unauthorized account, indicating data exposure of protected backup contents.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • > ACL/permission metadata on Acronis install directories, archive stores, and config files
  • > Modified/created Acronis agent binaries and their hashes
  • > File system audit (Windows Security 4663/Sysmon 11, Linux auditd) records of access to .tib/.tibx and agent files
  • > Acronis agent and MMS service logs

Tuning Guidance

Baseline the legitimate Acronis service account names (they vary per install, e.g. the Acronis Agent User and Acronis Managed Machine Service) and add them to allowlists. Exclude scheduled validation and update job processes by name/hash after confirming their behavior. Tighten severity for binary/config modifications by non-service accounts and lower it for read-only archive access from known backup operators. Deploy file-permission compliance checks to reduce noise from expected post-patch permission states.


Hunting Queries

Enumerate which accounts and hosts are accessing Acronis backup archives to spot non-service identities reading protected data.

Hunting — KQL
kql
DeviceFileEvents | where FolderPath has "acronis" | where FileName endswith ".tib" or FileName endswith ".tibx" | summarize count() by InitiatingProcessAccountName, DeviceName | order by count_ desc
Hunting — SPL
spl
index=* object_path="*acronis*" (file_name="*.tib" OR file_name="*.tibx") | stats count by user, host | sort - count

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Set world-writable permissions on Acronis binary directory (Windows)
windows

Simulates the vulnerable state by granting Everyone modify rights on an Acronis-like directory, then a non-admin write.

Command

powershell
mkdir C:\ProgramData\Acronis\Agent\test & icacls C:\ProgramData\Acronis\Agent\test /grant Everyone:(OI)(CI)M & echo malicious > C:\ProgramData\Acronis\Agent\test\schedul2.dll

Cleanup

powershell
del /q C:\ProgramData\Acronis\Agent\test\schedul2.dll & rmdir /s /q C:\ProgramData\Acronis\Agent\test

Expected Telemetry

DeviceFileEvents FileCreated for schedul2.dll under Acronis path by a non-service account; Windows 4663 access event.

Expected Detection

KQL/CrowdStrike/Chronicle rules fire on non-service modification of a .dll under an Acronis directory.

Test 2 Read backup archive as non-privileged user (Linux)
linux

Simulates a low-privilege user reading a world-readable Acronis backup archive.

Command

bash
sudo mkdir -p /var/lib/Acronis/backups && sudo sh -c 'echo backupdata > /var/lib/Acronis/backups/system.tibx' && sudo chmod 644 /var/lib/Acronis/backups/system.tibx && runuser -u nobody -- cat /var/lib/Acronis/backups/system.tibx

Cleanup

bash
sudo rm -f /var/lib/Acronis/backups/system.tibx && sudo rmdir /var/lib/Acronis/backups

Expected Telemetry

auditd file access record showing user 'nobody' opening a .tibx file under an Acronis path.

Expected Detection

SPL/Elastic/Sumo rules fire on non-root access to a .tibx archive in an Acronis directory.

Test 3 Tamper with Acronis config file as unprivileged user (Linux)
linux

Simulates modification of an Acronis agent config via incorrect default permissions.

Command

bash
sudo mkdir -p /etc/Acronis && sudo sh -c 'echo original > /etc/Acronis/agent.conf' && sudo chmod 666 /etc/Acronis/agent.conf && runuser -u nobody -- sh -c 'echo tampered >> /etc/Acronis/agent.conf'

Cleanup

bash
sudo rm -f /etc/Acronis/agent.conf && sudo rmdir /etc/Acronis

Expected Telemetry

auditd write event for user 'nobody' modifying /etc/Acronis/agent.conf.

Expected Detection

Elastic EQL / SPL rules fire on non-service modification of an Acronis .conf file.

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