Adobe Commerce/Magento Template Engine SSTI (CVE-2026-75650)
Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-75650, a KEV-listed server-side template injection (CWE-1336) in Adobe Commerce and Magento arising from improper neutralization of special elements used in the template engine. Attackers inject template directives (e.g. {{...}}, {%...%}) into fields processed by the storefront/admin template engine to achieve code execution, PHP object instantiation, or filesystem/config disclosure. Detection focuses on template directive syntax in HTTP request bodies/parameters to Magento endpoints, anomalous PHP process spawning from the web server, and unexpected writes to Magento var/ and pub/media directories.
Vulnerability Intelligence
KEV — Known ExploitedAffected Software
- Vendor
- Adobe
- Product
- Commerce and Magento
Weakness (CWE)
Timeline
- Disclosed
- September 8, 2026
References & Proof of Concept
- https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/magento/apsb26-146.html
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75650
- https://thehackernews.com/2026/09/adobe-patches-magento-zero-day.html
CVSS
What is CVE-2026-75650 Adobe Commerce/Magento Template Engine SSTI (CVE-2026-75650)?
Adobe Commerce/Magento Template Engine SSTI (CVE-2026-75650) (CVE-2026-75650) maps to the Initial Access and Execution tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.
This page provides production-ready detection logic for Adobe Commerce/Magento Template Engine SSTI (CVE-2026-75650), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Azure App Service HTTP Logs, WAF/Reverse Proxy Logs. The queries below are rated critical severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Initial Access Execution
let templateSig = dynamic(["{{block", "{{trans", "{{config", "{{var", "{{template", "{{depend", "{%", "getData(", "objectManager", "filter/template"]);
AppServiceHTTPLogs
| where CsUriStem has_any ("/admin", "/rest/", "/graphql", "/newsletter", "/customer", "/checkout", "/sendfriend")
| where CsMethod in ("POST", "PUT", "GET")
| extend Payload = strcat(tostring(CsUriQuery), " ", tostring(CsReferer))
| where Payload has_any (templateSig)
| project TimeGenerated, CsHost, CIp, CsMethod, CsUriStem, CsUriQuery, ScStatus, Payload
| sort by TimeGenerated desc Flags HTTP requests to Adobe Commerce/Magento endpoints containing template-engine directive syntax indicative of SSTI exploitation of CVE-2026-75650.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives
- Legitimate CMS/email template editing by admins using {{block}} and {{var}} directives in the Magento admin
- Security scanners and internal penetration testing traffic
- Marketing tools that store templated newsletter content containing directive syntax
Sigma rule & cross-platform mapping
The detection logic for Adobe Commerce/Magento Template Engine SSTI (CVE-2026-75650) (CVE-2026-75650) above is provided in a vendor-neutral
form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the
following logsource:
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:
Platform-specific guides for CVE-2026-75650
References (5)
- https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/magento/apsb26-146.html
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75650
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://thehackernews.com/2026/09/adobe-patches-magento-zero-day.html
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Magento template directive injection via newsletter field
Expected signal: Web access log entry to /newsletter/subscriber/new/ containing {{config ...}} directive syntax.
- Test 2Template directive with objectManager reference
Expected signal: Web access log entry to /sendfriend/ with block/objectManager directive in the query string.
- Test 3Simulated SSTI-to-shell process spawn
Expected signal: Process start event: php/php-fpm parent spawning bash and id under the www-data account.
Response Playbook
Triage
- Extract the full request URI, body and referer from the alert and confirm the payload contains Magento template directives ({{block}}, {{config}}, {{var}}, {%...%}) or objectManager references rather than legitimately stored CMS template markup.
- Identify the target endpoint (admin, /rest/, /graphql, newsletter, sendfriend) and the source IP; check whether the source IP is an authenticated admin session or anonymous storefront traffic.
- Determine the HTTP response status and size — a 200 with a large/reflective body or a 500 error following the directive suggests the template engine attempted to evaluate the injected content.
- Correlate the request timestamp with any child process, file-write or outbound connection events on the web/app host within a 2-minute window.
Containment
- Block the offending source IP(s) at the WAF/reverse proxy and add a virtual-patch rule rejecting template directive syntax on non-admin input fields.
- Apply the Adobe APSB26-146 security update to all Adobe Commerce/Magento instances immediately, per CISA BOD 26-04 prioritization.
- If RCE is confirmed, isolate the affected web/app node from the pool and preserve it for forensics.
Evidence Collection
- Capture the raw web server access and error logs, PHP-FPM logs, and any WAF logs covering the exploitation window.
- Snapshot the Magento var/, pub/media/, generated/ and app/etc/ directories and compute hashes to detect webshells or modified config; export the process execution timeline from EDR.
Escalation Criteria
- ! Escalate to incident response if a shell/interpreter process was spawned by php-fpm/httpd or if new files appeared under web-writable directories after the request.
- ! Escalate if the injected directives reference objectManager, file reads of app/etc/env.php, or database/credential access, indicating data exposure beyond reflection.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
Web server access/error logs and PHP-FPM logs containing the directive payloads - >
New or modified files under var/, pub/media/, generated/ and app/etc/env.php - >
EDR process-tree records showing interpreters spawned from php-fpm/httpd/nginx
Tuning Guidance
Baseline legitimate admin template-editing traffic (typically authenticated sessions hitting /admin CMS block/email-template endpoints) and exclude those source IPs/user sessions. Restrict directive matching on anonymous storefront input fields (newsletter, sendfriend, customer forms) where directive syntax should never legitimately appear. Pair the HTTP-layer rules with the process-spawn EQL/CQL rules to raise confidence before paging.
Hunting Queries
Aggregates Magento template-directive requests by source IP and endpoint to surface systematic SSTI probing of CVE-2026-75650.
AppServiceHTTPLogs | where CsUriQuery has_any ("{{block", "{{config", "objectManager", "filter/template") | summarize count() by CIp, CsUriStem, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h) index=web (uri_query="*{{block*" OR uri_query="*{{config*" OR uri_query="*objectManager*") | stats count by src_ip, uri_path Atomic Red Team Tests
Submits a Magento template directive in a storefront field to simulate SSTI probing of CVE-2026-75650.
Command
curl -sk -X POST 'https://magento.lab.local/newsletter/subscriber/new/' --data-urlencode 'email={{config path="web/unsecure/base_url"}}@test.com' Cleanup
curl -sk -X POST 'https://magento.lab.local/newsletter/subscriber/new/' --data-urlencode '[email protected]' >/dev/null 2>&1 || true Expected Telemetry
Web access log entry to /newsletter/subscriber/new/ containing {{config ...}} directive syntax.
Expected Detection
KQL/SPL/Sumo/QRadar/Chronicle template-directive rules fire on the {{config directive in the request body.
Sends a request containing an objectManager reference typical of Magento SSTI-to-object-instantiation attempts.
Command
curl -sk 'https://magento.lab.local/sendfriend/product/sendmail/?message={{block%20class=%22Magento\\Framework\\ObjectManager%22}}' Cleanup
echo 'no cleanup required' Expected Telemetry
Web access log entry to /sendfriend/ with block/objectManager directive in the query string.
Expected Detection
Directive-matching HTTP rules match on {{block and objectManager tokens.
Simulates the post-exploitation behavior of the PHP worker spawning a shell, which the EQL/CQL process rules detect.
Command
sudo -u www-data bash -c 'php -r "system(\"id\");"' Cleanup
echo 'no cleanup required' Expected Telemetry
Process start event: php/php-fpm parent spawning bash and id under the www-data account.
Expected Detection
Elastic EQL and CrowdStrike CQL process rules fire on the shell/interpreter spawned by the web/PHP worker.