CVE-2026-65400

CVE-2026-65400 — Apple macOS Screen Sharing Improper Authentication Exploitation

Initial Access Lateral Movement Last updated:

Detects exploitation attempts and successful abuse of CVE-2026-65400, an improper authentication vulnerability (CWE-287) in Apple macOS Screen Sharing / Remote Management. An unauthenticated remote attacker can bypass authentication on the Screen Sharing (VNC/ARD) service to gain interactive access to a macOS host. This CVE is on the CISA KEV catalog (BOD 26-04). Detection focuses on anomalous inbound Screen Sharing / ARD connections, screensharingd authentication events, unexpected launches of remote-management daemons, and connections from macOS hosts running vulnerable, unpatched builds.

Vulnerability Intelligence

KEV — Known Exploited

What is CVE-2026-65400 CVE-2026-65400 — Apple macOS Screen Sharing Improper Authentication Exploitation?

CVE-2026-65400 — Apple macOS Screen Sharing Improper Authentication Exploitation (CVE-2026-65400) maps to the Initial Access and Lateral Movement tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.

This page provides production-ready detection logic for CVE-2026-65400 — Apple macOS Screen Sharing Improper Authentication Exploitation, covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, Network Device Logs. The queries below are rated high severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Lateral Movement
Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
kusto
// Anomalous inbound Screen Sharing / ARD (ports 5900/3283) and screensharingd auth events on macOS
let remoteMgmtPorts = dynamic([5900, 3283]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where DeviceType == "Mac" or InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("screensharingd", "ARDAgent", "RemoteManagement")
| where ActionType == "InboundConnectionAccepted"
| where LocalPort in (remoteMgmtPorts)
| where not(ipv4_is_private(RemoteIP)) or RemoteIPType == "Public"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, LocalPort, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| join kind=leftouter (
    DeviceProcessEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where FileName in~ ("screensharingd", "ARDAgent", "sharingd")
    | project DeviceName, AuthProcess=FileName, AuthTime=Timestamp
) on DeviceName
| order by Timestamp desc

Flags inbound Screen Sharing/ARD connections from non-private/public IPs to macOS hosts, correlated with screensharingd authentication process activity indicative of CVE-2026-65400 auth bypass.

high severity medium confidence

Data Sources

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Network Device Logs

Required Tables

DeviceNetworkEvents DeviceProcessEvents

False Positives

  • Legitimate IT remote administration via Apple Remote Desktop from approved management subnets
  • Authorized helpdesk screen sharing sessions initiated over VPN
  • Security scanners probing 5900/3283 during authorized vulnerability assessments

Sigma rule & cross-platform mapping

The detection logic for CVE-2026-65400 — Apple macOS Screen Sharing Improper Authentication Exploitation (CVE-2026-65400) above is provided in a vendor-neutral form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the following logsource:

logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows

Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Enable macOS Screen Sharing service

    Expected signal: launchd loads com.apple.screensharing; screensharingd process starts and begins listening on TCP 5900.

  2. Test 2Enable Apple Remote Desktop / Remote Management

    Expected signal: ARDAgent process activity and a listener on TCP 3283/5900; Remote Management enabled in system preferences.

  3. Test 3Simulate inbound VNC connection to Screen Sharing port

    Expected signal: Inbound TCP connection accepted on port 5900 recorded by host firewall / network sensor with the external source IP.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Confirm the target macOS host's OS build against the patched builds in Apple advisories HT148170/148171/148172; unpatched builds are exploitable.
  2. Determine whether the source IP of the inbound Screen Sharing/ARD connection is an approved management host or an external/unexpected address.
  3. Review screensharingd unified logs (log show --predicate 'process == "screensharingd"') around the connection time for authentication success without a preceding credential prompt.
  4. Check whether Screen Sharing / Remote Management was expected to be enabled on this host at all.

Containment

  1. Immediately disable Screen Sharing and Remote Management (sudo /System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/ARDAgent.app/Contents/Resources/kickstart -deactivate -stop; sudo launchctl unload -w /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.screensharing.plist).
  2. Block inbound TCP 5900 and 3283 at the host and perimeter firewall for affected hosts.
  3. Isolate the host from the network if unauthorized interactive access is confirmed.

Evidence Collection

  1. Preserve unified logs: sudo log collect --output /tmp/cve65400.logarchive and export screensharingd/ARDAgent entries.
  2. Capture firewall and NetFlow records showing the inbound 5900/3283 session, source IP, and byte counts.
  3. Collect /Library/Logs, /var/log/, current process listing, and any new/modified LaunchAgents/LaunchDaemons for post-access persistence.

Escalation Criteria

  • ! Escalate to IR if authentication succeeded from an unapproved or external source IP.
  • ! Escalate if post-connection activity shows new user accounts, persistence, credential access, or lateral movement from the host.
  • ! Escalate if the affected host is unpatched and internet-exposed on 5900/3283.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • > screensharingd and ARDAgent entries in the macOS unified log (log archive)
  • > com.apple.screensharing.plist / com.apple.RemoteManagement launchd state and preferences
  • > Firewall/NetFlow records of inbound 5900/3283 sessions
  • > /var/db/dslocal and account records for any newly created local users

Tuning Guidance

Baseline the set of approved Apple Remote Desktop management hosts and their subnets, then allowlist those source IPs to reduce noise. Prioritize alerts where the source IP is external/public or where screensharingd reports authentication success without an interactive credential prompt. On networks where Screen Sharing is never legitimately used, treat any 5900/3283 inbound acceptance as high fidelity. Confirm affected hosts are unpatched per Apple advisories before raising severity to critical.


Hunting Queries

Hunts for all inbound Screen Sharing/ARD activity across macOS fleet over 30 days to baseline expected admin sources and surface anomalies.

Hunting — KQL
kql
DeviceNetworkEvents | where Timestamp > ago(30d) | where LocalPort in (5900,3283) and ActionType == "InboundConnectionAccepted" | summarize count(), makeset(RemoteIP) by DeviceName | order by count_ desc
Hunting — SPL
spl
index=macos (dest_port=5900 OR dest_port=3283 OR process_name=screensharingd) earliest=-30d | stats count values(src_ip) as src_ips by host | sort - count

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Enable macOS Screen Sharing service
macos

Enables the Screen Sharing (VNC) service on a lab macOS host to generate screensharingd startup telemetry.

Command

bash
sudo launchctl load -w /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.screensharing.plist

Cleanup

bash
sudo launchctl unload -w /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.screensharing.plist

Expected Telemetry

launchd loads com.apple.screensharing; screensharingd process starts and begins listening on TCP 5900.

Expected Detection

Process start of screensharingd and a new listener on port 5900 are observed.

Test 2 Enable Apple Remote Desktop / Remote Management
macos

Activates Remote Management via kickstart on a lab macOS host, exercising ARDAgent and port 3283.

Command

bash
sudo /System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/ARDAgent.app/Contents/Resources/kickstart -activate -configure -allowAccessFor -allUsers -privs -all -restart -agent

Cleanup

bash
sudo /System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/ARDAgent.app/Contents/Resources/kickstart -deactivate -stop

Expected Telemetry

ARDAgent process activity and a listener on TCP 3283/5900; Remote Management enabled in system preferences.

Expected Detection

ARDAgent execution and new remote-management listeners are detected.

Test 3 Simulate inbound VNC connection to Screen Sharing port
linux

From a second lab host, opens a TCP connection to the target's Screen Sharing port to generate an inbound connection event.

Command

bash
nc -vz TARGET_MAC_IP 5900

Cleanup

bash
echo 'no cleanup required — connection is transient'

Expected Telemetry

Inbound TCP connection accepted on port 5900 recorded by host firewall / network sensor with the external source IP.

Expected Detection

Inbound Screen Sharing connection from a non-approved source IP triggers the detection.

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