Microsoft SharePoint Deserialization of Untrusted Data Exploitation (CVE-2026-58644)
Detects exploitation attempts and post-exploitation indicators associated with CVE-2026-58644, a deserialization of untrusted data vulnerability (CWE-502) in Microsoft SharePoint. This vulnerability is listed in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, indicating confirmed active exploitation in the wild. Successful exploitation typically results in remote code execution via crafted serialized payloads submitted to vulnerable SharePoint endpoints (e.g. ViewState, application pages, or REST/SOAP endpoints), often followed by w3wp.exe spawning abnormal child processes, webshell drops into SharePoint application directories, and LSASS/credential access activity.
Vulnerability Intelligence
KEV — Known ExploitedAffected Software
- Vendor
- Microsoft
- Product
- SharePoint
Weakness (CWE)
Timeline
- Disclosed
- July 16, 2026
References & Proof of Concept
- https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-58644
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-58644
What is CVE-2026-58644 Microsoft SharePoint Deserialization of Untrusted Data Exploitation (CVE-2026-58644)?
Microsoft SharePoint Deserialization of Untrusted Data Exploitation (CVE-2026-58644) (CVE-2026-58644) maps to the Initial Access and Execution and Persistence tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.
This page provides production-ready detection logic for Microsoft SharePoint Deserialization of Untrusted Data Exploitation (CVE-2026-58644), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, Windows Security Events. The queries below are rated critical severity at high confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Initial Access Execution Persistence
let SuspiciousProcs = dynamic(["cmd.exe","powershell.exe","powershell_ise.exe","cscript.exe","wscript.exe","mshta.exe","certutil.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","net.exe","whoami.exe"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "w3wp.exe"
| where FileName in~ (SuspiciousProcs)
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("SharePoint", "MSSharePoint", "SPWebApplication", "w3wp")
| extend PoolHint = extract(@"-ap\s+\"?([A-Za-z0-9_\-]+)\"?", 1, InitiatingProcessCommandLine)
| where PoolHint has "SharePoint" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath has "SharePoint"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessId, ProcessId
| order by TimeGenerated desc Detects anomalous child processes spawned by the SharePoint IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) hosting a SharePoint application pool, consistent with successful deserialization exploitation leading to command execution.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives
- Legitimate SharePoint administrative scripts or scheduled maintenance tasks invoking PowerShell/cmd from the app pool identity
- Third-party SharePoint add-ins or health analyzer rules that shell out to system utilities
- Backup or antivirus agents instrumented into the SharePoint worker process context
Sigma rule & cross-platform mapping
The detection logic for Microsoft SharePoint Deserialization of Untrusted Data Exploitation (CVE-2026-58644) (CVE-2026-58644) above is provided in a vendor-neutral
form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the
following logsource:
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:
Platform-specific guides for CVE-2026-58644
References (4)
- https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-58644
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-58644
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Simulate Suspicious Child Process from w3wp.exe
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1 process creation showing parent process w3wp.exe launching cmd.exe with command line containing 'whoami'.
- Test 2Simulate Webshell Drop in SharePoint Directory
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11 file creation event for test_atomic.aspx under the SharePoint LAYOUTS directory, ideally attributed to w3wp.exe or an interactive PowerShell session.
- Test 3Simulate Encoded PowerShell Execution from IIS Context
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1 showing powershell.exe with -EncodedCommand flag and a parent process context simulating w3wp.exe.
- Test 4Simulate SharePoint ViewState Tampering Request
Expected signal: IIS W3SVC log entry recording the POST request with an oversized/malformed __VIEWSTATE parameter, and a corresponding SharePoint ULS log exception.
Response Playbook
Triage
- Confirm the alerting host is a SharePoint server (check IIS site bindings and running w3wp.exe application pools) and identify the affected application pool/site collection.
- Review the full command line and parent-child process lineage of the suspicious child process to determine if it matches known post-exploitation patterns (encoded PowerShell, webshell writes, LOLBin abuse).
- Check IIS logs and SharePoint ULS logs for anomalous POST requests to ViewState, REST (_api), SOAP (_vti_bin), or custom application pages around the time of the alert, especially large or malformed payloads.
- Determine if the vulnerable SharePoint server is internet-facing; CISA KEV listing indicates active exploitation, so internet-exposed instances should be treated as high priority.
- Search for newly created or modified .aspx files in SharePoint web application directories (webshells) and unexpected DLLs loaded by w3wp.exe.
Containment
- Isolate the affected SharePoint server from the network (or restrict inbound traffic to trusted admin IPs only) while preserving the host for forensic collection.
- Disable or restrict the affected application pool/site if active exploitation is confirmed, and rotate machine keys and service account credentials used by the SharePoint farm.
- Apply the vendor security update addressing CVE-2026-58644 to all affected SharePoint servers, prioritizing internet-facing instances per CISA BOD 26-04 guidance.
Evidence Collection
- Collect IIS W3SVC logs, SharePoint ULS logs, and Sysmon/EDR process, file, and network telemetry for the affected host covering the suspected exploitation window.
- Preserve memory and disk images of the affected SharePoint server, including any suspected webshell files, before remediation actions overwrite evidence.
- Export w3wp.exe process tree, loaded modules, and any dropped files or scheduled tasks created around the time of the alert.
Escalation Criteria
- ! Escalate immediately if a webshell, unauthorized administrative account, or lateral movement (e.g., LSASS access, SMB/WinRM connections to other hosts) is confirmed originating from the SharePoint server.
- ! Escalate to incident response leadership if the SharePoint server is internet-facing, given active KEV exploitation status, or if evidence indicates data exfiltration from SharePoint content databases.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
IIS W3SVC logs showing POST requests to SharePoint endpoints (ViewState, _api, _vti_bin, custom pages) with anomalous payload sizes or content types - >
SharePoint ULS (Unified Logging Service) logs capturing exceptions or errors related to deserialization/ViewState validation failures - >
Newly created or modified .aspx/.ashx files within the SharePoint 15/16 hive or web application content directories - >
Sysmon Event ID 1 (process creation) and Event ID 11 (file creation) records showing w3wp.exe spawning processes or writing files
Tuning Guidance
Baseline known legitimate SharePoint automation accounts, scheduled timer jobs, and third-party add-ins that intentionally spawn child processes from w3wp.exe, and add them as exclusions by process hash, parent command-line pattern, or service account. Because exploitation of CVE-2026-58644 is confirmed active (CISA KEV), avoid broadly suppressing this detection; instead narrow false positives with allowlists for verified maintenance scripts and monitor internet-facing SharePoint farms with the highest priority per CISA BOD 26-04.
Hunting Queries
Hunts for suspicious file writes of .aspx/.ashx files by the SharePoint w3wp.exe process, indicative of webshell deployment following deserialization exploitation.
DeviceFileEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "w3wp.exe"
| where FileNameExtension in~ ("aspx","ashx","asmx")
| where FolderPath has_any ("TEMPLATE\\LAYOUTS", "wwwroot", "15\\TEMPLATE", "16\\TEMPLATE")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType
| order by TimeGenerated desc index=sysmon EventCode=11 Image="*\\w3wp.exe*" TargetFilename="*.aspx" OR TargetFilename="*.ashx"
| stats count by host, Image, TargetFilename, _time
| sort -_time Atomic Red Team Tests
Simulates a SharePoint worker process spawning a command interpreter, mimicking post-deserialization-exploitation command execution.
Command
powershell.exe -Command "Start-Process -FilePath 'cmd.exe' -ArgumentList '/c whoami' -WindowStyle Hidden" # Run this from a process renamed/impersonating w3wp.exe in a lab VM for detection validation only Cleanup
Terminate any spawned cmd.exe/whoami.exe processes; no persistent changes are made. Expected Telemetry
Sysmon Event ID 1 process creation showing parent process w3wp.exe launching cmd.exe with command line containing 'whoami'.
Expected Detection
KQL/SPL/EQL rules should trigger on w3wp.exe spawning cmd.exe in the lab environment.
Simulates dropping a benign .aspx test file into a SharePoint LAYOUTS directory to validate webshell-drop detection logic (lab environment only, non-functional test file).
Command
powershell.exe -Command "'<%@ Page Language=\"C#\" %><%-- test artifact --%>' | Out-File -FilePath 'C:\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\wss\\VirtualDirectories\\80\\_layouts\\15\\test_atomic.aspx' -Encoding ascii" Cleanup
Remove-Item 'C:\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\wss\\VirtualDirectories\\80\\_layouts\\15\\test_atomic.aspx' -Force Expected Telemetry
Sysmon Event ID 11 file creation event for test_atomic.aspx under the SharePoint LAYOUTS directory, ideally attributed to w3wp.exe or an interactive PowerShell session.
Expected Detection
File-creation hunting query should surface the new .aspx artifact for analyst review.
Simulates a base64-encoded PowerShell command execution pattern commonly observed after successful web application deserialization exploits.
Command
powershell.exe -EncodedCommand JABQAFMAVgBlAHIAcwBpAG8AbgBUAGEAYgBsAGUALgBQAFMAVgBlAHIAcwBpAG8AbgA= # decodes to a benign $PSVersionTable.PSVersion read for lab validation Cleanup
No persistent artifacts created; no cleanup required beyond closing the PowerShell session. Expected Telemetry
Sysmon Event ID 1 showing powershell.exe with -EncodedCommand flag and a parent process context simulating w3wp.exe.
Expected Detection
Detections monitoring encoded PowerShell execution spawned from IIS worker processes should alert on this activity.
Sends a crafted HTTP POST with an anomalous __VIEWSTATE parameter to a lab SharePoint test page to validate IIS/ULS log-based hunting for malformed deserialization payloads.
Command
curl -s -X POST 'http://sharepoint-lab.local/_layouts/15/test.aspx' --data '__VIEWSTATE=AAAA_TEST_MALFORMED_PAYLOAD_AAAA&__EVENTVALIDATION=TEST' -H 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded' Cleanup
No server-side state change occurs from the malformed request; no cleanup required. Expected Telemetry
IIS W3SVC log entry recording the POST request with an oversized/malformed __VIEWSTATE parameter, and a corresponding SharePoint ULS log exception.
Expected Detection
Log-based hunting queries against IIS/ULS logs should flag the anomalous ViewState payload for review.