CVE-2026-47140 IBM QRadar · QRadar

Detect CVE-2026-47140 — vm2 Builtin Denylist Bypass via process/inspector Leads to Host RCE in IBM QRadar

Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-47140, a critical sandbox escape in the npm vm2 package (versions <= 3.11.3). Attackers bypass the builtin module denylist using process and inspector/promises references to execute arbitrary code on the host Node.js process. CVSS 10.0. PoC is publicly available.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Execution Privilege Escalation Lateral Movement

QRadar Detection Query

IBM QRadar (QRadar)
sql
SELECT
  DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'YYYY-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS event_time,
  sourceip,
  destinationip,
  username,
  processname,
  "Process Command Line" AS cmdline,
  QIDNAME(qid) AS event_name,
  logsourcename(logsourceid) AS log_source
FROM events
WHERE
  LOGSOURCETYPENAME(devicetype) IN ('Microsoft Windows Security Event Log', 'Sysmon')
  AND (processname ILIKE '%node%' OR processname ILIKE '%node.exe%')
  AND (
    "Process Command Line" ILIKE '%vm2%'
    OR "Process Command Line" ILIKE '%NodeVM%'
    OR "Process Command Line" ILIKE '%new VM%'
  )
  AND (
    destinationip NOT INCIDR '10.0.0.0/8'
    AND destinationip NOT INCIDR '172.16.0.0/12'
    AND destinationip NOT INCIDR '192.168.0.0/16'
    AND destinationip NOT INCIDR '127.0.0.0/8'
    AND destinationip IS NOT NULL
  )
  AND DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'YYYY-MM-dd') = DATEFORMAT(NOW(), 'YYYY-MM-dd')
ORDER BY starttime DESC
LIMIT 500
critical severity medium confidence

QRadar AQL query identifying Node.js processes referencing vm2 that establish outbound connections to non-RFC1918 addresses, indicating possible post-sandbox-escape C2 or exfiltration.

Data Sources

QRadar Windows DSMQRadar Sysmon DSMQRadar Universal DSM

Required Tables

events

False Positives & Tuning

  • Node.js applications legitimately using vm2 with authorized external connectivity
  • SaaS platforms that use vm2 for user-code sandboxing with expected external calls
  • Development environments where vm2 is used alongside services requiring internet access
  • Serverless functions using vm2 for isolation that make legitimate API calls

Other platforms for CVE-2026-47140


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1vm2 Sandbox Escape via inspector/promises — Host Code Execution

    Expected signal: Sysmon/auditd will log: (1) node process launch with vm2 in path or arguments, (2) file creation event at /tmp/vm2_escape_poc.txt by the node process, (3) a child process or execSync call spawning sh/bash from within node

  2. Test 2vm2 Escape with Outbound Network Callback (Simulated C2 Beacon)

    Expected signal: Network flow logs will show an outbound HTTP connection to example.com originating from the node process PID. EDR should capture the network connect event and correlate it to the parent node process with vm2 in its command line.

  3. Test 3vm2 Escape via process.binding — Enumerate Host Environment Secrets

    Expected signal: File write event at /tmp/vm2_env_harvest.json attributed to node process. Process event showing node with potential vm2-related arguments. EDR may also capture the internal environment variable enumeration if it hooks process.env access.

Unlock Pro Content

Get the full detection package for CVE-2026-47140 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.

Response PlaybookInvestigation GuideHunting QueriesAtomic Red Team TestsTuning Guidance

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