Detect Dell RecoverPoint for Virtual Machines (RP4VMs) Hard-coded Credentials Exploitation in CrowdStrike LogScale
Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-22769, a hard-coded credentials vulnerability in Dell RecoverPoint for Virtual Machines (RP4VMs). Threat actors (including UNC6201) have actively exploited this zero-day to gain unauthorized access to RP4VMs appliances, enabling lateral movement, data exfiltration, and ransomware deployment within virtualized environments. The hard-coded credentials allow unauthenticated remote access to RP4VMs management interfaces.
MITRE ATT&CK
LogScale Detection Query
#event_simpleName IN ("UserLogon", "UserLogonFailed2", "ProcessRollup2", "NetworkConnectIP4")
| UserName IN ["admin", "support", "boxmgmt", "root", "service", "recover"]
| ComputerName MATCHES "(?i)(recoverpoint|rp4vm|rpa\\d)"
| LogonType_decimal IN [3, 10, 11]
| Success_decimal = 1
| groupBy([ComputerName, UserName, RemoteAddressIP4, LogonType_decimal], function=count(aid, as=event_count))
| sort(event_count, order=desc)
| rename RemoteAddressIP4 as source_ip
| rename LogonType_decimal as logon_typeCrowdStrike Falcon LogScale (CQL) query detecting successful remote logon events on Dell RP4VMs hosts using known hard-coded or default usernames. Groups results by host, username, and source IP to highlight repeated exploitation attempts and successful sessions.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Falcon sensor deployed on RP4VMs hosts with default service accounts still active pending hardening
- Automated CrowdStrike RTR sessions initiated with default credentials for initial sensor enrollment
- System-level logon events misclassified as user interactive sessions by the Falcon sensor on RP4VMs Linux builds
- IT operations scripts using shared default credentials for multi-appliance RP4VMs administration
Other platforms for CVE-2026-22769
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1RP4VMs Default Credential SSH Authentication Simulation
Expected signal: SSH authentication event in /var/log/auth.log on the target RP4VMs appliance showing 'Accepted password for admin from <attacker_ip>'. SIEM should receive this via syslog forwarding from the appliance.
- Test 2RP4VMs Post-Exploitation Command Execution via Hard-coded Credentials
Expected signal: SSH session opened for user 'support' followed by process execution events (cat, ps, netstat/ss, find) visible in Auditd or Falco telemetry if deployed on the RP4VMs Linux host.
- Test 3RP4VMs Credential Discovery — Searching for Additional Credentials Post-Compromise
Expected signal: Auditd EXECVE syscall events for grep, cat, and env commands executed under the 'boxmgmt' user context on the RP4VMs host. File access events for /etc directory traversal.
- Test 4RP4VMs Persistence — Unauthorized SSH Key Installation
Expected signal: File write event to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys under the 'admin' user account on the RP4VMs host. Auditd or Falco should capture the open/write syscalls against the authorized_keys file path.
References (4)
- https://www.dell.com/support/kbdoc/en-us/000426773/dsa-2026-079
- https://www.dell.com/support/kbdoc/en-us/000426742/recoverpoint-for-vms-apply-the-remediation-script-for-dsa
- https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc6201-exploiting-dell-recoverpoint-zero-day
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22769
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