CVE-2026-20805

Microsoft Windows Information Disclosure (CVE-2026-20805)

Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-20805, a Microsoft Windows information disclosure vulnerability (CWE-200) that allows attackers to access sensitive memory or kernel data. This vulnerability is actively exploited in the wild (CISA KEV). Successful exploitation may expose credentials, memory contents, or system information that enables privilege escalation or lateral movement.

Vulnerability Intelligence

KEV — Known Exploited

Affected Software

Vendor
Microsoft
Product
Windows

Weakness (CWE)

Timeline

Disclosed
January 13, 2026

CVSS

Unscored
Write-up coming soon

What is CVE-2026-20805 Microsoft Windows Information Disclosure (CVE-2026-20805)?

Microsoft Windows Information Disclosure (CVE-2026-20805) (CVE-2026-20805) maps to the Credential Access and Discovery and Privilege Escalation tactics — the adversary is trying to steal account names and passwords in MITRE ATT&CK.

This page provides production-ready detection logic for Microsoft Windows Information Disclosure (CVE-2026-20805), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, Microsoft Sentinel, Windows Security Events. The queries below are rated high severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Credential Access Discovery Privilege Escalation
Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
kusto
let timeWindow = 24h;
union DeviceEvents, DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(timeWindow)
| where DeviceId in (
    DeviceInfo
    | where OSPlatform startswith "Windows"
    | distinct DeviceId
)
| where (ActionType in ("SensitiveFileRead", "CredentialAccess", "KernelDriverLoaded", "NtQuerySystemInformation") or
    (ProcessCommandLine has_any ("NtQuerySystemInformation", "ZwQuerySystemInformation", "ReadProcessMemory", "OpenProcess") and
     InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel in~ ("Low", "Medium")))
| extend SuspiciousScore = case(
    InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel =~ "Low" and ActionType == "KernelDriverLoaded", 3,
    ProcessCommandLine has_any ("NtQuerySystemInformation", "ZwQuerySystemInformation"), 2,
    ActionType == "SensitiveFileRead" and InitiatingProcessAccountName !in~ ("SYSTEM", "LOCAL SERVICE", "NETWORK SERVICE"), 2,
    1)
| where SuspiciousScore >= 2
| summarize EventCount = count(), Actions = make_set(ActionType), Processes = make_set(InitiatingProcessFileName), Score = max(SuspiciousScore) by DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, bin(Timestamp, 1h)
| where EventCount >= 2
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, DeviceId, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Actions, Processes, EventCount, Score
| order by Score desc, EventCount desc

Detects patterns consistent with CVE-2026-20805 exploitation: low/medium integrity processes invoking Windows kernel information disclosure APIs (NtQuerySystemInformation, ZwQuerySystemInformation) or performing sensitive file reads outside of expected SYSTEM-level context.

high severity medium confidence

Data Sources

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Microsoft Sentinel Windows Security Events

Required Tables

DeviceEvents DeviceProcessEvents DeviceInfo

False Positives

  • Legitimate security scanning tools (e.g., Sysinternals ProcMon, Process Hacker) querying system information
  • Antivirus or EDR agents performing routine kernel-level enumeration
  • System administration scripts running under non-SYSTEM accounts with elevated permissions
  • Performance monitoring software reading process or memory metrics

Sigma rule & cross-platform mapping

The detection logic for Microsoft Windows Information Disclosure (CVE-2026-20805) (CVE-2026-20805) above is provided in a vendor-neutral form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the following logsource:

logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows

Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1NtQuerySystemInformation via PowerShell P/Invoke

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Create) for powershell.exe; Windows Event ID 4688 if process command line auditing is enabled; EDR process telemetry capturing the PowerShell invocation with P/Invoke patterns.

  2. Test 2LSASS Handle Open with VM_READ Access

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) with TargetImage=lsass.exe, GrantedAccess=0x0010 (PROCESS_VM_READ), SourceImage=powershell.exe; Windows Security Event ID 4656 for handle request to LSASS process object.

  3. Test 3Sensitive Registry Hive Access from Low Integrity Context

    Expected signal: Windows Security Event ID 4663 with ObjectName containing SECURITY hive path; Sysmon Event ID 1 for process creation with low integrity level token; Event ID 4656 for registry key open with sensitive access mask.

Unlock Pro Content

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Response PlaybookInvestigation GuideHunting QueriesAtomic Red Team TestsTuning Guidance

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