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CVE-2026-17239 Splunk · SPL

Detect IBM API Connect Path Traversal RCE (CVE-2026-17239) in Splunk

Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-17239, a path traversal vulnerability (CWE-22) in IBM API Connect 12.1.0.0 through 12.1.1.2 that allows a remote authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code. Exploitation typically manifests as HTTP requests to API Connect management/provider endpoints containing directory-traversal sequences (../, encoded variants) used to write or read files outside the intended directory, leading to code execution. This detection surfaces traversal patterns in web/proxy logs targeting API Connect, suspicious file writes to API Connect web-accessible or configuration directories, and anomalous child processes spawned by API Connect / Node.js runtime processes.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Execution

SPL Detection Query

Splunk (SPL)
spl
``` df00tech DF00-de67841fb1 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-17239 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web (sourcetype="iis" OR sourcetype="apache:access" OR sourcetype="ms:iis:auto")
| eval raw_uri=uri_path."?".uri_query
| eval decoded=urldecode(raw_uri)
| where (like(uri_path,"%/apiconnect%") OR like(uri_path,"%/manager%") OR like(uri_path,"%/provider%") OR like(uri_path,"%/consumer%") OR like(uri_path,"%/analytics%"))
| where (match(decoded,"\.\.(/|\\\\)") OR match(raw_uri,"(?i)(\.\.%2f|%2e%2e%2f|\.\.%5c|\.\.%252f|\.\./)"))
| search (status=200 OR status=201 OR status=302 OR status=500)
| table _time, src_ip, user, method, uri_path, uri_query, status, host
| sort - _time
critical severity medium confidence

Searches web access logs for path-traversal sequences in requests to IBM API Connect endpoints with a successful or server-error response.

Data Sources

Web Server LogsIIS Logs

Required Sourcetypes

iisapache:accessms:iis:auto

False Positives & Tuning

  • Benign query parameters containing literal dot-dot strings
  • Authorized vulnerability scanning of API Connect hosts
  • URL normalization by upstream proxies producing false traversal matches

Other platforms for CVE-2026-17239


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Encoded path traversal request to API Connect endpoint

    Expected signal: Web/IIS access log entry with URI /apiconnect/provider/..%2f..%2f..%2fetc%2fpasswd and an authenticated session

  2. Test 2 Double-encoded traversal probe

    Expected signal: Web log entry containing ..%252f against the /apiconnect/manager path

  3. Test 3 Simulated runtime child process spawn

    Expected signal: Process creation event with parent process name 'node' spawning a shell/recon command (id, whoami)

Last updated: Research depth: standard
References (2)

Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Confirm the target host runs IBM API Connect and identify its version; versions 12.1.0.0 through 12.1.1.2 are vulnerable and must be patched to 12.1.1.3 or later.
  2. Decode the full request URI and parameters to confirm genuine path-traversal sequences (../, ..%2f, %2e%2e%2f, double-encoded variants) rather than benign dot-dot literals.
  3. Identify the authenticated user account tied to the request (attack requires authentication) and determine whether that account is expected to call the targeted endpoint.
  4. Correlate the request timestamp with any new or modified files in API Connect web-accessible, upload, or configuration directories.
  5. Check whether the API Connect runtime (Node.js/Java) spawned any unexpected child processes shortly after the request.

Containment

  1. Isolate or network-restrict the affected API Connect node pending investigation, blocking inbound access from the source IP at the WAF/load balancer.
  2. Revoke or reset credentials and API tokens for the authenticated account used in the traversal attempt.
  3. Apply the IBM fix (upgrade to API Connect 12.1.1.3) or vendor-provided mitigation before returning the node to service.

Evidence Collection

  1. Preserve web/proxy/IIS access logs showing the full raw and decoded request URI, source IP, and authenticated user.
  2. Capture a file-system snapshot of API Connect directories and hash any files created or modified around the event time.
  3. Collect process execution telemetry and command lines for children of the API Connect runtime process.
  4. Export authentication logs to establish how the attacker obtained the authenticated session.

Escalation Criteria

  • !Escalate to incident response if a file write outside the intended directory or a spawned shell/recon process is confirmed, indicating achieved code execution.
  • !Escalate if the authenticated account shows signs of compromise (anomalous source IP, impossible travel, or credential reuse across hosts).
  • !Escalate if multiple traversal attempts, lateral movement, or persistence artifacts are observed on the API Connect host.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • >Web/IIS/proxy access log entries containing encoded or raw ../ sequences targeting API Connect endpoints
  • >Newly created or modified files in API Connect web-accessible, upload, or config directories
  • >Child-process and command-line records for the Node.js/Java runtime service account
  • >Authentication and session logs for the account used in the traversal request

Tuning Guidance

Baseline legitimate API Connect endpoints and query parameters that may contain literal dot-dot strings, and allowlist authorized vulnerability scanners by source IP. Prioritize alerts where the request is followed by a file write in API Connect directories or a shell/recon child process of the runtime, as these indicate code execution rather than a blocked probe. Scope the web-log queries to hosts confirmed to run vulnerable versions (12.1.0.0-12.1.1.2) to reduce noise.


Hunting Queries

Aggregates path-traversal attempts against API Connect endpoints by source IP and user to surface repeated or distributed probing.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-de67841fb1 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-17239 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | where csUriStem has "apiconnect" or csUriQuery has "%2e%2e" | extend d = url_decode(csUriQuery) | where d has "../" or d has "..\\" | summarize count() by cIP, csUserName, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-de67841fb1 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-17239 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web (sourcetype=iis OR sourcetype=apache:access) | eval d=urldecode(uri_query) | where like(uri_path,"%apiconnect%") AND (match(d,"\.\.(/|\\\\)")) | stats count by src_ip, user

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Encoded path traversal request to API Connect endpoint
linux

Sends an HTTP request with a URL-encoded path-traversal sequence to a simulated API Connect endpoint to generate web-log telemetry.

Command

bash
curl -s -o /dev/null -k 'https://localhost:9443/apiconnect/provider/..%2f..%2f..%2fetc%2fpasswd' -H 'Authorization: Bearer TESTTOKEN'

Cleanup

bash
echo 'No cleanup required; stateless HTTP request.'

Expected Telemetry

Web/IIS access log entry with URI /apiconnect/provider/..%2f..%2f..%2fetc%2fpasswd and an authenticated session

Expected Detection

The kql, spl, qradar_aql, sumo_logic and chronicle_yaral queries match the traversal sequence against an API Connect endpoint.

Test 2 Double-encoded traversal probe
linux

Issues a double-URL-encoded traversal request to verify detection of evasion variants.

Command

bash
curl -s -o /dev/null -k 'https://localhost:9443/apiconnect/manager/..%252f..%252fconfig' -H 'Authorization: Bearer TESTTOKEN'

Cleanup

bash
echo 'No cleanup required.'

Expected Telemetry

Web log entry containing ..%252f against the /apiconnect/manager path

Expected Detection

The spl and qradar_aql queries match the ..%252f double-encoded pattern.

Test 3 Simulated runtime child process spawn
linux

Spawns a shell from a process named to mimic the API Connect Node.js runtime to exercise the endpoint-based CQL detection.

Command

bash
cp /bin/sh /tmp/node && /tmp/node -c 'id; whoami'

Cleanup

bash
rm -f /tmp/node

Expected Telemetry

Process creation event with parent process name 'node' spawning a shell/recon command (id, whoami)

Expected Detection

The crowdstrike_cql query matches a shell/recon child process spawned by a node-named parent process.

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