Detect Incus TLS Trusted-Certificate Authentication Bypass (CVE-2026-130778) in Google Chronicle
Detects exploitation attempts and indicators of CVE-2026-130778, a critical (CVSS 10.0) authentication bypass in the Incus container and VM manager before 7.6.0. The flaw (CWE-287) allows a remote attacker to authenticate to the Incus HTTPS API as any trusted client by presenting a crafted certificate whose public key matches a trusted certificate, effectively impersonating a trusted identity without possessing the corresponding private key. Successful exploitation grants full API access, enabling creation/modification of instances, execution of commands inside instances, and host compromise. This detection surfaces anomalous authenticated access to the Incus API (TCP 8443) from new or unexpected client certificates, privileged API operations following a new-certificate TLS handshake, and version fingerprints of vulnerable Incus daemons.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Initial Access Stealth
YARA-L Detection Query
// df00tech DF00-3d1febb5fb · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-130778 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
rule incus_cert_auth_bypass_cve_2026_130778 {
meta:
author = "Argus Detection Platform"
description = "Incus trusted-certificate authentication bypass (CVE-2026-130778)"
severity = "CRITICAL"
events:
$e.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH" or $e.metadata.event_type = "GENERIC_EVENT"
(re.regex($e.principal.process.command_line, `incusd|incus`) or re.regex($e.target.application, `incus`))
re.regex($e.metadata.description, `(?i)certificate`)
re.regex($e.metadata.description, `(?i)untrusted|new certificate|fingerprint`)
$host = $e.principal.hostname
match:
$host over 5m
condition:
$e
} YARA-L rule matching Incus daemon events referencing untrusted/new client certificates, indicative of the CVE-2026-130778 public-key impersonation bypass.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- New certificate onboarding by admins.
- Automated certificate rotation.
- Monitoring reconnections after restart.
Other platforms for CVE-2026-130778
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.
- Test 1 Query Incus daemon version for vulnerable release
Expected signal: Process execution of incus/incusd with --version; version string in output.
- Test 2 List Incus trusted certificates
Expected signal: incus process launch; trust-store read; list of certificate fingerprints and names.
- Test 3 Simulate client authentication to Incus API with a fresh certificate
Expected signal: TLS handshake to 8443 with a new client certificate; Incus daemon logs an untrusted/new certificate authentication attempt with its fingerprint.
Response Playbook
Triage
- Confirm the Incus daemon version on the affected host (`incus version` or package metadata); any version before 7.6.0 is vulnerable to CVE-2026-130778.
- Identify the client certificate fingerprint used in the flagged authentication and compare it against the list of expected trusted certificates (`incus config trust list`).
- Determine the source IP of the authenticating client and verify whether it belongs to a known/authorised management host or automation system.
- Review API activity performed in the session following the suspicious authentication (instance create/exec, certificate additions, cluster changes) for unauthorised operations.
Containment
- If the authentication is confirmed unauthorised, immediately restrict network access to the Incus API (TCP 8443) to known management IPs via host firewall or security group.
- Revoke the suspicious/unexpected client certificate with `incus config trust remove <fingerprint>` and rotate all remaining trusted client certificates.
- Upgrade Incus to 7.6.0 or later on all affected hosts to remediate the public-key impersonation flaw.
Evidence Collection
- Capture the Incus daemon logs (journalctl -u incus / incusd) covering the authentication window, preserving certificate fingerprints and source IPs.
- Export the current trust store (`incus config trust list`) and snapshot affected instance configurations and recent task history (`incus operation list`) before remediation.
Escalation Criteria
- !Escalate to incident response if an unexpected certificate successfully authenticated AND privileged operations (instance exec, certificate addition, cluster/project changes) followed.
- !Escalate if the Incus version is confirmed vulnerable and the API port is reachable from untrusted networks, regardless of whether exploitation is yet confirmed.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
Incus daemon logs (journald unit incus/incusd) showing certificate fingerprints and authentication outcomes. - >
The Incus trust store database (`incus config trust list`) and the server certificate/config under /var/lib/incus/. - >
Network flow records for TCP 8443 and instance operation/task history (`incus operation list`).
Tuning Guidance
Baseline the set of legitimate trusted certificate fingerprints and authorised management source IPs for each Incus host, then suppress those from alerting so only new/unexpected certificates or sources trigger. If certificate rotation is automated, allowlist the rotation host and schedule window. Prioritise alerts where a new fingerprint is immediately followed by privileged API operations (instance exec, trust additions, cluster changes).
Hunting Queries
Enumerate distinct client-certificate fingerprints authenticating to Incus daemons over time to spot newly appearing or anomalous certificates consistent with the CVE-2026-130778 impersonation bypass.
// df00tech DF00-3d1febb5fb · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-130778 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
Syslog | where ProcessName has_any ("incusd","incus") | where SyslogMessage has "certificate" | extend fp=extract("fingerprint[=:\\s]+([a-fA-F0-9]{16,64})",1,SyslogMessage) | summarize count() by Computer, fp, bin(TimeGenerated,1h) ``` df00tech DF00-3d1febb5fb · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-130778 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=linux (incusd OR incus) certificate | rex "fingerprint[=:\s]+(?<fp>[a-fA-F0-9]{16,64})" | stats count by host, fp Atomic Red Team Tests
Determines whether the installed Incus version is affected by CVE-2026-130778 (before 7.6.0).
Command
incus version || incusd --version Cleanup
echo 'no cleanup required' Expected Telemetry
Process execution of incus/incusd with --version; version string in output.
Expected Detection
Version fingerprint below 7.6.0 identifies a vulnerable host (informational; pairs with network exposure checks).
Enumerates trusted client certificates in the Incus trust store to establish a baseline and detect unexpected entries.
Command
incus config trust list --format csv Cleanup
echo 'read-only, no cleanup required' Expected Telemetry
incus process launch; trust-store read; list of certificate fingerprints and names.
Expected Detection
New or unexpected fingerprints in the trust store surface as candidates for the impersonation bypass.
In a lab, generates a new client certificate and attempts an authenticated API call to the Incus HTTPS endpoint, generating the daemon-side authentication telemetry the detection keys on.
Command
openssl req -x509 -newkey ec -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:secp384r1 -nodes -keyout /tmp/atk.key -out /tmp/atk.crt -days 1 -subj '/CN=atk'; curl -sk --cert /tmp/atk.crt --key /tmp/atk.key https://127.0.0.1:8443/1.0 | head -c 400 Cleanup
rm -f /tmp/atk.key /tmp/atk.crt Expected Telemetry
TLS handshake to 8443 with a new client certificate; Incus daemon logs an untrusted/new certificate authentication attempt with its fingerprint.
Expected Detection
The KQL/SPL/EQL rules flag the new untrusted certificate authenticating against the Incus API.