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CVE-2026-130675 Splunk · SPL

Detect Craft CMS ImageTransforms RCE via normalizeTransform() Object Instantiation (CVE-2026-130675) in Splunk

Detects exploitation attempts and post-exploitation indicators for CVE-2026-130675, a critical (CVSS 9.3) remote code execution vulnerability in Craft CMS versions 5.0.0 through 5.11.3. The flaw lives in ImageTransforms::normalizeTransform(), where improper comparison logic (CWE-697) allows an attacker-controlled transform definition to drive instantiation of arbitrary PHP classes. By supplying a crafted 'transform' value in an image-transform request, an attacker can instantiate a class of their choosing (and influence its constructor arguments), leading to code execution in the context of the web server. This detection surfaces anomalous transform parameters, suspicious class/namespace tokens in image endpoint requests, and the child-process and file-write behaviour typical of PHP-based RCE on a Craft CMS host. Remediation is upgrade to Craft CMS 5.11.4 or later.

Based on Craft CMS Security Advisory GHSA-hq78-cm2m-h24h

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Execution

SPL Detection Query

Splunk (SPL)
spl
``` df00tech DF00-c22c57d4d1 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-130675 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web (sourcetype="iis" OR sourcetype="nginx:plus:access" OR sourcetype="access_combined")
| eval decoded=urldecode(uri_query)
| search (uri_path="*/index.php" OR uri_path="*transform*" OR decoded="*transform*")
| regex decoded="(normalizeTransform|__class|__construct|\\\\|craft\\|yii\\|system\(|passthru|eval\(|phar:\/\/)"
| stats count min(_time) as firstSeen max(_time) as lastSeen values(uri_path) as paths values(decoded) as queries by src_ip, http_user_agent
| where count > 0
| convert ctime(firstSeen) ctime(lastSeen)
critical severity medium confidence

Searches Craft CMS web access logs for decoded transform parameters carrying PHP class/namespace or command-execution tokens associated with CVE-2026-130675 exploitation.

Data Sources

Web Server LogsIIS LogsNginx Access Logs

Required Sourcetypes

iisnginx:plus:accessaccess_combined

False Positives & Tuning

  • Custom transform handles legitimately containing namespace-like separators
  • Automated uptime/health-check probes hitting image endpoints
  • Internal QA and penetration-test traffic against the CMS

Other platforms for CVE-2026-130675


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Crafted transform parameter with PHP class token

    Expected signal: Web server access log entry with decoded query containing __class and craft\ namespace tokens on the transform parameter.

  2. Test 2 Phar wrapper in transform parameter

    Expected signal: Access log shows decoded transform value containing the phar:// wrapper.

  3. Test 3 PHP web process spawns shell

    Expected signal: Process-creation event showing sh/id/whoami spawned with a php parent process.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Confirm the target host runs Craft CMS and determine the exact version; anything in 5.0.0-5.11.3 is vulnerable and must be treated as potentially compromised.
  2. Decode and inspect the flagged transform parameter, look for PHP namespace separators, __class/__construct tokens, phar:// wrappers, or command-execution strings that indicate class instantiation abuse.
  3. Correlate the web request timestamp with process-start, file-write and outbound-network telemetry on the host to determine whether code execution actually occurred.
  4. Review the HTTP response status and size for the flagged requests to gauge whether the exploit attempt succeeded or was rejected.

Containment

  1. Isolate the affected web host from the network to prevent lateral movement and C2, preserving volatile state for forensics.
  2. Upgrade Craft CMS to 5.11.4 or later; if immediate patching is not possible, apply a WAF rule blocking transform parameters containing namespace separators or class tokens.
  3. Rotate Craft CMS security keys, database credentials, and any secrets accessible from the web application context.

Evidence Collection

  1. Capture the full web server access and error logs covering the suspicious requests, plus PHP-FPM logs.
  2. Preserve a forensic image or snapshot of the web root and runtime/storage directories to capture any dropped webshells or generated PHP files.
  3. Export EDR process-tree, file-write and network-connection events for the web-server/PHP process around the incident window.

Escalation Criteria

  • !Escalate to incident response if a shell, discovery command, or outbound connection is observed spawned from the PHP/web-server process following a flagged transform request.
  • !Escalate if new or modified PHP files, phar archives, or webshells are found in the Craft CMS web root or storage directories.
  • !Escalate if the same source IP shows successful (2xx) responses to multiple crafted transform requests across hosts.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • >Web server access/error logs with crafted transform query strings
  • >PHP-FPM logs and any newly created PHP/phar files under the Craft web root and storage/runtime directories
  • >EDR process-creation records showing shells spawned by php-fpm/httpd/w3wp

Tuning Guidance

Baseline the legitimate transform handles used by your Craft installation and allowlist those exact values before alerting. If no custom transforms use namespace separators, treat any backslash in a transform parameter as high fidelity. Pair the web-layer signatures with the EDR process-correlation query to minimise false positives, require both a crafted request and anomalous process/file activity before raising a critical alert.


Hunting Queries

Hunts for recurring crafted transform requests grouped by source IP to surface persistent exploitation attempts.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-c22c57d4d1 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-130675 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | extend d = url_decode(csUriQuery) | where d has "transform" and d matches regex @"(?i)(normalizeTransform|__class|craft\\|yii\\|phar://)" | summarize count() by cIP, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-c22c57d4d1 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-130675 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web sourcetype IN (iis,access_combined) | eval d=urldecode(uri_query) | regex d="(?i)(normalizeTransform|__class|craft\\\\|yii\\\\|phar:\/\/)" | stats count by src_ip

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Crafted transform parameter with PHP class token
linux

Sends a GET request to a Craft CMS index.php endpoint with a transform parameter carrying a namespaced class token, simulating normalizeTransform() class-instantiation abuse.

Command

bash
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' "http://localhost/index.php?p=transform&transform=%7B%22__class%22%3A%22craft%5C%5Celements%5C%5CAsset%22%7D"

Cleanup

bash
echo 'no cleanup required - read-only request'

Expected Telemetry

Web server access log entry with decoded query containing __class and craft\ namespace tokens on the transform parameter.

Expected Detection

KQL/SPL/Chronicle web-layer rules flag the decoded transform parameter as containing class-instantiation indicators.

Test 2 Phar wrapper in transform parameter
linux

Submits a transform parameter referencing a phar:// stream wrapper, a common vector for object instantiation/deserialization abuse.

Command

bash
curl -s -o /dev/null "http://localhost/index.php?transform=phar%3A%2F%2F%2Ftmp%2Fevil.phar%2Ftest"

Cleanup

bash
rm -f /tmp/evil.phar 2>/dev/null; echo done

Expected Telemetry

Access log shows decoded transform value containing the phar:// wrapper.

Expected Detection

Web-layer detections match the phar:// token in the transform parameter.

Test 3 PHP web process spawns shell
linux

Simulates post-exploitation by having a php process spawn a shell discovery command, mimicking RCE following normalizeTransform abuse.

Command

bash
php -r 'system("id; whoami");'

Cleanup

bash
echo 'no cleanup required'

Expected Telemetry

Process-creation event showing sh/id/whoami spawned with a php parent process.

Expected Detection

Elastic EQL sequence and CrowdStrike CQL process-correlation rules detect the shell/discovery child of the PHP process.

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