Detect Google Chromium Use-After-Free (CVE-2026-125350, KEV) in Google Chronicle
Detects the presence and exploitation risk of CVE-2026-125350, a use-after-free (CWE-416) vulnerability in the XML component of Google Chrome/Chromium that is listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. The flaw affects Chrome prior to 157.0.8103.50 and lets a remote attacker run code via a crafted HTML page. Because it is actively exploited in the wild and reachable from web content, this detection focuses on identifying vulnerable Chromium/Chrome browser versions in the environment, anomalous browser process behavior consistent with renderer-process memory corruption and sandbox escape (unexpected child processes, crashes, and suspicious file/network activity from the browser), and endpoints missing the vendor patch. Operators should prioritize patching per CISA BOD 26-04.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Initial Access Execution Stealth
YARA-L Detection Query
// df00tech DF00-86460d7cd8 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-125350 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
rule chromium_uaf_cve_2026_125350_sandbox_escape {
meta:
author = "Argus Detection Platform"
description = "Chromium-based browser spawning shells/LOLBins, consistent with CVE-2026-125350 UAF sandbox escape"
cve = "CVE-2026-125350"
severity = "HIGH"
events:
$e.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
re.regex($e.principal.process.parent_process.file.full_path, `(?i)(chrome\.exe|chromium|msedge\.exe|brave\.exe)$`)
re.regex($e.target.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(cmd\.exe|powershell\.exe|mshta\.exe|rundll32\.exe|regsvr32\.exe|wscript\.exe|/bash|/sh|/curl|/wget)$`)
not $e.target.process.command_line = /--type=(renderer|gpu-process|utility|crashpad)/ nocase
condition:
$e
} Chronicle YARA-L 2.0 rule detecting Chromium-based browsers launching shells or LOLBins, indicating possible UAF exploitation of CVE-2026-125350.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Native messaging hosts launched by extensions
- Headless automation shelling out
- Security tooling injected into the browser
Other platforms for CVE-2026-125350
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.
- Test 1 Simulate browser-spawned shell (sandbox escape proxy)
Expected signal: Process-creation event showing chrome.exe as parent of cmd.exe with no --type= browser flags.
- Test 2 Browser-to-PowerShell execution (Linux-less proxy on Windows)
Expected signal: chromium.exe parent spawning powershell.exe in process telemetry.
- Test 3 Chromium spawns shell on Linux
Expected signal: auditd/EDR execve record showing a chromium-named parent launching /bin/sh.
References (5)
- https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/11/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_018223192.html
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-125350
- https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/google-issues-chrome-security-update.html
Response Playbook
Triage
- Confirm the installed Chromium/Chrome/Edge version on the affected endpoint and compare against the fixed Stable channel build 157.0.8103.50 referenced in the Chrome Releases advisory (November 9, 2026); flag any host below the patched version as vulnerable.
- Review the full process tree around the alert: confirm the shell/LOLBin child was genuinely spawned by the browser renderer or broker process and is not a known extension native-messaging host.
- Check for browser crash artifacts (crashpad dumps, renderer crash events) near the alert time, which often accompany UAF exploitation attempts.
- Correlate the user's recent browsing, proxy/DNS logs, for newly visited or suspicious domains immediately preceding the suspicious child process.
Containment
- Isolate the affected endpoint from the network if post-exploitation activity (shell, LOLBin, C2) is confirmed.
- Force-close and block execution of the vulnerable browser version via EDR/application control until the patched build is deployed.
- Push the emergency Chromium/Chrome update to the affected and at-risk endpoints and verify the version post-install.
Evidence Collection
- Collect crashpad/minidump files, browser process memory, and the renderer crash logs from the affected host.
- Export the full EDR process tree, command lines, and loaded modules for the browser and all child processes.
- Preserve proxy, DNS, and network connection logs for the browser process to identify the exploit delivery URL.
Escalation Criteria
- !Escalate to IR if the browser spawned any shell, scripting host, or made outbound connections to unknown infrastructure after the suspicious child process.
- !Escalate if the same exploitation pattern is seen across multiple endpoints, indicating a targeted or watering-hole campaign.
- !Escalate if patch deployment cannot be completed within the CISA BOD 26-04 required timeline for KEV items.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
Chromium crashpad minidump files (e.g., %LOCALAPPDATA%\Google\Chrome\User Data\Crashpad\reports or ~/.config/google-chrome/Crash Reports) - >
Browser version and last-updated timestamp from the installed build manifest - >
EDR process-creation records showing anomalous browser child processes - >
Browser history/cache entries for the exploit-delivery URL
Tuning Guidance
Baseline the legitimate native-messaging hosts and enterprise helpers launched by browsers in your environment and allowlist them by full path/hash. Exclude known browser internal process types (--type=renderer/gpu-process/utility/crashpad) which are normal. Focus alerting on browser-to-shell/LOLBin transitions and on hosts whose browser build is below the patched version; raise severity when both the version is vulnerable and a suspicious child process is observed.
Hunting Queries
Inventory installed Chromium-based browser versions across the fleet to identify endpoints running builds vulnerable to CVE-2026-125350.
// df00tech DF00-86460d7cd8 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-125350 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
DeviceProcessEvents | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","chromium.exe","msedge.exe","brave.exe") | summarize versions=make_set(InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion), hosts=dcount(DeviceName) by InitiatingProcessFileName | order by hosts desc ``` df00tech DF00-86460d7cd8 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-125350 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=endpoint (sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1) (Image="*chrome.exe" OR Image="*chromium*" OR Image="*msedge.exe" OR Image="*brave.exe") | stats values(FileVersion) as versions dc(host) as hosts by Image Atomic Red Team Tests
Launches a command shell as a child of a renamed chrome.exe binary to emulate the post-UAF sandbox-escape process tree without exploiting the real vulnerability.
Command
copy %ComSpec% %TEMP%\chrome.exe & "%TEMP%\chrome.exe" /c "cmd.exe /c whoami" Cleanup
del %TEMP%\chrome.exe Expected Telemetry
Process-creation event showing chrome.exe as parent of cmd.exe with no --type= browser flags.
Expected Detection
KQL/SPL/EDR rules fire on a Chromium-named parent spawning cmd.exe.
Emulates a browser renderer invoking PowerShell, mimicking exploit payload staging after a UAF.
Command
copy %ComSpec% %TEMP%\chromium.exe & "%TEMP%\chromium.exe" /c "powershell.exe -NoProfile -Command Get-Date" Cleanup
del %TEMP%\chromium.exe Expected Telemetry
chromium.exe parent spawning powershell.exe in process telemetry.
Expected Detection
Detection rules match browser-to-powershell child process pattern.
Copies a shell to a chromium-named binary and uses it to launch /bin/sh, emulating a Linux browser sandbox escape.
Command
cp /bin/bash /tmp/chromium && /tmp/chromium -c '/bin/sh -c id' Cleanup
rm -f /tmp/chromium Expected Telemetry
auditd/EDR execve record showing a chromium-named parent launching /bin/sh.
Expected Detection
EQL/Chronicle/CQL rules match chromium-named parent spawning /bin/sh.