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CVE-2026-123807 IBM QRadar · QRadar

Detect Signal K Server Resources API Path Traversal to JWT Secret Disclosure and RCE (CVE-2026-123807) in IBM QRadar

Detects exploitation of a path traversal vulnerability (CWE-22) in the Signal K server resources API (@signalk/resources-provider) affecting signalk-server >= 2.0.0, < 2.34.0 and @signalk/resources-provider >= 1.0.0, < 1.5.3. The v2 REST resources endpoint GET /signalk/v2/api/resources/:resourceType/:resourceId passes the resource id to the file store without validation, so a URL-encoded traversal sequence escapes the resources directory and returns any JSON file on the server. On deployments with allow_readonly enabled an unauthenticated attacker can read security.json; on default deployments any readonly user token works. Reading security.json discloses the JWT signing secret, which an attacker can use to forge an admin token and then achieve remote code execution by adding an Execute provider via POST /skServer/providers. CVSS 9.8, public proof of concept. Detection focuses on HTTP requests to the resources API containing traversal sequences, access to sensitive config files, and anomalous authentication following suspected secret theft.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Credential Access Collection Execution

QRadar Detection Query

IBM QRadar (QRadar)
sql
-- df00tech DF00-35e38742fa · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-123807 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
SELECT sourceip, destinationip, "URL", "HTTP Response Code", "User Agent", starttime
FROM events
WHERE ("URL" ILIKE '%resources%' OR "URL" ILIKE '%signalk%')
  AND (
    "URL" ILIKE '%../%' OR "URL" ILIKE '%..\%2f%' OR "URL" ILIKE '%\%2e\%2e\%2f%'
    OR "URL" ILIKE '%..\%5c%' OR "URL" ILIKE '%....//%' OR "URL" ILIKE '%security.json%'
  )
ORDER BY starttime DESC LAST 7 DAYS
critical severity medium confidence

QRadar AQL querying web event logs for Signal K resources API requests containing traversal sequences or direct references to security.json.

Data Sources

Web Server LogsProxy Logs

Required Tables

events

False Positives & Tuning

  • Authorized scanner activity
  • Benign resource names with dot sequences
  • Encoded monitoring probes

Other platforms for CVE-2026-123807


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Signal K resources API basic path traversal probe

    Expected signal: Web/proxy access log entry for /signalk/v2/api/resources with ../ sequences and a non-404 response if vulnerable.

  2. Test 2 URL-encoded traversal to JWT secret

    Expected signal: Access log entry containing %2f and security.json; HTTP 200 if disclosure succeeds.

  3. Test 3 Windows PowerShell traversal probe against Signal K

    Expected signal: IIS/W3C log entry with ..%5c sequences against the signalk resources path.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Confirm the targeted host runs signalk-server and determine its version; versions >= 2.0.0 < 2.34.0 and >= 1.0.0 < 1.5.3 are vulnerable, so check `npm ls signalk-server` or the package.json and the running process version.
  2. Decode the full request URL and examine whether the traversal path resolved to a sensitive file such as security.json or settings.json under the Signal K config directory (~/.signalk or $SIGNALK_NODE_CONFIG_DIR), and record the HTTP response status; a 200 indicates likely successful disclosure.
  3. Review the source IP's request history for reconnaissance (probing multiple resource paths), repeated traversal depth variations, and whether the same IP subsequently performed authenticated admin actions (adding a provider, config change).
  4. Correlate the timestamp with any new or forged JWT usage; look for admin logins from the attacker IP or anomalous token issuance immediately after the suspected secret read.

Containment

  1. Upgrade signalk-server to 2.34.0 (2.x) or resources-provider to 1.5.3, or apply the vendor patch from commit 83689f040d7e90280dddc643f44f3e4ce348fbb1; restrict the resources API behind authentication and a reverse-proxy allowlist until patched.
  2. Rotate the JWT signing secret in security.json and invalidate all existing sessions and tokens, since a successful read means every previously issued admin token may be forged.
  3. Block the offending source IP(s) at the firewall/WAF and add a WAF rule that normalizes and rejects traversal sequences on /signalk/*/api/resources paths.

Evidence Collection

  1. Preserve web server / reverse-proxy access logs, the Signal K server application logs, and the security.json file metadata (mtime/atime) to establish whether and when the secret was accessed.
  2. Capture the full raw HTTP requests (headers, decoded URL, body) and the server responses for the implicated source IP, and snapshot the installed plugin directory and server config for tamper analysis.

Escalation Criteria

  • !Escalate to incident response if the traversal request returned HTTP 200 for security.json/settings.json, indicating probable JWT secret disclosure.
  • !Escalate to full RCE investigation if, after the suspected disclosure, an Execute provider was added, the server configuration changed, or forged admin tokens were used.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • >Web/proxy access logs showing traversal URLs against /signalk/*/api/resources
  • >security.json access timestamps and the Signal K configuration directory contents
  • >JWT tokens issued or used around the incident window and plugin directory modification times

Tuning Guidance

Baseline legitimate resource identifiers used by your Signal K deployment and whitelist known benign names before alerting. Prioritize alerts where the decoded path references security.json/settings.json or returns HTTP 200. Exclude authorized scanner source IPs. If the proxy already normalizes paths, key the detection on URL-encoded traversal (%2e%2e, %2f) which survives partial normalization.


Hunting Queries

Surface all Signal K requests containing dot-dot sequences grouped by source IP and response status to find both probing and successful reads.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-35e38742fa · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-123807 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | where csUriStem has "signalk" | extend d=url_decode(strcat(csUriStem,"?",csUriQuery)) | where d has ".." | summarize count(), make_set(d) by cIP, scStatus
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-35e38742fa · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-123807 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web signalk | eval d=urldecode(uri) | where match(d,"\.\.") | stats count values(d) by src_ip status

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Signal K resources API basic path traversal probe
linux

Sends an unauthenticated request to the Signal K resources endpoint with a directory traversal sequence attempting to read /etc/passwd as a vulnerability proof.

Command

bash
curl -s -k 'http://127.0.0.1:3000/signalk/v2/api/resources/notes/../../../../../../etc/passwd' -o /tmp/sk_trav_test.out; cat /tmp/sk_trav_test.out

Cleanup

bash
rm -f /tmp/sk_trav_test.out

Expected Telemetry

Web/proxy access log entry for /signalk/v2/api/resources with ../ sequences and a non-404 response if vulnerable.

Expected Detection

KQL/SPL rules match the traversal sequence on the signalk resources path.

Test 2 URL-encoded traversal to JWT secret
linux

Attempts to read the Signal K security.json (JWT signing secret) using URL-encoded traversal sequences to evade naive path normalization.

Command

bash
curl -s -k 'http://127.0.0.1:3000/signalk/v2/api/resources/notes/..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2fsecurity.json' -o /tmp/sk_secret_test.out; cat /tmp/sk_secret_test.out

Cleanup

bash
rm -f /tmp/sk_secret_test.out

Expected Telemetry

Access log entry containing %2f and security.json; HTTP 200 if disclosure succeeds.

Expected Detection

Rules flag SuspectSecret / suspect_secret=yes for the encoded traversal referencing security.json.

Test 3 Windows PowerShell traversal probe against Signal K
windows

Issues a traversal request from a Windows host against a Signal K server to validate detection on IIS/reverse-proxy logs.

Command

powershell
powershell -Command "Invoke-WebRequest -UseBasicParsing -Uri 'http://127.0.0.1:3000/signalk/v2/api/resources/notes/..%5c..%5c..%5csecurity.json' -OutFile $env:TEMP\sk_trav.out"

Cleanup

powershell
powershell -Command "Remove-Item $env:TEMP\sk_trav.out -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue"

Expected Telemetry

IIS/W3C log entry with ..%5c sequences against the signalk resources path.

Expected Detection

KQL W3CIISLog rule matches the backslash-encoded traversal pattern.

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