Skip to content
CVE-2026-123218 Microsoft Sentinel · KQL

Detect IBM Aspera Faspex Incorrect Authorization Exploitation (CVE-2026-123218) in Microsoft Sentinel

Detects exploitation attempts against IBM Aspera Faspex leveraging an incorrect authorization flaw (CWE-863). An authorized user can craft a specific message to bypass authorization checks and gain full administrative privileges. This CVE is listed in the CISA KEV catalog as actively exploited. Detection focuses on anomalous access to Faspex API and package endpoints, authorization bypass patterns such as direct access to normally gated paths, and post-exploitation activity such as credential or package exfiltration and process spawning from the Faspex application context.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Privilege Escalation Credential Access

KQL Detection Query

Microsoft Sentinel (KQL)
kusto
// df00tech DF00-7fed015bbf · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-123218 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
let faspexPaths = dynamic(["/aspera/faspex", "/aspera/faspex/packages", "/aspera/faspex/admin", "/aspera/faspex/api", "/aspera/faspex/send", "/aspera/faspex/received"]);
W3CIISLog
| where csUriStem has_any (faspexPaths) or csUriStem contains "faspex"
| where scStatus in (200, 302, 207) and csMethod in ("GET", "POST", "PUT")
| where isempty(csUsername) or csUsername == "-" or csUsername == "anonymous"
| where csUriStem has_any ("admin", "api", "packages", "users", "accounts")
| summarize RequestCount = count(), Paths = make_set(csUriStem, 50), Methods = make_set(csMethod), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated) by cIP, sSiteName, Computer
| where RequestCount >= 3
| extend Reason = "Unauthenticated access to gated Faspex endpoints, possible CVE-2026-123218 authorization bypass"
| sort by RequestCount desc
critical severity medium confidence

Flags unauthenticated or anonymous HTTP requests that succeed (2xx/3xx) against protected IBM Aspera Faspex endpoints (admin/api/packages), indicative of the incorrect-authorization bypass.

Data Sources

IIS LogsWeb Server LogsReverse Proxy Logs

Required Tables

W3CIISLog

False Positives & Tuning

  • Legitimate administrators whose session cookie is not captured in the IIS username field, causing the request to appear unauthenticated.
  • Health-check or monitoring probes hitting Faspex endpoints with service accounts that do not populate cs-username.
  • Load balancers or reverse proxies that strip authentication headers before the request reaches the backend logged by IIS.

Other platforms for CVE-2026-123218


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Unauthenticated access to Faspex admin endpoint

    Expected signal: Web/IIS access log entry for /aspera/faspex/admin with no authenticated username and a 2xx/3xx status code.

  2. Test 2 Enumerate Faspex package API without session

    Expected signal: Multiple web access log entries to /aspera/faspex/{packages,api,users,accounts} from one source IP without authentication.

  3. Test 3 Windows PowerShell Faspex bypass probe

    Expected signal: IIS log entry for /aspera/faspex/api with anonymous/empty username and a success/redirect status.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Confirm the targeted host runs IBM Aspera Faspex and identify its exact version against IBM advisory node/7295921 to determine whether it is in the affected range (5.0.0 through 5.0.19) for CVE-2026-123218.
  2. Review the source IP(s) in the alert: check reputation, geolocation, and whether they have any legitimate prior history with the Faspex service.
  3. Reconstruct the full request sequence for the source IP: list every Faspex endpoint accessed, HTTP methods, status codes, and whether any authentication event preceded the successful gated-endpoint access.
  4. Determine whether sensitive endpoints (admin, user management, package listing/download) returned 2xx without a corresponding authenticated session, which can indicate the authorization bypass rather than normal use.

Containment

  1. Block the offending source IP(s) at the perimeter/WAF and restrict external access to the Faspex management and API paths to known administrative networks only.
  2. Apply the IBM fix per advisory node/7295921 (upgrade to Faspex 5.0.19 PL1) or, if patching is not immediately possible, take the Faspex service offline or front it with an authenticating reverse proxy.
  3. Rotate credentials and API keys for any accounts whose data may have been exposed through the bypassed endpoints.

Evidence Collection

  1. Preserve IIS/Apache access logs, Faspex application logs, and any WAF/proxy logs covering the full window of suspicious access for forensic review.
  2. Capture the Faspex application and database state (package metadata, user accounts, delivery records) to identify what data was enumerated or exfiltrated.
  3. Export the correlated SIEM events, matched source IPs, and accessed endpoint list as a timeline artifact for the incident record.

Escalation Criteria

  • !Escalate to incident response immediately if gated administrative or package-download endpoints returned successful responses to unauthorized sources, indicating confirmed data exposure.
  • !Escalate if evidence of post-exploitation (new accounts, downloaded packages, process execution from the Faspex service account, or lateral movement) is observed.
  • !Escalate to management/legal if exfiltrated packages contained regulated or sensitive data requiring breach notification.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • >IIS/Apache access logs showing successful requests to gated Faspex paths without preceding authentication.
  • >Faspex application logs recording package access, user enumeration, or admin actions from unexpected sources.
  • >Database records of package downloads and account activity correlating to the attacker source IP.

Tuning Guidance

Baseline normal Faspex traffic first: identify the reverse-proxy/load-balancer IPs and service accounts that legitimately appear unauthenticated in backend web logs and exclude them. If your IIS logs never populate cs-username because authentication is terminated upstream, pivot the detection to the WAF/proxy logs that carry the authenticated identity instead, and tighten the gated-path regex to the specific admin/api routes IBM documents for your Faspex version to cut noise.


Hunting Queries

Surfaces source IPs exhibiting broad enumeration of Faspex endpoints, a precursor or companion to authorization-bypass exploitation.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-7fed015bbf · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-123218 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | where csUriStem contains "faspex" | summarize Requests=count(), Statuses=make_set(scStatus), Paths=make_set(csUriStem,100) by cIP | where Requests > 10 | sort by Requests desc
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-7fed015bbf · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-123218 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web uri_path="*faspex*" | stats count values(status) AS statuses values(uri_path) AS paths dc(uri_path) AS unique_paths by src_ip | where unique_paths > 10 | sort - count

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Unauthenticated access to Faspex admin endpoint
linux

Simulate an unauthenticated GET to a protected Faspex administrative path to generate the bypass telemetry.

Command

bash
curl -sk -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' https://faspex.lab.local/aspera/faspex/admin

Cleanup

bash
echo 'No cleanup required; read-only request'

Expected Telemetry

Web/IIS access log entry for /aspera/faspex/admin with no authenticated username and a 2xx/3xx status code.

Expected Detection

KQL/SPL rules flag an unauthenticated successful request to a gated Faspex endpoint.

Test 2 Enumerate Faspex package API without session
linux

Issue repeated unauthenticated requests to the Faspex package API to trigger the enumeration threshold.

Command

bash
for p in packages api users accounts; do curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "$p %{http_code}\n" https://faspex.lab.local/aspera/faspex/$p; done

Cleanup

bash
echo 'No cleanup required; read-only requests'

Expected Telemetry

Multiple web access log entries to /aspera/faspex/{packages,api,users,accounts} from one source IP without authentication.

Expected Detection

Rules aggregate >=3 unauthenticated successful gated-endpoint requests from a single source IP.

Test 3 Windows PowerShell Faspex bypass probe
windows

Use PowerShell to send an unauthenticated request to a protected Faspex endpoint from a Windows host.

Command

powershell
powershell -Command "try { (Invoke-WebRequest -Uri 'https://faspex.lab.local/aspera/faspex/api' -UseBasicParsing -SkipCertificateCheck).StatusCode } catch { $_.Exception.Response.StatusCode.value__ }"

Cleanup

powershell
echo done

Expected Telemetry

IIS log entry for /aspera/faspex/api with anonymous/empty username and a success/redirect status.

Expected Detection

Detection fires on unauthenticated access to the gated Faspex API path.

Related Detections