Detect OpenSSH Password Authentication Bypass via Unexpected Return Value (CVE-2026-123158 'SSHole') in Splunk
Detects exploitation and exposure of CVE-2026-123158, an OpenSSH vulnerability (CWE-394: Unexpected Status Code or Return Value) nicknamed 'SSHole'. On Linux systems that use musl libc with PAM disabled, such as Alpine Linux, sshd can misinterpret the return value of the password hashing function. An oversized password of 257 to 1024 bytes causes musl's crypt() to return the string '*', which matches the stored password field of accounts that have no password set, so authentication succeeds. The flaw does not affect accounts with valid password hashes. The CVE is listed on the CISA KEV catalog with in-the-wild exploitation reported against internet-facing Linux systems. OpenSSH fixed the issue in version 10.6p2, released 2026-11-05. The CVSS 3.1 base score is 8.1 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H). This detection surfaces vulnerable OpenSSH versions, anomalous successful password authentications where no valid credential should have succeeded, and post-auth activity consistent with unauthorized access.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Initial Access Credential Access
SPL Detection Query
``` df00tech DF00-f679ee8a84 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-123158 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=linux (sourcetype="linux_secure" OR sourcetype="syslog") process=sshd
| rex field=_raw "OpenSSH[_ ]?(?<openssh_version>\d+\.\d+(?:p\d+)?)"
| rex field=_raw "Accepted (?<auth_method>password|keyboard-interactive(?:/pam)?) for (?<auth_user>[\w\-\.\$]+) from (?<src_ip>[0-9a-fA-F\.:]+)"
| eval accepted_pw=if(match(_raw,"Accepted (password|keyboard-interactive)"),1,0)
| stats values(openssh_version) as openssh_version sum(accepted_pw) as accepted_pw_logins values(auth_user) as users values(src_ip) as src_ips latest(_time) as last_seen by host
| where accepted_pw_logins>0
| convert ctime(last_seen)
| sort - accepted_pw_logins Identifies Linux hosts running OpenSSH that recorded successful password/keyboard-interactive authentications, prioritizing unpatched versions for CVE-2026-123158 password-auth bypass triage.
Data Sources
Required Sourcetypes
False Positives & Tuning
- Valid password-based administrator logins on hosts not yet exploited.
- Service/automation accounts authenticating via SSH passwords.
- Security scanners enumerating SSH banners and attempting authentication.
Other platforms for CVE-2026-123158
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.
- Test 1 Enumerate installed OpenSSH version
Expected signal: Process execution of ssh/dpkg/rpm/apk; version banner string containing OpenSSH_<version> in command output.
- Test 2 Remote SSH banner grab
Expected signal: Outbound TCP connection to 22/tcp; sshd logs a connection and version exchange on the target.
- Test 3 Simulate successful password authentication event (lab)
Expected signal: sshd auth log line 'Accepted password for labuser from <src_ip>'; USER_LOGIN/UserLogon event in EDR/SIEM.
References (9)
- https://www.openssh.org/releasenotes.html
- https://alpinelinux.org/posts/2026-11-05-openssh-password-authentication-bypass/
- https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/4353fdc43ef646c43a8dda7025cc1a898caf1482
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-123158
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-exploit-sshole-openssh-flaw-to-breach-linux-systems/
- https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/hackers-exploited-openssh-sshole-flaw.html
- https://isc.sans.edu/diary/rss/33498
Response Playbook
Triage
- Confirm the host's installed OpenSSH version (`ssh -V` / `sshd -V`, package manager) against the fixed release referenced in the OpenSSH release notes and Alpine advisory; flag any build predating the CVE-2026-123158 fix (commit 4353fdc43ef646c43a8dda7025cc1a898caf1482).
- Review the host's sshd auth logs (/var/log/auth.log, /var/log/secure, journalctl -u ssh) for 'Accepted password' / 'Accepted keyboard-interactive' events, correlating the source IP and username against known-good baselines.
- Determine whether the authenticating account should be able to log in with the presented method at all (e.g., accounts with locked/no password, or PasswordAuthentication expected to fail), a success there strongly indicates bypass.
- Check whether the host is internet-exposed on 22/tcp (or alternate SSH port) via asset inventory and external scan data, raising priority for exposed systems per CISA BOD 26-04.
Containment
- Apply the patched OpenSSH release immediately; where patching is not instant, set `PasswordAuthentication no` and `KbdInteractiveAuthentication no` in sshd_config and reload sshd to remove the vulnerable code path.
- Restrict SSH exposure with firewall/security-group rules limiting 22/tcp to management networks or a bastion, and block the identified attacker source IPs.
- Rotate credentials and revoke sessions for any account observed in a suspicious successful authentication, and terminate active unauthorized SSH sessions.
Evidence Collection
- Preserve full sshd auth logs, syslog, and systemd journal entries covering the suspected exploitation window, plus the output of the installed OpenSSH version.
- Capture sshd process memory/open sessions (`ss -tnp`, `who`, `last`, `/var/run/utmp`) and any shell history for accounts that logged in during the window.
Escalation Criteria
- !Escalate to incident response if a successful authentication cannot be attributed to a legitimate credential/user, or occurs for an account that should not authenticate via password.
- !Escalate if post-authentication activity is observed (privilege escalation, new accounts, persistence, lateral SSH) following a flagged login on a vulnerable host.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
sshd auth log entries (/var/log/auth.log, /var/log/secure) showing Accepted password/keyboard-interactive events - >
Installed OpenSSH package version and sshd binary build string - >
utmp/wtmp/btmp and systemd journal records of SSH sessions - >
sshd_config authentication settings and any recent modifications
Tuning Guidance
Build an allowlist of expected SSH source networks, service accounts, and password-auth-enabled hosts to suppress routine logins. Prioritize alerting on hosts confirmed to run pre-fix OpenSSH builds and those internet-exposed on SSH. Where key-only authentication is enforced fleet-wide, any 'Accepted password' event becomes high-fidelity and can be alerted directly. Reduce noise from vulnerability scanners by excluding known scanner source IPs from banner-only matches while retaining successful-auth matches.
Hunting Queries
Baselines successful SSH authentications by host/user/source so analysts can spot anomalous accepted password logins consistent with the CVE-2026-123158 bypass.
// df00tech DF00-f679ee8a84 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-123158 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
Syslog | where ProcessName in~ ('sshd','sshd-session') | where SyslogMessage has 'Accepted' | extend User=extract(@'for (invalid user )?([A-Za-z0-9_\-\.$]+)',2,SyslogMessage), SrcIp=extract(@'from ([0-9a-fA-F\.:]+)',1,SyslogMessage) | summarize count() by Computer, User, SrcIp, bin(TimeGenerated,1h) | order by count_ desc ``` df00tech DF00-f679ee8a84 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-123158 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=linux sourcetype IN (linux_secure,syslog) sshd "Accepted" | rex "Accepted (?<method>\S+) for (?<user>[\w\-\.\$]+) from (?<src>[0-9a-fA-F\.:]+)" | stats count by host, user, src, method | sort -count Atomic Red Team Tests
Collect the OpenSSH version from a Linux host to determine exposure to CVE-2026-123158.
Command
ssh -V 2>&1; dpkg -l openssh-server 2>/dev/null || rpm -q openssh-server 2>/dev/null || apk info -v openssh 2>/dev/null Cleanup
echo 'No cleanup required (read-only enumeration).' Expected Telemetry
Process execution of ssh/dpkg/rpm/apk; version banner string containing OpenSSH_<version> in command output.
Expected Detection
Vulnerable (pre-fix) OpenSSH version identified in software inventory / banner correlation query.
Retrieve the SSH server banner from a target to fingerprint OpenSSH version remotely (lab only, authorized targets).
Command
nc -w3 target.lab.local 22 </dev/null | head -1 Cleanup
echo 'No cleanup required.' Expected Telemetry
Outbound TCP connection to 22/tcp; sshd logs a connection and version exchange on the target.
Expected Detection
OpenSSH banner captured; vulnerable version flagged by banner/version detection logic.
Generate a successful SSH password authentication in a lab to validate that 'Accepted password' events are ingested and correlated (proxy for bypass detection; do not exploit real CVE).
Command
sshpass -p 'LabPassw0rd!' ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no [email protected] 'id; exit' Cleanup
ssh [email protected] 'rm -f ~/.bash_history' 2>/dev/null; echo done Expected Telemetry
sshd auth log line 'Accepted password for labuser from <src_ip>'; USER_LOGIN/UserLogon event in EDR/SIEM.
Expected Detection
Accepted password/keyboard-interactive authentication surfaced by the KQL/SPL correlation queries.