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CVE-2026-118740 Google Chronicle · YARA-L

Detect CVE-2026-118740 - Aspire Dashboard Security Feature Bypass (Missing Authorization) in Google Chronicle

Detects exploitation and exposure conditions for CVE-2026-118740, a security feature bypass (CWE-862, Missing Authorization) in the .NET Aspire Dashboard (Aspire.Dashboard.Sdk packages) prior to version 13.6.5. The Aspire Dashboard exposes OpenTelemetry data (traces, logs, metrics), resource details, environment variables and console logs. A missing-authorization flaw allows an unauthenticated or improperly-authorized actor on the network to bypass the dashboard's frontend/OTLP authentication and access sensitive telemetry and configuration. Because the issue is an authorization bypass rather than a memory-corruption bug, detection focuses on exposed/vulnerable dashboard instances, anomalous unauthenticated access to dashboard HTTP endpoints and OTLP ports (default 18888 frontend, 18889 OTLP), and access that lacks the expected authentication token/header. Exploit status is theoretical as of disclosure (2026-11-12).

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Discovery Collection

YARA-L Detection Query

Google Chronicle (YARA-L)
yaral
// df00tech DF00-dc8b2fb75e · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-118740 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
rule aspire_dashboard_authz_bypass_cve_2026_118740 {
  meta:
    author = "Argus Detection Platform"
    description = "Unauthenticated access to .NET Aspire Dashboard telemetry endpoints / OTLP ports (CVE-2026-118740)"
    severity = "HIGH"
    cve = "CVE-2026-118740"
  events:
    $e.metadata.event_type = "NETWORK_HTTP"
    (
      $e.target.port = 18888 or
      $e.target.port = 18889 or
      re.regex($e.target.url, `(?i)(StructuredLogs|/Traces|/Metrics|/ConsoleLogs|/v1/traces|/v1/logs)`)
    )
    $e.network.http.response_code = 200
    $e.src.ip = $src
  match:
    $src over 10m
  condition:
    #e > 5
}
high severity medium confidence

YARA-L 2.0 rule matching repeated successful HTTP access to Aspire Dashboard ports/endpoints from a single source within a 10-minute window.

Data Sources

Chronicle UDMNetwork HTTP EventsProxy

Required Tables

udm.network_http

False Positives & Tuning

  • Legitimate engineering access to the dashboard.
  • Monitoring probes.
  • Internal proxies collapsing many clients to one source IP.

Other platforms for CVE-2026-118740


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Access Aspire Dashboard telemetry endpoint without authorization token

    Expected signal: Web/proxy access log entries showing GET requests to /StructuredLogs and /v1/traces on ports 18888/18889 without an Authorization header.

  2. Test 2 Port scan of Aspire Dashboard default ports

    Expected signal: NetworkConnectIP4 / network flow events to ports 18888 and 18889 from the testing host.

  3. Test 3 Repeated OTLP trace retrieval to simulate telemetry scraping

    Expected signal: Ten HTTP GET requests to /v1/traces on port 18889 from a single source within a short window, no Authorization header.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Confirm the affected host is running an Aspire.Dashboard.Sdk package below version 13.6.5 (inventory via dotnet tool/package manifests or deployment manifests).
  2. Determine whether the Aspire Dashboard frontend (default port 18888) and/or OTLP endpoint (default port 18889) is reachable from untrusted networks; check firewall/NSG and binding address (0.0.0.0 vs loopback).
  3. Review access logs for the flagged source IPs and confirm whether requests to telemetry endpoints (/StructuredLogs, /Traces, /Metrics, /ConsoleLogs, /v1/traces, /v1/logs) succeeded without an authorization token.
  4. Assess what sensitive data the exposed dashboard could leak (environment variables, connection strings, console logs, traces containing secrets).

Containment

  1. Restrict dashboard ports (18888/18889) to loopback or an authenticated reverse proxy / management VLAN via firewall, NSG or security group rules.
  2. Upgrade the Aspire.Dashboard.Sdk package to 13.6.5 or later and redeploy the affected application(s).
  3. If immediate patching is not possible, disable the dashboard or enforce frontend/OTLP authentication tokens and rotate any secrets that may have been exposed through telemetry.

Evidence Collection

  1. Preserve web/reverse-proxy access logs and OTLP connection logs covering the exposure window, including source IPs, URIs and response codes.
  2. Capture the running package version and deployment manifest showing the vulnerable Aspire.Dashboard.Sdk version.
  3. Export any telemetry/console-log content that may have been accessed to scope data exposure and identify leaked secrets.

Escalation Criteria

  • !Evidence of successful telemetry or environment-variable retrieval by an unauthorized external source IP.
  • !Exposed dashboard reachable from the public internet or an untrusted network segment.
  • !Indicators that secrets (connection strings, API keys) visible in dashboard telemetry were subsequently used elsewhere.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • >Web/reverse-proxy access logs showing token-less 200 responses to Aspire telemetry endpoints.
  • >Network connection records to ports 18888/18889 from unexpected source IPs.
  • >Package lock/manifest files recording the vulnerable Aspire.Dashboard.Sdk version.
  • >Aspire Dashboard console-log and trace exports that reveal accessed content.

Tuning Guidance

Baseline the set of legitimate operator source IPs and monitoring systems that access the dashboard and exclude them. Confirm the actual dashboard ports in your environment (18888/18889 are defaults but can be overridden) and tune port lists accordingly. Where a reverse proxy terminates auth, pivot detection to the proxy logs and the presence/absence of the upstream authorization token rather than the backend. Lower the hit threshold if dashboards should normally be loopback-only.


Hunting Queries

Hunt for successful access to Aspire Dashboard telemetry endpoints grouped by source IP to find scraping behavior and identify unauthorized clients.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-dc8b2fb75e · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-118740 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | where csUriStem has_any ("StructuredLogs","Traces","Metrics","ConsoleLogs","/v1/traces","/v1/logs") | where scStatus == 200 | summarize count() by cIP, csUriStem, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h) | sort by count_ desc
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-dc8b2fb75e · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-118740 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web (uri_path="*StructuredLogs*" OR uri_path="*/v1/traces*" OR uri_path="*ConsoleLogs*") status=200 | stats count by src_ip uri_path | sort - count

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Access Aspire Dashboard telemetry endpoint without authorization token
linux

Simulates an unauthenticated request to the Aspire Dashboard structured logs/OTLP endpoint to generate telemetry matching the bypass pattern (lab only; against a test instance you control).

Command

bash
curl -sk -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' http://127.0.0.1:18888/StructuredLogs; curl -sk -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' http://127.0.0.1:18889/v1/traces

Cleanup

bash
echo 'No persistent changes made by this test'

Expected Telemetry

Web/proxy access log entries showing GET requests to /StructuredLogs and /v1/traces on ports 18888/18889 without an Authorization header.

Expected Detection

KQL/SPL/EQL rules flag non-401/403 access to Aspire telemetry endpoints without an auth token.

Test 2 Port scan of Aspire Dashboard default ports
linux

Probes the default Aspire Dashboard frontend and OTLP ports to simulate discovery of an exposed vulnerable instance.

Command

bash
for p in 18888 18889; do (echo > /dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/$p) >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo "port $p open"; done

Cleanup

bash
echo 'No persistent changes made by this test'

Expected Telemetry

NetworkConnectIP4 / network flow events to ports 18888 and 18889 from the testing host.

Expected Detection

CrowdStrike CQL and QRadar AQL rules flag connections to Aspire Dashboard ports.

Test 3 Repeated OTLP trace retrieval to simulate telemetry scraping
windows

Issues multiple token-less requests to the OTLP traces endpoint to exceed the detection volume threshold in a lab environment.

Command

powershell
1..10 | ForEach-Object { try { Invoke-WebRequest -Uri 'http://127.0.0.1:18889/v1/traces' -UseBasicParsing -TimeoutSec 2 | Out-Null } catch {} }

Cleanup

powershell
Write-Output 'No persistent changes made by this test'

Expected Telemetry

Ten HTTP GET requests to /v1/traces on port 18889 from a single source within a short window, no Authorization header.

Expected Detection

Volume-threshold rules (Hits/conn_count > 5) fire for the single source IP accessing telemetry endpoints.

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