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CVE-2026-115893 Sumo Logic CSE · Sumo

Detect Wasmtime Cranelift aarch64 br_table Incorrect Branch Target (CVE-2026-115893) in Sumo Logic CSE

Detects the presence and exploitation risk of CVE-2026-115893, a control-flow integrity flaw (CWE-691) in the Wasmtime WebAssembly runtime's Cranelift code generator on aarch64. When compiling a Wasm module containing a br_table instruction with more than about 256,000 targets, the aarch64 backend can emit a branch that jumps to an incorrect target, leading to sandbox escape and arbitrary control flow within the host process. The flaw is tracked in GHSA-mghf-wjfp-p5xm. Affected: wasmtime < 36.0.19, >= 37.0.0 < 48.0.7, and >= 49.0.0 < 49.0.4. This detection surfaces vulnerable Wasmtime binaries and crates on aarch64 hosts, untrusted-module compilation activity, and anomalous crashes or control-flow faults in processes embedding Wasmtime.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Execution Privilege Escalation

Sumo Detection Query

Sumo Logic CSE (Sumo)
sql
// df00tech DF00-5b8ad4c8d4 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-115893 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
_sourceCategory=*endpoint* ("wasmtime")
| parse regex "wasmtime[^0-9]*(?<ver>\d+\.\d+\.\d+)" nodrop
| parse regex field=ver "(?<maj>\d+)\.(?<min>\d+)\.(?<pat>\d+)"
| where (maj<36) or (maj=36 and pat<19) or (maj>=37 and maj<=47) or (maj=48 and pat<7) or (maj=49 and pat<4)
| count by _sourceHost, ver, process_name
high severity low confidence

Sumo Logic search extracting Wasmtime version strings from endpoint logs and filtering to vulnerable CVE-2026-115893 ranges.

Data Sources

Endpoint logsprocess execution logs

Required Tables

_sourceCategory endpoint

False Positives & Tuning

  • Regex extraction picking up unrelated version-like strings near 'wasmtime' token
  • Patched hosts with stale log lines in the search window
  • Non-aarch64 hosts without arch field

Other platforms for CVE-2026-115893


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Enumerate installed Wasmtime version

    Expected signal: Process execution event for wasmtime with version string in command output.

  2. Test 2 Scan Rust project dependencies for vulnerable wasmtime

    Expected signal: cargo-audit process execution reporting the advisory and the resolved wasmtime version.

  3. Test 3 Compile a large br_table Wasm module (lab trigger)

    Expected signal: Wasmtime compile process event on aarch64; possible abnormal exit code, segfault, or crash log.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Confirm host architecture is aarch64 (arm64); the bug is only reachable on the Cranelift aarch64 backend, so non-aarch64 hosts are not exploitable by this specific flaw.
  2. Extract the exact Wasmtime version from the binary/crate (e.g. wasmtime --version, Cargo.lock, or SBOM) and compare against affected ranges: < 36.0.19, 37.0.0-48.0.6, 49.0.0-49.0.3.
  3. Identify whether the embedding compiles untrusted/attacker-supplied Wasm modules at runtime; a module with a very large br_table is the trigger, so attacker-controlled module input is the key risk factor.
  4. Review recent crash/segfault telemetry or abnormal control-flow faults in the embedding process that correlate with compilation of new modules.

Containment

  1. Upgrade Wasmtime to a fixed release: 36.0.19, 48.0.7, or 49.0.4 (or later) across all aarch64 hosts, then rebuild/redeploy embeddings.
  2. As an interim mitigation where upgrade is not immediate, disable acceptance/compilation of untrusted Wasm modules, or restrict br_table size via module validation/pre-screening, or run the embedding on a non-aarch64 host.
  3. Isolate hosts that compile attacker-supplied modules behind stricter sandboxing (seccomp, separate process, resource limits) until patched.

Evidence Collection

  1. Capture the Wasmtime version, build flags (Cranelift backend confirmation), and host architecture for each affected deployment.
  2. Preserve any Wasm modules submitted around the time of suspected exploitation, plus core dumps/crash logs from the embedding process for offline analysis.

Escalation Criteria

  • !Escalate to IR if a vulnerable aarch64 host that compiles untrusted modules shows crashes, unexpected syscalls, or memory-corruption indicators coincident with module submission.
  • !Escalate to the application/platform owner if SBOM scanning reveals the vulnerable Wasmtime dependency in any production service accepting external Wasm.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • >Wasmtime version metadata in binaries, Cargo.lock, and SBOM entries
  • >Submitted Wasm module blobs and their br_table target counts
  • >Process core dumps / crash signatures from the embedding process
  • >Host architecture inventory flagging aarch64 nodes

Tuning Guidance

Gate alerts on host architecture (aarch64) and on whether the embedding compiles untrusted modules - static trusted-only module workloads are lower risk. Suppress hosts confirmed patched (>=36.0.19 / >=48.0.7 / >=49.0.4) via SBOM. Because version strings are often absent from statically embedded Wasmtime, supplement process telemetry with SBOM/dependency scanning (cargo-audit/RUSTSEC-2026-0379) to avoid false negatives rather than relying on runtime version parsing alone.


Hunting Queries

Inventory all Wasmtime versions per host to scope affected aarch64 deployments against the CVE-2026-115893 ranges.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-5b8ad4c8d4 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-115893 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
DeviceProcessEvents | where FileName has "wasmtime" | summarize count() by DeviceName, ProcessVersionInfoProductVersion | order by DeviceName asc
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-5b8ad4c8d4 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-115893 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=endpoint process=*wasmtime* | stats count by host, version | sort host

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Enumerate installed Wasmtime version
linux

Query the Wasmtime CLI/binary for its version to determine exposure to CVE-2026-115893.

Command

bash
wasmtime --version || cargo install --list | grep -i wasmtime

Cleanup

bash
echo 'no cleanup required'

Expected Telemetry

Process execution event for wasmtime with version string in command output.

Expected Detection

Version falls within an affected range (< 36.0.19, 37.0.0-48.0.6, 49.0.0-49.0.3) -> flagged vulnerable.

Test 2 Scan Rust project dependencies for vulnerable wasmtime
linux

Use cargo-audit against RUSTSEC-2026-0379 to detect a vulnerable wasmtime crate in a project's Cargo.lock.

Command

bash
cargo audit 2>&1 | grep -i -A3 'RUSTSEC-2026-0379\|wasmtime'

Cleanup

bash
echo 'no cleanup required'

Expected Telemetry

cargo-audit process execution reporting the advisory and the resolved wasmtime version.

Expected Detection

cargo-audit reports RUSTSEC-2026-0379 for a wasmtime version in the affected range.

Test 3 Compile a large br_table Wasm module (lab trigger)
linux

In an isolated lab, feed a Wasm module containing a very large br_table to a vulnerable Wasmtime on aarch64 to observe miscompilation/crash behavior.

Command

bash
wasmtime compile ./large_br_table.wasm -o /tmp/out.cwasm; echo exit=$?

Cleanup

bash
rm -f /tmp/out.cwasm

Expected Telemetry

Wasmtime compile process event on aarch64; possible abnormal exit code, segfault, or crash log.

Expected Detection

Vulnerable Wasmtime on aarch64 compiling an untrusted large-br_table module -> high-risk correlation; crash telemetry escalates.

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