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CVE-2026-114784 Google Chronicle · YARA-L

Detect Oracle Business Intelligence Enterprise Edition Platform Security Critical Vulnerability (CVE-2026-114784) in Google Chronicle

Detects exploitation attempts against a critical vulnerability (CVSS 10.0) in the Platform Security component of Oracle Business Intelligence Enterprise Edition (OBIEE), part of Oracle Analytics. The flaw lets an unauthenticated attacker with network access over HTTP compromise OBIEE. The scope is changed, so attacks may affect additional products. Successful exploitation can result in full takeover, with confidentiality, integrity and availability fully impacted. The root cause is a missing authentication check (CWE-306). No public exploit is confirmed as of the Oracle Critical Patch Update disclosure, so this detection focuses on anomalous access to BI and Analytics endpoints, authentication-bypass patterns, and post-exploitation process spawning from Oracle or WebLogic service accounts.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Execution

YARA-L Detection Query

Google Chronicle (YARA-L)
yaral
// df00tech DF00-43dc641418 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-114784 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
rule obiee_platform_security_cve_2026_114784 {
  meta:
    author = "Argus Detection Platform"
    description = "OBIEE Platform Security exploitation attempt (CVE-2026-114784)"
    severity = "CRITICAL"
  events:
    $e.metadata.event_type = "NETWORK_HTTP"
    re.regex($e.network.http.response_code, "200|302|500")
    (
      $e.target.url = /\/(analytics|xmlpserver|bi-security-login|wsm-pm|bisystem)\//
    )
    (
      $e.target.url = /(\.\.\/|rO0AB|java\.lang|SyncServlet|readProperties)/ or
      $e.network.http.user_agent = /(?i)(java\/|python-requests|curl|Go-http-client)/
    )
    $ip = $e.principal.ip
  match:
    $ip over 10m
  condition:
    #e >= 3
}
critical severity medium confidence

Chronicle YARA-L rule detecting repeated exploitation-pattern HTTP requests to OBIEE/BI Publisher endpoints for CVE-2026-114784.

Data Sources

HTTP ProxyWeb Server LogsIIS Logs

Required Tables

NETWORK_HTTP

False Positives & Tuning

  • Legitimate automated BI reporting clients.
  • Security scanners against the Analytics web tier.
  • Proxy aggregation obscuring distinct source principals.

Other platforms for CVE-2026-114784


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Simulated OBIEE deserialization probe to analytics endpoint

    Expected signal: IIS/Apache access log entry for POST /analytics/saw.dll with Java user agent and rO0AB body marker.

  2. Test 2 Simulated path traversal against BI Publisher

    Expected signal: Web log entry for GET /xmlpserver/servlet/readProperties with ../ traversal and python-requests user agent.

  3. Test 3 Simulated post-exploitation shell from BI service account

    Expected signal: ProcessRollup2/Sysmon ProcessCreate event: cmd.exe child with a java/weblogic-style parent and command line /c whoami.

Last updated: Research depth: standard
References (1)

Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Identify the targeted OBIEE/Analytics host and confirm whether it runs an Oracle BI Enterprise Edition version covered by the November 2026 Oracle CPU; cross-check against https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cspunov2026.html.
  2. Review the full request/response for the flagged client IP against /analytics, /xmlpserver, /bi-security-login and /wsm-pm endpoints, focusing on 200/302 responses that follow traversal or deserialization markers.
  3. Determine whether the source IP is internal, a known scanner, or an untrusted external address, and whether requests were authenticated or anonymous (unauthenticated access to privileged BI functions is the key indicator).
  4. Check the WebLogic/Oracle BI service account (e.g. the OS user running the Java process) for any child processes, new scheduled tasks, or outbound connections spawned near the request time.

Containment

  1. Block the offending source IP(s) at the WAF/reverse proxy and restrict external access to the Analytics and BI Publisher web tier to trusted networks only.
  2. Apply the Oracle November 2026 Critical Patch Update for Business Intelligence Enterprise Edition; if patching is not immediately possible, take the exposed BI web tier offline or place it behind authenticated VPN access.
  3. Rotate credentials and keys accessible to the OBIEE/WebLogic service account (RPD credentials, datasource connections, and any stored service principals) if compromise is suspected.

Evidence Collection

  1. Preserve IIS/Apache/WebLogic access and error logs, the WebLogic AdminServer and managed-server .out/.log files, and OBIEE sawlog/nqserver logs covering the activity window.
  2. Capture the full process tree and command lines for any child processes spawned by the Java/BI service account, plus relevant EDR process and network telemetry.
  3. Image or snapshot the affected host and collect the deployed BI application artifacts (WAR/EAR, custom JARs) to identify any webshell or modified component.

Escalation Criteria

  • !Escalate to incident response immediately if traversal/deserialization requests returned 200/302 AND a child process or outbound connection was spawned by the BI service account.
  • !Escalate if evidence of credential theft, RPD exfiltration, or lateral movement from the OBIEE host is observed.
  • !Escalate to the application owner and Oracle support if the host is confirmed unpatched and externally reachable, given the CVSS 10.0 unauthenticated impact.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • >WebLogic managed-server and AdminServer stdout/stderr logs and the deployment staging directory for newly written JSP/WAR artifacts.
  • >OBIEE sawlog0.log, nqserver.log, and obis/obips component logs around the event timeframe.
  • >IIS/Apache access logs plus any new files under the analytics/xmlpserver deployment paths and their modification timestamps.

Tuning Guidance

Baseline normal BI Publisher scheduler and dashboard client IPs and user agents, then exclude them. Tighten the deserialization/traversal marker list to your environment's observed benign patterns, and raise the hits threshold during scheduled reporting windows. Where a reverse proxy masks client IPs, pivot the correlation to X-Forwarded-For and add the proxy's forwarded-header field to the group-by.


Hunting Queries

Hunts for high-volume authenticated-looking POST activity to OBIEE endpoints that may indicate automated exploitation or data exfiltration.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-43dc641418 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-114784 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | where csUriStem has_any ("/analytics/","/xmlpserver/","/wsm-pm/") | where scStatus == 200 and csMethod == "POST" | summarize count() by cIP, csUriStem, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h) | where count_ > 10
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-43dc641418 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-114784 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web (uri_path="*/analytics/*" OR uri_path="*/xmlpserver/*") method=POST status=200 | stats count by clientip, uri_path | where count>10

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Simulated OBIEE deserialization probe to analytics endpoint
linux

Sends a crafted POST to the OBIEE analytics endpoint containing a base64 Java-serialized-object marker to trigger web-tier detection (lab only, no real exploit payload).

Command

bash
curl -s -o /dev/null -X POST 'http://obiee-lab.local:9502/analytics/saw.dll?SyncServlet' -H 'User-Agent: Java/1.8.0_181' --data 'rO0ABXNyABFqYXZhLmxhbmcuUnVudGltZQ=='

Cleanup

bash
echo 'No cleanup required; request was non-persistent'

Expected Telemetry

IIS/Apache access log entry for POST /analytics/saw.dll with Java user agent and rO0AB body marker.

Expected Detection

KQL/SPL web-tier rules fire on the rO0AB marker and java/ user agent against the analytics path.

Test 2 Simulated path traversal against BI Publisher
linux

Issues a GET request with a path traversal sequence against the xmlpserver endpoint to validate traversal detection logic.

Command

bash
curl -s -o /dev/null 'http://obiee-lab.local:9502/xmlpserver/servlet/readProperties?file=../../../../etc/passwd' -H 'User-Agent: python-requests/2.31.0'

Cleanup

bash
echo 'No cleanup required; request was non-persistent'

Expected Telemetry

Web log entry for GET /xmlpserver/servlet/readProperties with ../ traversal and python-requests user agent.

Expected Detection

Traversal marker and automated user-agent conditions trigger the web-tier detections.

Test 3 Simulated post-exploitation shell from BI service account
windows

Spawns a benign child process under a process named to emulate the Oracle BI/WebLogic Java runtime to validate EDR correlation logic.

Command

powershell
powershell -Command "Start-Process -FilePath cmd.exe -ArgumentList '/c whoami'"

Cleanup

powershell
echo done

Expected Telemetry

ProcessRollup2/Sysmon ProcessCreate event: cmd.exe child with a java/weblogic-style parent and command line /c whoami.

Expected Detection

Elastic EQL / CrowdStrike CQL post-exploitation rules flag the shell spawned from the BI runtime parent.

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