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CVE-2026-111560 Google Chronicle · YARA-L

Detect Barracuda Multiple Products Authenticated OS Command Injection (CVE-2026-111560) in Google Chronicle

Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-111560, an OS command injection vulnerability (CWE-78) in the timezone configuration field of multiple Barracuda Networks appliance products. An authenticated administrator can inject shell metacharacters into the timezone value, which run as operating-system commands with root privileges when the value is later processed. The CVE is on the CISA KEV catalog (added 2026-11-10) under BOD 26-04. This detection surfaces anomalous management requests carrying shell metacharacters or command tokens, together with host-side signs of the appliance web/management process spawning shell or reconnaissance children.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Execution

YARA-L Detection Query

Google Chronicle (YARA-L)
yaral
// df00tech DF00-2a09763592 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-111560 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
rule barracuda_cve_2026_111560_cmd_injection {
  meta:
    author = "Argus Detection Platform"
    description = "Barracuda multiple products authenticated OS command injection CVE-2026-111560"
    severity = "CRITICAL"
    reference = "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-111560"
  events:
    $e.metadata.event_type = "NETWORK_HTTP"
    re.regex($e.network.http.referral_url, `(?i)(cgi-bin|/admin|/manage|/config|/api/|/ajax)`) or re.regex($e.target.url, `(?i)(cgi-bin|/admin|/manage|/config|/api/|/ajax)`)
    re.regex($e.target.url, `(%3B|%7C|%60|%24%28|;|\||\x60|\$\(|wget|curl|/bin/sh|/bin/bash|whoami|cat /etc/passwd|uname -a)`)
    $e.network.http.response_code != 404
    $e.network.http.response_code != 400
    $ip = $e.principal.ip
  match:
    $ip over 5m
  condition:
    $e
}
critical severity medium confidence

YARA-L rule matching HTTP events to Barracuda management endpoints carrying command-injection payloads with non-error responses.

Data Sources

Network HTTP telemetryWeb proxy logs

Required Tables

NETWORK_HTTP

False Positives & Tuning

  • Authorized scanner activity
  • Pentest traffic
  • Admin requests with encoded reserved characters

Other platforms for CVE-2026-111560


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Shell metacharacter injection against management endpoint

    Expected signal: Web access log entry for /cgi-bin/mgmt with a URI containing %3Bid (decoded ;id) from the test source IP.

  2. Test 2 Recon command injection via encoded payload

    Expected signal: Web access log entry for /api/config with decoded $(cat /etc/passwd) payload.

  3. Test 3 Web service spawns shell child (post-exploitation)

    Expected signal: Process-start events showing a web-service account spawning bash, id, uname, and wget.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Identify the source IP(s) of the suspect requests and determine whether they belong to authorized scanners, pentest ranges, or admin jumphosts; if not, treat as hostile.
  2. Decode the full request URI/body and extract the injected command(s); classify intent (recon, download/stage, reverse shell, persistence).
  3. Correlate the request timestamp with host-side process telemetry on the Barracuda appliance to confirm whether a shell/recon child process was spawned by the web/management service.
  4. Determine the appliance product, firmware version, and patch level against the Barracuda trust advisory to confirm exposure.

Containment

  1. Block the attacker source IP(s) at the perimeter and isolate the affected Barracuda appliance management interface from untrusted networks (restrict to management VLAN/VPN).
  2. Apply the vendor fix from the Barracuda trust advisory immediately per CISA BOD 26-04 timelines; if no patch is available, take the management interface offline or ACL it to trusted hosts only.
  3. Rotate all credentials, API keys, and certificates stored on or reachable from the appliance, assuming full compromise of the root account.

Evidence Collection

  1. Preserve appliance web/management access logs, system logs, and any shell history or spawned-process records covering the attack window.
  2. Capture a forensic image or configuration/state export of the appliance before remediation to retain attacker artifacts (webshells, cron jobs, modified configs).
  3. Export matching SIEM events and full packet captures of the attacker session for the incident record.

Escalation Criteria

  • !Escalate to IR lead and declare an incident if host telemetry confirms command execution (shell/recon child from the web service) or any outbound connection to attacker infrastructure.
  • !Escalate to management and regulatory/notification tracks if the appliance handled sensitive data (email security gateway, WAF-fronted apps) and compromise is confirmed.
  • !Escalate to threat intel for KEV reporting and to coordinate with CISA BOD 26-04 reporting obligations if exploitation is confirmed.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • >Appliance web/management access logs showing injection-shaped requests
  • >New or modified files in web-accessible/cgi-bin directories (webshells)
  • >Shell command history and spawned-process audit records for the web service account
  • >Newly created cron jobs, startup scripts, or SSH authorized_keys on the appliance
  • >Outbound network connections from the appliance to unknown hosts

Tuning Guidance

Baseline legitimate admin and vendor-update traffic to the management endpoints and exclude known scanner and pentest source IPs via an allowlist. Reserved URL characters (& | ;) appear in benign parameter separators, so require co-occurrence with a recon/command token or a correlated host-side process spawn before alerting at high severity. Once the appliance is patched and verified, downgrade the standalone web-request rule to informational and retain the correlated network+process rule as the high-fidelity signal.


Hunting Queries

Hunts for injection/recon payloads in decoded Barracuda management request URIs across the environment.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-2a09763592 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-111560 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | extend d = url_decode(strcat(csUriStem, csUriQuery)) | where d has_any ("$(", "`", ";wget", ";curl", "/bin/sh", "bash -i") | summarize count() by cIP, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-2a09763592 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-111560 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web sourcetype IN ("barracuda:http","apache:access") | eval d=urldecode(uri) | where match(d, "(?i)(\$\(|`|;wget|;curl|/bin/sh|bash -i)") | stats count by src_ip, dest

Hunts for shell/recon processes spawned by appliance web services indicating successful command execution.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-2a09763592 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-111560 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
DeviceProcessEvents | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("httpd","nginx","lighttpd","php") and FileName in~ ("sh","bash","wget","curl","nc","python","perl") | project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-2a09763592 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-111560 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=edr sourcetype=*process* parent_process IN (httpd,nginx,lighttpd,php) process IN (sh,bash,wget,curl,nc,python,perl) | table _time host parent_process process process_command_line

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Shell metacharacter injection against management endpoint
linux

Send a crafted request to a Barracuda-style management CGI endpoint embedding a command substitution payload to simulate the injection attempt.

Command

bash
curl -sk 'https://appliance.lab.local/cgi-bin/mgmt?action=diag&host=127.0.0.1%3Bid'

Cleanup

bash
echo 'No cleanup required; stateless request. Remove any lab log entries if desired.'

Expected Telemetry

Web access log entry for /cgi-bin/mgmt with a URI containing %3Bid (decoded ;id) from the test source IP.

Expected Detection

The kql/spl/qradar_aql/sumo/chronicle URI rules fire on the shell metacharacter in the management endpoint request.

Test 2 Recon command injection via encoded payload
linux

Simulate an attacker injecting a reconnaissance command through the vulnerable parameter using URL-encoded command substitution.

Command

bash
curl -sk 'https://appliance.lab.local/api/config?name=%24%28cat%20%2Fetc%2Fpasswd%29'

Cleanup

bash
echo 'No cleanup required; stateless request.'

Expected Telemetry

Web access log entry for /api/config with decoded $(cat /etc/passwd) payload.

Expected Detection

URI-based rules match the $( command substitution and recon token cat /etc/passwd.

Test 3 Web service spawns shell child (post-exploitation)
linux

Simulate the appliance web/management process executing an injected shell command by spawning a recon process from a web-service-like parent.

Command

bash
sudo -u www-data bash -c 'bash -c "id; uname -a; wget http://127.0.0.1/stage.sh -O /tmp/stage.sh"'

Cleanup

bash
rm -f /tmp/stage.sh

Expected Telemetry

Process-start events showing a web-service account spawning bash, id, uname, and wget.

Expected Detection

The elastic_eql sequence and crowdstrike_cql process rule fire on the web-service parent spawning shell/recon/download children.

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