Skip to content
CVE-2026-110644 Splunk · SPL

Detect nodejs-whisper OS Command Injection via Crafted Audio File Paths (CVE-2026-110644) in Splunk

Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-110644, an OS command injection vulnerability in the npm package nodejs-whisper prior to version 0.4.0. The vulnerable convertToWavType and related helpers in src/utils.ts interpolate attacker-controlled audio file paths directly into shell commands (ffmpeg / whisper invocations) executed via child_process shell execution. A crafted filename containing shell metacharacters (e.g. ';', '|', '$()', backticks) results in arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the Node.js process. Detection focuses on Node.js processes spawning unexpected shell/child processes whose command lines contain audio file path patterns combined with shell metacharacters, and anomalous child processes of ffmpeg/whisper invocations.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Execution

SPL Detection Query

Splunk (SPL)
spl
``` df00tech DF00-833a7d72e4 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-110644 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=* (sourcetype="linux:process" OR sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" OR sourcetype="Sysmon" OR sourcetype="sysmon")
| eval parent=lower(coalesce(parent_process_name, ParentImage, parent_process))
| eval cmd=coalesce(process, CommandLine, process_command_line)
| search parent IN ("node","node.exe","npm","npx","ffmpeg","ffmpeg.exe")
| where match(cmd, "ffmpeg|whisper|\.wav|\.mp3|\.m4a|\.ogg|\.flac")
| where match(cmd, "[;&|`]|\$\(|\|\||&&|>\s*/")
| table _time, host, user, parent, cmd
| sort - _time
critical severity medium confidence

Correlates Node.js/ffmpeg/whisper parent processes with child command lines containing audio path references and shell metacharacters indicative of injection.

Data Sources

Linux auditd / process telemetryWindows Sysmon (Event ID 1)

Required Sourcetypes

linux:processSysmonWinEventLog:Security

False Positives & Tuning

  • Media processing batch scripts legitimately chaining ffmpeg commands
  • Automated transcription services using shell wrappers around whisper
  • Build pipelines converting audio assets with ffmpeg

Other platforms for CVE-2026-110644


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Command injection via crafted WAV filename (semicolon)

    Expected signal: Process launch of /bin/bash spawned by node, with command line containing 'ffmpeg -i audio.wav; touch /tmp/pwned_cve_2026_110644'.

  2. Test 2 Command injection via command substitution in filename

    Expected signal: Shell process with command line containing '$(id > /tmp/inj_cve_2026_110644)' spawned by node.

  3. Test 3 Command injection via pipe in filename (backtick variant)

    Expected signal: Shell process spawned by node with pipe ('|') to curl and audio extension in command line.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Identify the host and the Node.js application invoking nodejs-whisper; confirm the installed package version with 'npm ls nodejs-whisper', versions < 0.4.0 are vulnerable.
  2. Extract the full command line of the spawned shell/child process and isolate the injected payload after the shell metacharacter (e.g. text following ';', '|', '$()', or backticks).
  3. Determine the source of the audio file path, was the filename user-supplied (upload, API parameter, queue message)? Trace back to the request/entrypoint that provided it.
  4. Assess whether the injected command executed successfully by correlating subsequent process, network, and file events from the same process tree.

Containment

  1. Isolate or restrict the affected host/container from the network to prevent further command execution or lateral movement.
  2. Kill the malicious process tree spawned from the node/ffmpeg parent and suspend the vulnerable service until patched.
  3. Block any attacker-controlled C2 or download URLs observed in the injected command at the egress firewall/proxy.

Evidence Collection

  1. Capture the full process tree (parent node process, ffmpeg/whisper invocation, injected child) with command lines, timestamps, and user context.
  2. Preserve the malicious audio filename and any uploaded file, plus application logs showing how the path was received and passed to nodejs-whisper.
  3. Collect network connection logs and any files created/downloaded by the injected command for forensic analysis.

Escalation Criteria

  • !Escalate to incident response if the injected command achieved execution beyond reconnaissance (reverse shell, payload download, credential access, or persistence).
  • !Escalate if the vulnerable service is internet-facing or accepts untrusted audio uploads, indicating active exploitation risk.
  • !Escalate if evidence of lateral movement, data exfiltration, or the process ran with elevated/root privileges is found.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • >Shell history and spawned process command lines in the node/ffmpeg process tree
  • >The crafted audio filename containing shell metacharacters in application upload/temp directories
  • >Application logs recording the request parameter or queue message that supplied the malicious path

Tuning Guidance

Baseline legitimate media/transcription pipelines on your hosts and exclude their known ffmpeg chaining patterns by full command-line signature rather than by parent process alone. Tighten the audio-extension list to those your application actually processes. If false positives persist from '&&' batch conversions, require the presence of injection-specific indicators (e.g. '$(', backticks, ';' followed by a non-audio command) to raise fidelity.


Hunting Queries

Hunt for any shell metacharacters in processes spawned by node or ffmpeg, broader than the primary detection to catch obfuscated variants.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-833a7d72e4 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-110644 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
DeviceProcessEvents | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("node","ffmpeg") | where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"[;&|`]|\$\(" | project Timestamp, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-833a7d72e4 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-110644 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=* (parent_process_name=node OR parent_process_name=ffmpeg) | regex process="[;&|`]|\$\(" | table _time host process parent_process_name

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Command injection via crafted WAV filename (semicolon)
linux

Simulates passing a filename containing a semicolon-delimited injected command to a vulnerable nodejs-whisper convert path in a lab.

Command

bash
node -e "const {execSync}=require('child_process'); const f='audio.wav; touch /tmp/pwned_cve_2026_110644'; execSync('ffmpeg -i '+f+' -ar 16000 out.wav', {shell:'/bin/bash'})" 2>/dev/null; ls -l /tmp/pwned_cve_2026_110644

Cleanup

bash
rm -f /tmp/pwned_cve_2026_110644 out.wav

Expected Telemetry

Process launch of /bin/bash spawned by node, with command line containing 'ffmpeg -i audio.wav; touch /tmp/pwned_cve_2026_110644'.

Expected Detection

KQL/SPL/EDR rules match on node parent spawning bash with audio reference and ';' metacharacter.

Test 2 Command injection via command substitution in filename
linux

Simulates a filename using $() command substitution to execute an injected command via the shell.

Command

bash
node -e "const {execSync}=require('child_process'); const f='clip$(id > /tmp/inj_cve_2026_110644).mp3'; execSync('ffmpeg -i '+f, {shell:'/bin/bash'})" 2>/dev/null; cat /tmp/inj_cve_2026_110644

Cleanup

bash
rm -f /tmp/inj_cve_2026_110644

Expected Telemetry

Shell process with command line containing '$(id > /tmp/inj_cve_2026_110644)' spawned by node.

Expected Detection

Detection matches on '$(' command-substitution metacharacter in a node/ffmpeg child command line.

Test 3 Command injection via pipe in filename (backtick variant)
linux

Simulates a filename using backticks/pipe to chain an attacker command through the vulnerable shell invocation.

Command

bash
node -e "const {execSync}=require('child_process'); const f='track.ogg | curl -s http://127.0.0.1/beacon'; execSync('ffmpeg -i \"'+f+'\"', {shell:'/bin/bash'})" 2>/dev/null; echo done

Cleanup

bash
rm -f track.ogg

Expected Telemetry

Shell process spawned by node with pipe ('|') to curl and audio extension in command line.

Expected Detection

Detection matches on '|' metacharacter plus audio reference in a node/ffmpeg child command line.

Related Detections