Detect GPUStack Improper Authentication Exploitation (CVE-2026-102895) in Microsoft Sentinel
Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-102895, a critical (CVSS 9.8) improper authentication vulnerability in GPUStack versions prior to 2.2.0. The flaw (CWE-287/CWE-290/CWE-346) allows attackers to bypass authentication and spoof identity against the GPUStack management/API server, gaining unauthorized access to model-serving infrastructure, worker registration, and administrative endpoints. This CVE is listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. Detection focuses on anomalous access to GPUStack API endpoints (model management, worker registration, token/API-key endpoints) from unauthenticated or forged sessions, successful requests lacking proper authentication state, and post-exploitation activity such as rogue worker enrollment or model deployment.
MITRE ATT&CK
KQL Detection Query
// df00tech DF00-97704b4425 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-102895 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
let gpustack_paths = dynamic(["/v1/models", "/v1/workers", "/v1-openai/", "/v1/model-instances", "/v1/api-keys", "/v1/users", "/v1/auth", "/v1/tokens"]);
let suspicious_status = dynamic([200, 201, 204]);
W3CIISLog
| where csUriStem has_any (gpustack_paths)
| extend AuthHeaderPresent = isnotempty(csAuthorization) or (csCookie has "access_token") or (csCookie has "session")
| where scStatus in (suspicious_status)
| where AuthHeaderPresent == false or csUsername == "-" or isempty(csUsername)
| where csMethod in ("POST", "PUT", "DELETE", "PATCH") or csUriStem has_any ("/v1/workers", "/v1/api-keys", "/v1/users")
| summarize RequestCount = count(), Methods = make_set(csMethod), Paths = make_set(csUriStem), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated) by cIP, Computer
| where RequestCount >= 1
| project FirstSeen, LastSeen, cIP, Computer, RequestCount, Methods, Paths
| order by RequestCount desc Identifies state-changing or sensitive GPUStack API requests that succeed without a valid authentication header, cookie, or authenticated username — the signature of the CVE-2026-102895 auth bypass. Also flags rogue worker/api-key/user creation from unauthenticated sources.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Internal health-check or monitoring probes hitting GPUStack read endpoints without auth tokens
- Load balancers or API gateways that strip the Authorization header before logging at the origin
- Legitimate anonymous access to GPUStack endpoints intentionally left public in a lab/dev deployment
Other platforms for CVE-2026-102895
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.
- Test 1 Unauthenticated GPUStack worker registration attempt
Expected signal: Web/proxy access log entry for POST /v1/workers with a 2xx status and no Authorization header.
- Test 2 Unauthenticated GPUStack API key creation
Expected signal: POST /v1/api-keys returning 200/201 with no auth context in the logs.
- Test 3 Unauthenticated GPUStack model listing enumeration
Expected signal: GET /v1/models returning 200 without an Authorization header.
References (7)
- https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/security/advisories/GHSA-gj9m-f8ph-pmhr
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102895
- https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/pull/5346
- https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/commit/53f42a6a553542974396d16a4ff6b12bcbedb48d
- https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/releases/tag/v2.2.0
- https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-102895
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gj9m-f8ph-pmhr
Response Playbook
Triage
- Confirm the GPUStack server version via `/v1/version` or the deployment manifest; any version < 2.2.0 is vulnerable to CVE-2026-102895.
- Review the flagged requests and determine whether state-changing endpoints (/v1/workers, /v1/api-keys, /v1/users, /v1/model-instances) returned 2xx without a valid authentication header or session.
- Correlate the source IP against known-good administrators, CI/CD systems, and internal monitoring; geolocate and check threat-intel reputation for external IPs.
- Enumerate any API keys, users, or workers created or modified in the time window around the suspicious requests.
Containment
- Immediately restrict network access to the GPUStack management/API port (default 80/443/10150) to trusted admin networks via firewall or security group.
- Upgrade GPUStack to version 2.2.0 or later, which contains the authentication fix (commit 53f42a6).
- Revoke and rotate all GPUStack API keys and force re-authentication of all users and workers.
- Deregister and quarantine any worker nodes that were enrolled without authorization.
Evidence Collection
- Preserve GPUStack server application logs, the reverse-proxy/web-server access logs, and systemd/journal logs covering the exposure window.
- Export the GPUStack database (users, api_keys, workers, model_instances tables) to capture attacker-created objects before remediation.
- Capture the full HTTP request/response pairs (including headers) for the flagged unauthenticated requests for forensic review.
Escalation Criteria
- !Escalate to incident response if any worker, API key, or admin user was created from an untrusted or external source IP.
- !Escalate if model instances were deployed or modified, as this may indicate model poisoning or use of GPU resources for unauthorized workloads.
- !Escalate immediately if the GPUStack instance is internet-exposed, given the CVE is in the CISA KEV catalog and under active exploitation.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
GPUStack database rows in users/api_keys/workers created or modified during the exposure window - >
Reverse-proxy and application access logs showing 2xx responses to sensitive endpoints without auth - >
Newly enrolled worker node registrations and their reported hostnames/IPs - >
GPUStack server configuration and version metadata confirming pre-2.2.0 build
Tuning Guidance
Baseline the set of source IPs that legitimately administer GPUStack (admin workstations, CI/CD, monitoring) and exclude them. If an upstream proxy strips the Authorization header before origin logging, instead correlate on the GPUStack application-level audit log where the authenticated principal is recorded. Narrow to state-changing methods and sensitive endpoints to reduce noise from benign anonymous reads, and raise severity when the source IP is external.
Hunting Queries
Hunts for successful creation/modification of GPUStack API keys, users, or workers without an authenticated user — a strong indicator of CVE-2026-102895 abuse.
// df00tech DF00-97704b4425 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-102895 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | where csUriStem has_any ("/v1/api-keys", "/v1/users", "/v1/workers") and csMethod in ("POST","PUT","DELETE") and scStatus in (200,201,204) | where isempty(csUsername) or csUsername == "-" | project TimeGenerated, cIP, csMethod, csUriStem, scStatus ``` df00tech DF00-97704b4425 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-102895 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web (uri_path="/v1/api-keys*" OR uri_path="/v1/users*" OR uri_path="/v1/workers*") method IN (POST,PUT,DELETE) status>=200 status<300 | search NOT authorization=* | table _time src_ip method uri_path status Atomic Red Team Tests
Simulates an attacker registering a rogue worker against the GPUStack API without authentication to test the CVE-2026-102895 bypass.
Command
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" -X POST http://gpustack.lab.local/v1/workers -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"name":"rogue-worker","hostname":"attacker-host","ip":"10.13.37.66"}' Cleanup
curl -s -X DELETE http://gpustack.lab.local/v1/workers/rogue-worker || true Expected Telemetry
Web/proxy access log entry for POST /v1/workers with a 2xx status and no Authorization header.
Expected Detection
KQL/SPL rules fire on successful state-changing GPUStack API call without authentication.
Attempts to create a GPUStack API key without valid credentials, exercising the identity-spoofing aspect of the vulnerability.
Command
curl -s -X POST http://gpustack.lab.local/v1/api-keys -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"name":"attacker-key","expires_in":0}' Cleanup
curl -s -X DELETE 'http://gpustack.lab.local/v1/api-keys?name=attacker-key' || true Expected Telemetry
POST /v1/api-keys returning 200/201 with no auth context in the logs.
Expected Detection
Hunting query for unauthenticated api-key creation matches.
Enumerates deployed models via the GPUStack API without authentication to confirm read-level access bypass.
Command
powershell -Command "try { $r = Invoke-WebRequest -Uri 'http://gpustack.lab.local/v1/models' -Method GET -UseBasicParsing; Write-Output $r.StatusCode } catch { Write-Output $_.Exception.Response.StatusCode.value__ }" Cleanup
echo no cleanup required Expected Telemetry
GET /v1/models returning 200 without an Authorization header.
Expected Detection
GPUStack unauthenticated access detection logs the anomalous read for correlation.