CVE-2025-62215 Microsoft Windows Race Condition Exploitation
Detects exploitation attempts of CVE-2025-62215, a race condition vulnerability (CWE-362) in Microsoft Windows. This KEV-listed vulnerability can be abused by attackers to gain elevated privileges or execute arbitrary code by winning a time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition. Detection focuses on suspicious process creation patterns, handle manipulation, and abnormal thread timing indicative of race condition exploitation.
Vulnerability Intelligence
KEV — Known ExploitedAffected Software
- Vendor
- Microsoft
- Product
- Windows
Weakness (CWE)
Timeline
- Disclosed
- November 12, 2025
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
What is CVE-2025-62215 CVE-2025-62215 Microsoft Windows Race Condition Exploitation?
CVE-2025-62215 Microsoft Windows Race Condition Exploitation (CVE-2025-62215) maps to the Privilege Escalation and Execution tactics — the adversary is trying to gain higher-level permissions in MITRE ATT&CK.
This page provides production-ready detection logic for CVE-2025-62215 Microsoft Windows Race Condition Exploitation, covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Windows Security Event Log, Microsoft Sentinel SecurityEvent table. The queries below are rated high severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Privilege Escalation Execution
let timeWindow = 5m;
SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where EventID in (4688, 4689, 4656, 4663, 4670)
| where ProcessName has_any ("svchost.exe", "lsass.exe", "winlogon.exe", "services.exe")
or (EventID == 4688 and ParentProcessName has_any ("svchost.exe", "services.exe") and NewProcessName !has_any ("conhost.exe", "WerFault.exe"))
| join kind=inner (
SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where EventID == 4672
| project AccountName, Computer, PrivilegeList, TimeGenerated
) on AccountName, Computer
| where PrivilegeList has_any ("SeDebugPrivilege", "SeTcbPrivilege", "SeCreateTokenPrivilege")
| summarize EventCount = count(), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated), UniqueEventIDs = make_set(EventID) by AccountName, Computer, ProcessName
| where EventCount > 3
| extend TimeDeltaSeconds = datetime_diff('second', LastSeen, FirstSeen)
| where TimeDeltaSeconds < 30
| extend RiskScore = case(EventCount > 10, "High", EventCount > 5, "Medium", "Low")
| project-reorder FirstSeen, LastSeen, Computer, AccountName, ProcessName, EventCount, TimeDeltaSeconds, RiskScore, UniqueEventIDsDetects rapid sequences of object access, privilege assignment, and process creation events on sensitive Windows processes within a short time window — characteristic of race condition exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2025-62215.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives
- Legitimate system administration tools performing rapid handle operations on system processes
- Security scanners or EDR agents that enumerate process handles at high frequency
- Software installers or update mechanisms that require elevated privileges and spawn multiple child processes
- Windows Defender or antivirus products performing deep process inspection
Sigma rule & cross-platform mapping
The detection logic for CVE-2025-62215 Microsoft Windows Race Condition Exploitation (CVE-2025-62215) above is provided in a vendor-neutral
form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the
following logsource:
logsource:
product: windowsBrowse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:
Platform-specific guides for CVE-2025-62215
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Simulate Rapid Handle Acquisition on System Process
Expected signal: Windows Security Event Log entries for EventID 4656 (A handle to an object was requested) and 4658 (The handle to an object was closed) appearing in rapid succession for the svchost process, triggering the burst detection threshold.
- Test 2Privilege Escalation Sequence Simulation
Expected signal: EventID 4688 (process creation) followed by EventID 4672 (special privileges assigned to new logon) within seconds, generating the correlated alert pattern.
- Test 3CreateRemoteThread into System Process (Lab Only)
Expected signal: CrowdStrike CreateRemoteThreadV2 event and Windows EventID 4656 for the target process handle, followed by potential Microsoft Defender ATP alert for suspicious cross-process thread creation.
Response Playbook
Triage
- Identify the source account and host involved in the burst of security events — determine if the account is a service account, standard user, or administrator, and whether the host is a server, workstation, or domain controller.
- Correlate the event timeline against patch status: query WSUS, Intune, or SCCM to confirm whether the affected system has received the November 2025 Microsoft security updates addressing CVE-2025-62215.
- Review process ancestry for the suspicious process chain — use EDR telemetry (CrowdStrike, Defender for Endpoint) to reconstruct the full parent-child process tree and identify the initiating binary.
- Check for concurrent lateral movement indicators: failed logon attempts (Event ID 4625), network connections from the host to unusual internal destinations, or SMB session establishment within the same timeframe.
Containment
- If exploitation is confirmed, isolate the affected host from the network immediately using EDR network isolation or VLAN quarantine, then notify the incident response team before taking further forensic steps.
- Revoke any active sessions for the implicated user account, force a password reset, and disable the account pending investigation — coordinate with identity team to check for persistence mechanisms such as new local admin accounts or scheduled tasks created post-exploitation.
Evidence Collection
- Capture a full memory dump of the affected system prior to isolation or reboot using tools such as WinPmem or built-in EDR memory acquisition — race condition exploits often leave ephemeral artifacts only in memory.
- Export Windows Security Event Log (Security.evtx), System Event Log, and any ETW traces (especially from the NT Kernel Logger) from the timeframe surrounding the detected burst, preserving chain of custody with hash verification.
Escalation Criteria
- ! Escalate immediately to senior IR if the affected host is a domain controller, certificate authority, or privileged access workstation — CVE-2025-62215 exploitation on these assets indicates potential for full domain compromise.
- ! Escalate if post-exploitation activity is detected, including new scheduled tasks, services, registry run keys, or outbound C2 connections from the affected host following the race condition event burst.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
Windows Security Event Log entries for EventIDs 4656, 4663, 4670, 4672, and 4688 clustered within seconds of each other for a single user/host combination - >
ETW traces from Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process and Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing providers showing rapid object handle acquisition and release sequences - >
Prefetch files (.pf) in C:\Windows\Prefetch for any unexpected binaries executed during the exploitation window - >
MFT entries showing creation or modification of files in C:\Windows\System32 or C:\Windows\Temp during the attack window
Tuning Guidance
Start by building a baseline of normal burst counts for your environment's service accounts and privileged users — thresholds of 5 events in 30 seconds may be too sensitive in environments with active software deployment. Exclude known-good automation accounts (e.g., SCCM client accounts, monitoring agents) by adding their SIDs or account names to an allowlist. For CrowdStrike environments, tune using the aid (agent ID) of known management hosts. Consider increasing the burst_count threshold to 10+ in high-activity environments while reducing the time window to 15 seconds to maintain detection fidelity. After applying the November 2025 patches, update the detection to focus on unpatched hosts by cross-referencing against your asset inventory.
Hunting Queries
Hunt for anomalous high-frequency file handle acquisition on System32 objects, which may indicate TOCTOU race condition exploitation or reconnaissance for CVE-2025-62215 targeting.
SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventID in (4656, 4663) and ObjectType == "File"
| where ObjectName startswith @"\Device\HarddiskVolume" and ObjectName has "System32"
| summarize access_count = count(), unique_objects = dcount(ObjectName), accounts = make_set(SubjectUserName) by Computer, bin(TimeGenerated, 1m)
| where access_count > 20 and unique_objects > 5
| order by access_count descindex=wineventlog sourcetype=WinEventLog:Security EventCode IN (4656, 4663) Object_Type=File
| where match(Object_Name, "(?i)system32")
| bucket span=1m _time
| stats count AS access_count, dc(Object_Name) AS unique_objects, values(Account_Name) AS accounts by _time, host
| where access_count > 20 AND unique_objects > 5
| sort - access_countAtomic Red Team Tests
Simulates the high-frequency object handle acquisition pattern characteristic of TOCTOU race condition exploitation by rapidly opening and closing handles to a sensitive system process.
Command
powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command "$proc = Get-Process svchost | Select-Object -First 1; 1..20 | ForEach-Object { $handle = [System.Diagnostics.Process]::GetProcessById($proc.Id); Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 50; $handle.Dispose() }; Write-Host 'Handle burst complete'"Cleanup
No cleanup required — handle operations are transient and process state is unmodified.Expected Telemetry
Windows Security Event Log entries for EventID 4656 (A handle to an object was requested) and 4658 (The handle to an object was closed) appearing in rapid succession for the svchost process, triggering the burst detection threshold.
Expected Detection
KQL and SPL queries should fire when event_count exceeds threshold within the 30-second window, with ProcessName matching svchost.exe.
Triggers a sequence of privilege-related security events that mirrors the pattern seen during CVE-2025-62215 exploitation, including special privilege assignment following process creation.
Command
cmd.exe /c "whoami /priv && runas /user:Administrator /savecred cmd.exe /c whoami && net localgroup administrators"Cleanup
No persistent changes made — command only queries existing state.Expected Telemetry
EventID 4688 (process creation) followed by EventID 4672 (special privileges assigned to new logon) within seconds, generating the correlated alert pattern.
Expected Detection
Sentinel KQL join between SecurityEvent EventID 4688 and 4672 for the same account within the time window should produce an alert row.
Simulates post-exploitation thread injection into a system process, which is commonly observed after a successful race condition privilege escalation. THIS IS FOR ISOLATED LAB USE ONLY.
Command
powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command "Add-Type -TypeDefinition @'
using System;
using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
public class ThreadInject {
[DllImport(\"kernel32.dll\")] public static extern IntPtr OpenProcess(uint a, bool b, int c);
[DllImport(\"kernel32.dll\",SetLastError=true)] public static extern IntPtr VirtualAllocEx(IntPtr h, IntPtr a, uint s, uint t, uint p);
[DllImport(\"kernel32.dll\")] public static extern bool WriteProcessMemory(IntPtr h, IntPtr a, byte[] b, uint s, out int w);
[DllImport(\"kernel32.dll\")] public static extern IntPtr CreateRemoteThread(IntPtr h, IntPtr a, uint s, IntPtr f, IntPtr p, uint c, IntPtr i);
}
'@; $target = Get-Process notepad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue; if ($target) { Write-Host \"Target found: $($target.Id)\" } else { Write-Host 'Start notepad first' }"Cleanup
Terminate any notepad.exe instances spawned during testing: Stop-Process -Name notepad -ForceExpected Telemetry
CrowdStrike CreateRemoteThreadV2 event and Windows EventID 4656 for the target process handle, followed by potential Microsoft Defender ATP alert for suspicious cross-process thread creation.
Expected Detection
CrowdStrike CQL query should detect the CreateRemoteThreadV2 event correlated with process handle events, triggering the burst detection with unique_event_types >= 2.