CVE-2025-59374

ASUS Live Update Embedded Malicious Code (CVE-2025-59374)

Detects indicators of compromise related to CVE-2025-59374, a supply chain attack where ASUS Live Update software contained embedded malicious code (CWE-506). This mirrors the ShadowHammer operation pattern where threat actors compromised the ASUS software update infrastructure to deliver backdoored updates to endpoints. Detection focuses on suspicious child processes spawned by ASUS Live Update, anomalous network connections, and staging activity consistent with backdoor execution.

Vulnerability Intelligence

KEV — Known Exploited

Affected Software

Vendor
ASUS
Product
Live Update

Weakness (CWE)

Timeline

Disclosed
December 17, 2025

CVSS

Unscored
Write-up coming soon

What is CVE-2025-59374 ASUS Live Update Embedded Malicious Code (CVE-2025-59374)?

ASUS Live Update Embedded Malicious Code (CVE-2025-59374) (CVE-2025-59374) maps to the Initial Access and Execution and Persistence and Lateral Movement and Command and Control tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.

This page provides production-ready detection logic for ASUS Live Update Embedded Malicious Code (CVE-2025-59374), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, Microsoft Sentinel DeviceProcessEvents, Microsoft Sentinel DeviceNetworkEvents. The queries below are rated critical severity at high confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Execution Persistence Lateral Movement Command and Control
Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
kusto
let AsusUpdateProcs = dynamic(['LivaUpdate.exe', 'LiveUpdate.exe', 'ASUS Live Update.exe', 'AsusLiveUpdate.exe']);
let SuspiciousChildProcs = dynamic(['cmd.exe', 'powershell.exe', 'wscript.exe', 'cscript.exe', 'mshta.exe', 'rundll32.exe', 'regsvr32.exe', 'certutil.exe', 'bitsadmin.exe', 'wmic.exe', 'net.exe', 'net1.exe', 'schtasks.exe', 'at.exe', 'sc.exe']);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (AsusUpdateProcs)
   or FileName in~ (AsusUpdateProcs)
| where FileName in~ (SuspiciousChildProcs)
   or (InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (AsusUpdateProcs) and not(FileName in~ (AsusUpdateProcs)))
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceId, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, FolderPath, SHA256
| union (
    DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
    | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (AsusUpdateProcs)
    | where RemotePort in (80, 443, 4444, 8080, 8443, 1337)
    | project TimeGenerated, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl, LocalIP
)
| order by TimeGenerated desc

Detects suspicious child process spawning and anomalous network connections originating from ASUS Live Update binaries, indicative of embedded malicious code execution per CVE-2025-59374.

critical severity high confidence

Data Sources

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Microsoft Sentinel DeviceProcessEvents Microsoft Sentinel DeviceNetworkEvents

Required Tables

DeviceProcessEvents DeviceNetworkEvents

False Positives

  • Legitimate ASUS Live Update performing routine software updates may spawn child installer processes
  • ASUS diagnostic tools launched from within the update framework
  • Administrator-initiated update tasks that invoke cmd.exe or powershell.exe for scripted installs

Sigma rule & cross-platform mapping

The detection logic for ASUS Live Update Embedded Malicious Code (CVE-2025-59374) (CVE-2025-59374) above is provided in a vendor-neutral form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the following logsource:

logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows

Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:

Last updated: 2026-06-19 Research depth: standard
References (2)

Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Simulate ASUS Live Update Spawning CMD Child Process

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1 showing LiveUpdate.exe as parent of cmd.exe; DeviceProcessEvents in MDE showing the parent-child relationship with command-line arguments

  2. Test 2Simulate ASUS Live Update Network Beacon

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 3 or DeviceNetworkEvents showing LiveUpdate.exe initiating outbound HTTP connection to external IP; DNS query logs for associated domain lookups

  3. Test 3Simulate ASUS Live Update Dropping Payload to Temp

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11 (FileCreate) showing executable written to TEMP directory; DeviceFileEvents in MDE capturing the file drop with SHA256 hash

Unlock Pro Content

Get the full detection package for CVE-2025-59374 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.

Response PlaybookInvestigation GuideHunting QueriesAtomic Red Team TestsTuning Guidance

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