CVE-2025-41244 - VMware Aria Operations & VMware Tools Privilege Escalation via Unsafe Actions
Detects exploitation of CVE-2025-41244, a privilege escalation vulnerability in Broadcom VMware Aria Operations and VMware Tools caused by privileges defined with unsafe actions (CWE-267). This KEV-listed vulnerability allows attackers with lower-privileged access to escalate privileges by abusing overly permissive or unsafe role/action definitions within VMware Aria Operations or VMware Tools components. Indicators include anomalous administrative API calls, unexpected privilege changes in VMware management interfaces, and suspicious process activity from VMware Tools guest utilities.
Vulnerability Intelligence
KEV — Known ExploitedAffected Software
- Vendor
- Broadcom
- Product
- VMware Aria Operations and VMware Tools
Weakness (CWE)
Timeline
- Disclosed
- October 30, 2025
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
What is CVE-2025-41244 CVE-2025-41244 - VMware Aria Operations & VMware Tools Privilege Escalation via Unsafe Actions?
CVE-2025-41244 - VMware Aria Operations & VMware Tools Privilege Escalation via Unsafe Actions (CVE-2025-41244) maps to the Privilege Escalation and Persistence tactics — the adversary is trying to gain higher-level permissions in MITRE ATT&CK.
This page provides production-ready detection logic for CVE-2025-41244 - VMware Aria Operations & VMware Tools Privilege Escalation via Unsafe Actions, covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: AzureActivity, SecurityEvent, DeviceProcessEvents. The queries below are rated high severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Privilege Escalation Persistence
let timeWindow = 1h;
union
(
AzureActivity
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeWindow)
| where OperationNameValue has_any ("VMware", "Aria", "vROps")
| where ActivityStatusValue == "Success"
| where Caller !in~ ("known-service-accounts")
| extend ParsedProps = parse_json(Properties)
| where tostring(ParsedProps.requestbody) has_any ("roleAssignment", "privilege", "permission", "adminRole")
| project TimeGenerated, Caller, OperationNameValue, ResourceGroup, Resource, ActivityStatusValue, Properties
),
(
SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeWindow)
| where EventID in (4672, 4673, 4674, 4728, 4732, 4756)
| where Process has_any ("vmtoolsd.exe", "vmwaretray.exe", "vmwareuser.exe", "vmware-vmx", "vrops", "aria")
| project TimeGenerated, Account, Process, EventID, Computer, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName
),
(
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeWindow)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("vmtoolsd.exe", "vmwareuser.exe", "vmwaretray.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("SeDebugPrivilege", "SeTcbPrivilege", "SeImpersonatePrivilege", "net localgroup", "whoami /priv", "runas")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
)
| order by TimeGenerated desc Detects suspicious privilege-related activity associated with VMware Aria Operations and VMware Tools processes, including anomalous administrative role assignments and privilege escalation patterns in security events and device process telemetry.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives
- Legitimate VMware administrators performing authorized role assignments or configuration changes in Aria Operations
- VMware Tools updates or patches that trigger process privilege events during installation
- Automated service accounts performing scheduled VMware management tasks
- Security scanning tools enumerating VMware privileges during authorized assessments
Sigma rule & cross-platform mapping
The detection logic for CVE-2025-41244 - VMware Aria Operations & VMware Tools Privilege Escalation via Unsafe Actions (CVE-2025-41244) above is provided in a vendor-neutral
form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the
following logsource:
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:
Platform-specific guides for CVE-2025-41244
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1VMware Tools Privilege Enumeration via vmtoolsd
Expected signal: DeviceProcessEvents showing schtasks.exe creating a task, followed by whoami.exe execution with SYSTEM context; Security Event 4672 (Special Logon for SYSTEM) and 4698 (Scheduled Task Created)
- Test 2Aria Operations Role Assignment via Unauthenticated or Low-Privilege API Call
Expected signal: VMware Aria Operations audit log entries recording the role assignment API call with the low-privilege token identity; HTTP 200 response on a vulnerable instance vs 403 on a patched instance
- Test 3VMware Tools Guest-to-Host Privilege Escalation Simulation
Expected signal: Linux auditd logs showing vmware-toolsd process activity and /dev/vmci access; VMware Tools log at /var/log/vmware-vmsvc-root.log recording guest operation invocations
Response Playbook
Triage
- Identify the affected host(s) running VMware Aria Operations or VMware Tools by correlating process telemetry with the detected CVE-2025-41244 indicators — confirm the product version against Broadcom's advisory at https://support.broadcom.com/web/ecx/support-content-notification/-/external/content/SecurityAdvisories/0/36149
- Determine whether the suspicious privilege activity originates from a legitimate VMware administrator account or an unexpected user by reviewing authentication logs, AD group memberships, and Aria Operations role audit trails
- Check if the affected VMware Tools or Aria Operations instance has been patched — query the VM's installed software inventory and compare against the fixed versions in Broadcom's security advisory
- Assess lateral movement risk: determine whether the escalated account has been used to access other VMware vCenter, ESXi, or Aria components after the privilege change
Containment
- If exploitation is confirmed, immediately isolate the affected guest VM or Aria Operations management node from the network to prevent lateral movement while preserving forensic state — use VMware network micro-segmentation or NSX firewall rules to quarantine without powering off
- Revoke or suspend the compromised account's roles and permissions within VMware Aria Operations, reset credentials, and audit all role assignments made by or granted to the account since the earliest detected suspicious event
Evidence Collection
- Export VMware Aria Operations audit logs covering the 48-hour window before and after the first detected event, capturing all role assignments, API calls, and configuration changes — preserve raw log files with cryptographic hashes for chain-of-custody
- Collect VMware Tools process telemetry from the affected guest OS including process creation logs, parent-child relationships, privilege tokens, and network connections initiated by vmtoolsd.exe or related processes
Escalation Criteria
- ! Escalate to incident response if the compromised account has vCenter administrator rights or ESXi host access, as full hypervisor compromise may be achievable from the escalated privilege level
- ! Escalate immediately if evidence of persistence mechanisms (new scheduled tasks, registry run keys, backdoor accounts) is found on the affected host following the privilege escalation event
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
VMware Aria Operations audit log entries showing unexpected role assignments or permission grants with timestamps correlating to the incident window - >
Windows Security Event Log entries 4672 (Special Logon) and 4673 (Privileged Service Called) generated by vmtoolsd.exe or vmwareuser.exe processes - >
VMware Tools log files located at C:\ProgramData\VMware\VMware Tools\vmware-vmsvc-root.log (Windows) or /var/log/vmware-vmsvc-root.log (Linux) containing API call history - >
Process memory dumps of vmtoolsd.exe capturing in-memory privilege tokens and injected code if process injection was used as part of exploitation
Tuning Guidance
Begin by baselining normal VMware Tools process activity and expected privilege event counts per host in your environment over a 14-day window. Exclude known VMware service accounts (vmware-system-* prefixed accounts, vCenter service accounts) and hosts undergoing scheduled patching. Adjust the event_count thresholds in hunting queries based on your VMware deployment scale. If VMware Aria Operations generates high volumes of legitimate role change events, filter by specific role types (admin, superuser) rather than all role modifications. For CrowdStrike environments, create allow-list entries for known-good VMware Tools command-line signatures to reduce false positives while retaining detections for novel privilege escalation command patterns.
Hunting Queries
Threat hunt for recurring privileged operation patterns involving VMware Tools processes over the past 7 days — elevated counts may indicate persistent exploitation or repeated abuse of CVE-2025-41244
SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(7d)
| where EventID in (4672, 4673, 4674)
| where Process has_any ("vmtoolsd", "vmwareuser", "vmwaretray")
| summarize event_count = count(), first_seen = min(TimeGenerated), last_seen = max(TimeGenerated) by Account, Process, Computer
| where event_count > 5
| order by event_count desc index=windows sourcetype=WinEventLog:Security EventCode IN (4672, 4673, 4674)
| where like(lower(ProcessName), "%vmtoolsd%") OR like(lower(ProcessName), "%vmwareuser%")
| stats count as priv_events, earliest(_time) as first_seen, latest(_time) as last_seen by AccountName, ProcessName, ComputerName
| where priv_events > 5
| sort - priv_events Atomic Red Team Tests
Simulates an attacker who has compromised a VMware guest and uses vmtoolsd.exe parent process context to enumerate current process privileges, mimicking the reconnaissance phase prior to CVE-2025-41244 exploitation
Command
# Run as low-privileged user in lab VM with VMware Tools installed
# Spawn a child process from vmtoolsd context (simulated via scheduled task)
SCHTASKS /Create /TN "VMwarePrivTest" /TR "whoami /priv" /SC ONCE /ST 00:00 /RU SYSTEM /F
SCHTASKS /Run /TN "VMwarePrivTest"
# Check output in scheduled task history
Get-WinEvent -LogName Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational | Where-Object {$_.Message -like '*VMwarePrivTest*'} | Select-Object -First 5 Cleanup
SCHTASKS /Delete /TN "VMwarePrivTest" /F Expected Telemetry
DeviceProcessEvents showing schtasks.exe creating a task, followed by whoami.exe execution with SYSTEM context; Security Event 4672 (Special Logon for SYSTEM) and 4698 (Scheduled Task Created)
Expected Detection
CrowdStrike CQL and KQL queries should trigger on the privilege enumeration command combined with VMware-adjacent process context; scheduled task creation by non-admin user should generate additional alerts
Simulates exploiting unsafe role/action definitions in VMware Aria Operations REST API to assign an elevated role to a controlled user account, representing the core CWE-267 exploitation pattern of CVE-2025-41244
Command
# Lab only — requires access to a vulnerable Aria Operations instance
# Replace ARIA_HOST, LOW_PRIV_TOKEN, and TARGET_USER with lab values
ARIA_HOST="aria-ops.lab.local"
LOW_PRIV_TOKEN="<low-privilege-bearer-token>"
TARGET_USER="lab-test-user"
# Attempt to assign admin role using low-privilege token (should fail on patched systems)
curl -sk -X POST "https://${ARIA_HOST}/suite-api/api/auth/roles/assign" \
-H "Authorization: OpsToken ${LOW_PRIV_TOKEN}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"userId": "'${TARGET_USER}'", "roleId": "AdministratorRole"}'
# Check current roles for the target user
curl -sk -X GET "https://${ARIA_HOST}/suite-api/api/auth/users/${TARGET_USER}/roles" \
-H "Authorization: OpsToken ${LOW_PRIV_TOKEN}" Cleanup
# Remove the role assignment if it succeeded
curl -sk -X DELETE "https://${ARIA_HOST}/suite-api/api/auth/roles/assign" \
-H "Authorization: OpsToken <admin-token>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"userId": "lab-test-user", "roleId": "AdministratorRole"}' Expected Telemetry
VMware Aria Operations audit log entries recording the role assignment API call with the low-privilege token identity; HTTP 200 response on a vulnerable instance vs 403 on a patched instance
Expected Detection
Sumo Logic and Splunk queries should surface the API call to the role assignment endpoint from a non-admin identity; QRadar AQL should flag the roleAssignment keyword in the payload
Simulates an attacker using VMware Tools' vix/VMCI channel from a guest VM to execute privileged commands on the host side, representing the guest-to-host privilege escalation vector that may be enabled by CVE-2025-41244's unsafe action definitions
Command
# Lab only — run from inside a Linux VMware guest with VMware Tools installed
# Check VMware Tools version and service status
vmware-toolsd --version 2>/dev/null || echo "VMware Tools not found"
systemctl status vmware-tools 2>/dev/null || service vmtools status 2>/dev/null
# Enumerate VMware guest info channels (privilege boundary check)
ls -la /dev/vmci* 2>/dev/null
cat /proc/modules | grep vmw
# Attempt to use vmware-rpctool to invoke guest ops (lab simulation of unsafe action)
if command -v vmware-rpctool &>/dev/null; then
vmware-rpctool 'info-get guestinfo.ovfenv' 2>&1
vmware-rpctool 'tools.capability.guest_temp_disable_tools_on_host 1' 2>&1 || echo "Blocked (expected on patched)"
fi Cleanup
# No persistent changes; VMware Tools state returns to normal after command execution Expected Telemetry
Linux auditd logs showing vmware-toolsd process activity and /dev/vmci access; VMware Tools log at /var/log/vmware-vmsvc-root.log recording guest operation invocations
Expected Detection
Chronicle YARA-L rule should trigger on VMware process events followed by privilege-related activity; Elastic EQL sequence should correlate vmware-vmx process with subsequent IAM events