Detect Gladinet CentreStack and Triofox Hard-Coded Cryptographic Key Exploitation in CrowdStrike LogScale
Detects exploitation of CVE-2025-14611, a hard-coded cryptographic key vulnerability (CWE-798) in Gladinet CentreStack and Triofox. Attackers who obtain the static machineKey or cryptographic seed can forge ASP.NET ViewState tokens or authentication artifacts, enabling remote code execution via deserialization attacks without valid credentials. This vulnerability is actively exploited and listed on CISA KEV.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Initial Access Execution Persistence
LogScale Detection Query
#event_simpleName IN (NetworkConnectIP4, ProcessRollup2, SyntheticProcessRollup2)
| $falcon.event_type = ProcessRollup2
| ImageFileName = /\\(cmd|powershell|wscript|cscript|mshta)\.exe$/i
| ParentImageFileName = /\\w3wp\.exe$/i
| CommandLine != null
// Correlate with network events on same host
| join (
#event_simpleName = NetworkConnectIP4
| RemotePort IN (80, 443, 8080, 8443)
| LocalAddressIP4 != null
) key=aid
| eval risk_indicator = if(CommandLine matches /.*(-enc|-encoded|iex|invoke-expression|downloadstring|webclient).*/i, "CRITICAL", "HIGH")
| stats count() as event_count, values(ImageFileName) as spawned_processes, values(CommandLine) as command_lines, values(RemoteAddressIP4) as remote_ips, max(risk_indicator) as risk by ComputerName, ParentImageFileName
| where event_count >= 1
| sort -risk, -event_countCrowdStrike Falcon query detecting suspicious child processes spawned from IIS worker processes (w3wp.exe) correlated with network connections, indicating potential exploitation of CVE-2025-14611 hard-coded key deserialization in Gladinet CentreStack or Triofox.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Legitimate IIS-hosted applications that spawn PowerShell for authorized automation tasks on CentreStack hosts
- Application pool identity running administrative scripts during scheduled maintenance windows
- Penetration testing activities generating cmd.exe or PowerShell from IIS in authorized engagements
- Third-party IIS modules that legitimately spawn child processes on the same host
Other platforms for CVE-2025-14611
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Simulate Forged ASP.NET ViewState Payload Submission to CentreStack Endpoint
Expected signal: IIS access log entry showing POST to /portal/default.aspx with large cs-uri-query value; HTTP response code 500 if payload is malformed, 200 if bypassed; network events capturing the inbound connection
- Test 2IIS Worker Process Child Shell Spawn Simulation (Lab)
Expected signal: Windows Security Event ID 4688 for cmd.exe process creation; EDR process telemetry showing PowerShell spawning cmd.exe; file creation event for exploit_sim_output.txt in C:\Temp
- Test 3CentreStack web.config Hard-Coded MachineKey Inspection
Expected signal: File read event on web.config via Sysmon Event ID 11/4663; PowerShell script block logging capturing the content search pattern; output file creation at C:\Temp\machinekey_audit.txt
- Test 4Forged Authentication Token Submission via Hardcoded Key (Lab Only)
Expected signal: IIS access log showing GET request with .ASPXAUTH cookie header; Windows authentication event logs (Event ID 4624/4625) recording the authentication attempt; network events capturing the connection from the test host
Unlock Pro Content
Get the full detection package for CVE-2025-14611 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.